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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse different aspects of the distribution of 
agricultural incomes in Scotland. More specifically, the thesis will first investigate the 
impact of agricultural income support on inequality through the analysis of its 
redistributive effect. Decomposition of the redistributive effect allows to determine if 
agricultural support has been progressive or regressive in absolute terms and whether 
discrimination between farms with equal pre-support incomes exists. Such assessment 
is performed both for actual data with the historic model of the Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) in place, as well as for counter-factual data generated by two hypothetical 
regional model distributions of the SFP; the latter is particularly informative in the 
context of the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform that will require all 
Member States to adopt area-based entitlements. In addition, the thesis will study the 
evolution of agricultural income distribution through the analysis of income mobility. 
The first focus of this dynamic analysis is to investigate the transition process 
underlying the evolution of agricultural income inequality over time. This is achieved 
by decomposing changes in inequality over time into the part which measures if income 
growth was progressive or regressive (vertical mobility) and the part which measures 
the resulting reshuffling of individuals within the income order (reranking mobility). 
The characterisation of the expected income growth process will indirectly examine the 
validity of Gibrat’s law in Scottish agriculture. Furthermore, the determinants of vertical 
mobility will be investigated in order to analyse the impact of structural change and 
transitory shocks. The second focus of the dynamic analysis is to investigate whether 
the inequality in Scottish agricultural incomes is a transitory or structural problem, and 
	   	  IX	  
to what extent structural inequality is caused by differences in the economic size of 
farms.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
The improvement of the income position of the agricultural community is an important, 
although poorly defined, goal of agricultural support (OECD, 2003). This objective was 
historically met by providing assistance through the support of farm output prices, 
however successive reforms aimed to disconnect the payments from production levels. 
Thus market support measures were largely reduced and replaced with payments 
coupled to hectares planted and breeding livestock numbers. Eventually, the decoupled 
direct payments were introduced in 2005 in the form of the Single Farm Payment (SFP), 
which is paid out on a per hectare basis and independently from current production 
levels. The Single Payment Scheme (SPS) was introduced in Scotland using the historic 
model, which means that entitlement values received by individual farmers allow them 
to enjoy support levels comparable to the coupled support the SFP replaced. The 
historic model of the SFP implementation has been widely criticized as unjust and 
increasingly hard to justify, and the post-2014 CAP reform is intended to replace the 
heterogeneous entitlement values with flat regional rates, which implies changes in the 
support distribution in Scotland. 
 
As a result of the switch to decoupled direct payments, the distribution of support 
became more transparent and open to manipulation, allowing the policy to be targeted 
in order to meet different policy objectives. The current distribution of support reflects 
many different goals, including environmental sustainability and rural development. 
However, one of the founding objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
was “to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
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increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture” (Treaty of Rome, 
1957). As such, farm income support remains one of the key objectives of the CAP, 
with the European Commission (1991, 2002) expressing concerns about the inequitable 
distribution of agricultural income support. Furthermore equity and targeting have been 
identified by the OECD (1998) as general operational criteria for agricultural policy 
evaluation.  
 
In this context, the broad aim of this thesis is to analyse different aspects of the 
distribution of agricultural incomes in Scotland. More specifically, the thesis will 
investigate the impact of agricultural income support on inequality through the analysis 
of its redistributive effect and the evolution of agricultural income distribution through 
the analysis of income mobility.  
 
The analysis of inequality closely links with the analysis of mobility, because as 
Yitzhaki and Wodon (2003, p. 2) note “formally, if we consider a bivariate distribution 
representing an initial and a final distributions, an inequality index is a summary 
statistics defined over each marginal distribution, i.e. the initial and the final 
distributions. By contrast, a mobility index describes the transition process between 
these two distributions.“ As such, looking at both aspects will provide a more 
comprehensive characterisation of the agricultural income situation in Scotland.   
 
In terms of more specific objectives, the analysis of the redistributive effect of 
agricultural support primarily aims to show whether the provision of support in 
Scotland serves to increase or decrease absolute income inequality. Furthermore, by 
decomposing the redistributive effect, the analysis will investigate if the support has 
	   	  3	  
been favouring poorer or richer farms in absolute terms, and to what extent 
discrimination between farms with equal pre-support incomes takes place – both within 
a given farm type and between farm types. The methodology is based on Allanson 
(2008), who measured the redistributive effect in Scotland in years 2000/2001 - 
2004/2005. While the majority of studies on the redistributive performance of 
agricultural support focus on its vertical stance (Keeney, 2000; Schmid et al., 2006, 
Von Witzke and Noleppa, 2007), Allanson’s decomposition also addresses the 
previously neglected issue of horizontal inequalities in support provision.  
 
The contribution of this thesis in terms of the redistributive effect analysis is threefold. 
Firstly, the measurement of pre-support incomes will be done using an improved 
approach to calculate the net value of transfers. Allanson (2008, Allanson and Rocchi, 
2008) simply made assumptions about the passthrough of direct payments. Borrowing 
from the OECD (2003), he assumed that a return from a unit increase in direct payments 
to individual inputs is equal to the farm-owned share of those inputs. In the case of SFP, 
this assumption would imply zero passthrough for tenanted farmers. Since the SFP 
constitutes a large share of the agricultural support in the study period, it was important 
to replace this assumption with an empirical estimate to ensure the validity of the 
findings. For that purpose, the capitalisation of the SFP into rental rates of agricultural 
land will be estimated. Relatively little research exists on the SFP capitalisation, with 
estimates of capitalisation degree varying between 6% (Ciaian et al., 2011) and 41% 
(Kilian et al., 2008), and there are no estimates for Scotland specifically.  
 
Secondly, the thesis will analyse the redistributive effect of support in Scotland after the 
SFP was introduced in 2005. This provides an evaluation of how the redistributive per - 
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formance of support was affected by the switch to the SFP.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis will investigate how support would have affected inequality if a 
counter-factual regional, flat rate system of the SFP had been introduced instead of the 
historic model. This simulation is of policy interest in the context of the upcoming 
obligatory switch from historic to regional model of the SFP. Two possible scenarios 
will be investigated: a flat rate for all entitlements across the whole of Scotland, and two 
separate rates of entitlements for eligible Less Favoured Areas (LFA) and non-LFA 
land (which is in line with the proposal of the Pack inquiry into future support in 
Scotland (Pack, 2010b)). 
 
To complement the static analysis of income inequality, the thesis will also perform a 
dynamic analysis through the study of farm income mobility. This area of study is 
largely unexplored; the only study of Scottish farm incomes dynamics is performed by 
Phimister et al. (2004) and covers the years from 1998/1989 to 1999/2000. The concept 
of income mobility has many different dimensions and the large literature on the topic 
does not provide a unified discourse. Jantti and Jenkins (2013) helped to clarify possible 
confusion by classifying the existing approaches into four different concepts of 
mobility. This thesis will use data for years 1995/1996 to 2009/2010 to explore all four 
of the concepts of mobility identified by Jantti and Jenkins, and as such it provides a 
first comprehensive analysis of the issue.  
 
The first main focus of the dynamic analysis will be to investigate the transition process 
underlying the evolution of agricultural income inequality over time. Following the 
approach of Jenkins and van Kerm (2006), changes in inequality will be decomposed 
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into a part that measures the impact of expected income growth, that is vertical 
mobility, and a part that measures the reshuffling of individuals within the income 
order, that is reranking mobility. This will show whether expected income growth in the 
Scottish agriculture is progressive, regressive or neutral in relative terms, and thereby 
indirectly examine the validity of Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect for farm income 
growth.  
 
Moreover, the vertical mobility index will be further decomposed in the manner of 
Allanson and Petrie (2013) through the use of a regression-based procedure in order to 
investigate how inequalities in income determinants affect the income growth. For the 
purpose of this decomposition, an Error Correction Model (ECM) of changes in 
agricultural income is estimated, in which income is modelled as a dynamic function of 
the economic size of farms. This specification allows investigating the roles of 
structural change and transitory shocks in inequality changes over time.  The vertical 
mobility decomposition of Allanson and Petrie’s (2013) is employed for the first time 
outside of its original application to the measurement of changes in income-related 
health inequality. The thesis extends their methodology by decomposing multiyear, as 
well as single year, changes in inequality.  
 
The second main focus of the dynamic analysis will be to investigate whether the 
inequality in Scottish agricultural incomes is a transitory or structural phenomenon. The 
first method used to investigate this issue is the traditional measure of structural rigidity 
due to Shorrocks’ (1978a), which compares the inequality of longer-term income 
averages to the weighted average of actual inequality levels observed in each year. This 
is complemented by an analysis based on a behavioural concept of equilibrium income 
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based on the results from the ECM. Using estimates of the equilibrium income relation, 
the extent of chronic inequality in agricultural incomes will be measured, and the role of 
inequalities in the distribution of the economic size of enterprises in the determination 
of structural farm income inequality will be investigated.  
 
 
1.1 The data 
 
 
The thesis is based on micro-level weighted panel data from Farm Accounts Survey 
(FAS). The survey is carried out on an annual basis by the Scottish Agricultural College 
(SAC) for the Scottish Government in order to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
financial stance of Scottish farms. It covers most of the main types of full-time farms in 
Scotland, excluding specialist pig, horticulture and specialist poultry producers. It is 
carried out using farmers’ financial years instead of calendar years, which will vary 
depending on the farmer, but the results are centered on the same production periods. 
As such, the range of years used covers 1996 to 2010, but this will correspond to 
1995/1996 - 2009/2010 production years, which end in March. Thus for example data 
for 2006 will de facto be centered on 2005 production year (from 1st of April 2005 to 
31st of March 2006).  
 
The survey collects detailed information on up to 500 farms that are representative of all 
the main types of farms in Scotland. A wide range of information is collected, including 
production, sales, revenue, quotas, crop areas, subsidies and costs. The data is validated 
against assurance checks to provide reliable, quality information. In order to yield 
summary statistics for the whole population, the data is weighted by size and type, as 
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well as tenure for balance-sheet tables, based on the information from the annual June 
Census on the population of Scottish farms. 
The survey is meant to be representative at national level, however part-time farmers as 
well as those who have substantial involvement in non-farm or other agricultural 
activities are not included. For this reason the results can play down the incidence of 
pluriactivity of farms and the significance of non-farm sources of income (Allanson and 
Rocchi, 2008). 
Table 1.1 Number of farms by number of years in the FAS sample. 
 
An important characteristic of FAS is that once a farm is recruited into the database, it 
can stay in the sample for unlimited amount of time, provided it remains a full-time 
commercial enterprise. This implies that linking data across many consecutive years 
allows observing changes in variables for the same farms. There is no formal account of 
attrition, but farms must remain in the sample for at least 2 consecutive years to be 
included in the Scottish Government’s analysis. Together with the difficulty of 
recruiting new farms, this suggests that SAC will strive to minimise the attrition 
Number of
years in sample Number of farms
1 83
2 121
3 82
4 53
5 64
6 53
7 79
8 43
9 15
10 30
11 34
12 42
13 48
14 44
15 151
Total 942
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(Phimister et al., 2004). Table 1.1 shows the number of farms by the number of years 
present in the sample, which gives some support for the low attrition. In particular, 151 
farms have been consistently present in the dataset for period 1996 – 2010.  
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the origins and developments of the CAP as a farm 
income support measure. It discusses what farm income problem is, how it was initially 
addressed by the CAP and how successive reforms throughout the history of the policy 
have altered its shape, introducing direct payments which have greater transparency and 
targeting potential. The purpose behind this chapter is to facilitate the understanding of 
the policy’s current shape and set the ground for the subsequent analysis.  
 
Chapter 3 estimates the degree of capitalisation of the SFP into agricultural rental rates. 
The SFP is linked to land through the requirement of eligible hectares needed to activate 
the entitlements; this has caused concerns among policy makers that landlords will be 
able to capture a substantial share of the support through higher agricultural rents. By 
estimating a rent equation, this chapter quantifies how much of the payment goes to the 
farmer, and how much is captured by the landlord in the form of higher rental rates for 
agricultural land. This result provides a numerical estimate of the SFP passthrough 
needed to calculate the net value of transfers in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 measures and decomposes the redistributive effect of support following 
Allanson’s (2008) approach. In addition to assessing the redistributive effect of actual 
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policy in years 2005/2006 – 2009/2010 with the historic model in place, the chapter 
looks at the performance of a two counter-factual regional model distributions of 
support which have been considered as possible future payment models: flat rate of 
support across the whole Scotland, or two rates of entitlements, one for LFA land and 
one for non-LFA land.  
 
Chapter 5 estimates a dynamic model of agricultural income determinants, where 
agricultural income is a function of the economic size of farms. The model is specified 
as an Error Correction Model (ECM), which provides a clear distinction between the 
short-run dynamics and the implied long-run income relationship. The results from the 
model will be used in the subsequent chapter to provide the basis for a regression-based 
decomposition of vertical mobility and an analysis of equilibrium inequality.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the dynamics of agricultural income inequality in Scotland in the 
period 1995/1996 – 2009/2010. The role of transitory shocks in levels of inequality is 
investigated using the Shorrocks (1978a) rigidity index which captures the concept of 
mobility as equalizer of longer-term incomes. Annual and multiyear changes in 
inequality are also decomposed into vertical and reranking mobility indices, following 
the approach of Jenkins and van Kerm (2006). These two measures correspond to 
concepts of mobility as individual income growth and positional movement, 
respectively. The measurement of vertical mobility indirectly provides a test of Gibrat’s 
law of proportionate effect for farm income growth, and the robustness of this result 
will be investigated based on Jenkins and van Kerm’s (2011) data manipulation 
techniques. Vertical mobility will be further decomposed in the manner of Allanson and 
Petrie (2013) using the ECM results from chapter 5; this will characterize the influence 
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of inequalities in income determinants on the redistributive effect of expected income 
growth. Lastly, equilibrium, or chronic inequality, will be measured and decomposed 
using the results of long-run income relationship from the ECM in chapter 5; the 
difference between actual and equilibrium inequality in this context corresponds to the 
concept of mobility as income risk and may be compared to Shorrocks rigidity measure 
in that it quantifies the role of transitory shocks in inequality.  
 
Chapter 7 will present the conclusions from the whole thesis. The main findings will be 
summarized in a condensed way and policy implications from these findings will be 
discussed, as well as the thesis’ limitations and suggestions for further work.  
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2 The CAP and farm income support 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“Farm income has lagged urban incomes for many decades, and the concerns over 
economically disadvantaged farmers has been behind the foundations of much of 
the agricultural support, in the context that equity is good and disparity is bad. 
This is pure income transfer argument which is becoming less and less tenable as 
the size of transfers increases and their distribution, linked to production, falls 
largely on big enterprises.” 
 
(Moore, 1987, p. 5) 
 
The above quote captures well the essence of farm income policy in Europe; what is 
underlying the policy and why it is a politically difficult issue. This chapter will look in 
more depth at the causes of and the European policy solutions for the farm income 
problem. In order to better understand the current shape of agricultural policy and the 
political situation surrounding it in Scotland and the EU, it is very important to look at 
the history of support for farmers in Europe, the evolution of CAP measures which 
address the farm income problem, and the political context and future policy changes.  
 
The chapter starts with a description of historical perceptions of the farm income 
problem and the need for support in section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 talks about the origins 
and early development of the CAP, followed by a discussion of how the support 
evolved from market price measures to direct payments and how this gave it the 
opportunity of being targeted in section 2.2.3. Section 2.2.4 discusses the creation and 
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structure of the SPS (Single Payment Scheme). In section 2.2.5 the latest reform of the 
CAP for the financial perspective of 2014-2020 is outlined, and the chapter is closed 
with conclusions section. 
 
2.2 The policy developments 
 
2.2.1 Historical perception of farm income problem and need for support 
 
 
Support for farmers in Europe has a long-lived history, which dates back to the 19th 
century. Until then the agricultural sector had been doing well – growing population 
pushed agricultural prices up, which encouraged farmers to invest in new techniques 
and crops. The resulting increase in supply mitigated the rise in prices, creating better 
living conditions for the whole society. Around 1800 the Industrial Revolution started 
in Britain; its arrival was made possible by the welfare created by a flourishing 
agricultural sector.  At that time, agricultural protection was not necessary. Quite on the 
contrary, food imports were welcomed with open arms as a measure to reduce the 
pressure of population growth on agricultural prices. Consequently, import tariffs were 
either reduced or banned by many European countries (Koning, 2006).  
 
That situation changed in the late 19th century, when on one hand, developments in 
transport made imports cheaper and more competitive, and on the other hand, the new 
technological solutions resulted in cheaper fertilizers that increased domestic 
production. The situation of farmers was further deteriorated by a reduction in demand 
for their products. The invention of electricity, artificial fibers and internal combustion 
engines raised the demand for fossil fuels as an alternative energy source and undercut 
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the demand for agricultural products (Koning, 2006). Overall, bigger supply was faced 
with a smaller demand, which put agricultural markets under pressure. Resulting 
overproduction and decrease in prices affected farmers’ income position, leading to 
stagnation in some rural areas. These developments made farmers seek support from the 
state; their calls were often backed up by manufacturers, who worried that stagnation in 
agriculture would adversely affect the industry sector (Koning, 2006).  
 
These events marked the beginning of the farming lobby at the national level in Europe. 
The initial goal of the lobby in various countries was to obtain protection from the 
government through favourable policies supporting agricultural production and farming 
incomes. Faced with the new situation, Western European countries started introducing 
import tariffs. The beginnings of agricultural protection in Europe were purely national. 
However, these measures were addressed at a global increase in production and they 
worked fine only as long as the country in question was a net importer.  By raising 
import tariffs, the country protected its farmers, and if this added to global 
overproduction and further decreased world prices, the tariffs could be raised even 
higher (Koning, 2006). The situation was not that simple if the country produced more 
than it consumed. In such a case, in order to export the surpluses, a subsidy to the 
farmers was necessary to bridge the gap between domestic and world prices; this 
process is called dumping and it is a very costly policy, which becomes more expensive 
the more surplus production increases.   
 
The 1920s and 30s saw a large fall in prices and curbed domestic demand, caused by the 
Great Depression. The number of countries with surpluses increased, and a need for 
supranational policy emerged. Individual countries introduced supply management 
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measures, and these were soon linked to international trade agreements. First 
agreements for commodities like wheat, sugar, tea and rubber were established 
(Milward, 1994). This led to the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the precursor of World Trade Organisation, in 1949.  
 
The situation of European agriculture changed drastically with the start of World War 
II, a very influential event in the shaping of current agricultural policy. Shortages of 
inputs of production (in particular labour), the disruption of supplies, loss of land due to 
military activities, and general damages caused by military campaigns induced a 
reduction in supply and caused food shortages (Milward, 1994). The experience of the 
war period taught everyone a vital lesson about how important food security was and 
that no country should be overly dependant on food imports. Following that, the main 
focus of agricultural policy became increasing food production in order to gain self-
sufficiency. The main mechanism used to achieve this goal was through improving 
income position of agricultural community and encouraging larger food production. As 
Hofreither noted, “one of the key internal incentives to achieve self-sufficiency was 
price guarantees for producers at levels above the international averages” (Hofreither, 
2007, p. 2). This policy soon achieved its goal, and within a decade many Western 
European countries found themselves with agricultural surpluses in some products, like 
dairy, beef and wheat (Ibid., 2007).  
 
In spite of rising commodity prices, farming income still increased at a slower rate than 
in other sectors. It is widely recognized by economic theory and supported by empirical 
evidence that technological progress in the agricultural sector of a growing economy 
causes a fall in agricultural prices, which leads to a “secular decline in agricultural 
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incomes” (Petrick, 2008, p. 247). Engel’s law (Engel, 1857) states that price and income 
elasticities of demand for food are low. Therefore an increase in the wealth of 
population or reduction in prices of food will have limited effect on food consumption 
levels. Contrary to this, the richer the nation is, the higher the level of expenditure on 
industrial products. Consequently, economic growth makes incomes in the industrial 
sector grow faster than those in agriculture. Yet another reason behind the stagnating 
agricultural incomes is the fact that a large part of the benefit from raising agricultural 
prices gets dissipated to upstream and downstream sectors (Hofreither et al., 1996). In 
other words, large part of the increase in agricultural prices is captured by input owners 
and producers of processed food products. For all these reasons, the income position of 
the farming community was still worse than in other sectors.   
 
The farming lobby, whose political power was fuelled by the focus on food security 
after World War II, kept pressuring the governments for income support (Milward, 
1994). An important notion that started gaining significance in political discussion at 
the time was that of justice for farmers. Since farmers were not benefiting much from 
rising commodity prices or economic growth, they started to feel injustice towards their 
sector, which, in spite of losing importance in the share of employment and national 
production to the industrial one, still remained imperative in order to feed the constantly 
growing population. The paradigm of justice that started appearing in the political 
discourse meant that the farmers called for their fair share of income growth in Europe 
(Petrick, 2008). In particular, increasing costs of fuel and fertilizers made farmers 
demand compensation in the form of parity prices. This new concept would dominate 
the political scene for many years to come.  
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The above discussion brings up the notion of the farm income problem which has been 
behind the developments of agricultural policy. The income problem has three inter-
related aspects: poverty, inequality and stability. On the one hand, farmers suffer from 
low incomes which might trap them in poverty and make them feel disadvantaged in 
comparison with workers in other sectors, and on the other hand, due to the nature of 
agricultural production and markets, these incomes are very variable with fluctuations 
from year to year (Hill, 1999). In this context, addressing the farm income problem by 
policy-makers means increasing farm incomes to eliminate the poverty among farmers 
and put them on parity with other sectors, as well as to create safety mechanism which 
help them deal with income fluctuations between the years. 
 
The issue of farm income problem is connected with how to measure the farmers’ well-
being. Historically, the attention has been focused on current farming incomes. 
However, nowadays farming is most often one of the activities that rural households 
engage in, and therefore overall income of the household is a better indicator of its 
welfare than just the farming income. Furthermore, a meaningful comparison among 
farms, as well as between farm and non-farm households, calls for inclusion of a wealth 
measure (Hill, 2000). As Hill points out, wealth is important since it generates income 
in many ways, and what is more, it provides security and freedom to use resources, as 
well as generates economic and political power. It is often neglected, but wealth is a 
meaningful measure of the financial status of farms (Mishra et al., 2002); thus current 
incomes are only one dimension of the farm’s well-being, where wealth also plays an 
important role. That being said, the focus of policy-makers remains largely on current 
incomes analysis of the farmers’ well-being. In line with this, and the fact that current 
income statistics are more easily available, the majority of research on the redistributive 
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performance of support and farmers’ welfare concerns the current income distribution. 
It could be argued that such approach, aside from characterizing the well-being of 
farmers, allows to evaluate the profitability of farming.  
 
2.2.2 Origins of the CAP and the early developments 
 
Aside from justice for farmers, another important line of thought that emerged in the 
political discussion after World War II was the rising awareness of benefits from 
international cooperation (Petrick, 2008). With GATT already in place, the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was established in 1948, 
followed by the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Political leaders started 
to realize that further integration could bring more gains, and that it could be a potential 
solution to the agricultural policy problems. With this in mind, several meetings at 
international levels were organized to discuss cooperation. These steps would 
eventually lead to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. In order to pursue the idea of 
organization of common agricultural market in Europe, a Special Committee was 
established by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Hofreither, 2007). 
The committee decided to employ the concept of a supranational authority for 
agriculture drafted in the so-called Charpentier Plan put forward by France. The plan 
called for control of production levels in the participating states, fixing European prices 
relative to production costs, and the elimination of trade barriers between Member 
States.  
 
The initial series of meetings took place between 1952-1954. There was a disagreement 
between two conceptual sides; one, represented by France and the Netherlands, argued 
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for strong supranational authority, and the other, led by Britain, opposed 
supranationalism. These negotiations not only failed to reach any agreement, but also 
served to display the crucial differences between ideas of individual countries. 
However, what became apparent after this round of talks was the fact that several 
countries shared a common vision of European integration, including a common 
agricultural market (Zobbe, 2001). These were the founding members of the European 
Coal and Steel Community: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Luxembourg. At a conference in Mesina in 1955, the fundaments for the European 
Economic Community (EEC) were built. Agriculture was only one of many discussed 
topics, however the Spark Report published as an outcome of the conference made it 
clear that a common market excluding agriculture was unattainable (Fearne, 1997). As 
Mansholt (1963) points out, there were four main reasons why it was so important to 
include agricultural integration. First of all, since it was unrealistic to separate 
agricultural and industrial products, excluding agriculture was unachievable. Secondly, 
the agricultural sector was of great importance in the economies of the six countries and 
it constituted a large share of both imports and exports. In 1955, 26% of the working 
population in these six countries, or equivalent of 18 million people, were employed in 
agriculture (Harvey, 1982). Furthermore, the influence of the agricultural sector on the 
rest of the economy was significant because of the fluctuations in food prices, which 
also affect the price levels in other sectors. Finally, another important factor was the 
significance of structural adjustments in the agricultural sector for the rest of the 
economy. 
 
Reaching an agreement about including agriculture in the common market creation was 
a positive outcome, but all the stakeholders were aware of how difficult designing the 
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actual policy would be. However, the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was signed 
in 1957 and came into force on January 1st 1958. The Member States were keen to sign 
the treaty as soon as possible in order to ensure some stability and peace in Europe 
(Zobbe, 2001). Agriculture was mentioned in very broad terms, with more specific 
policy developments planned for the years to come.  
 
The following is from the Treaty of Rome concerning the objectives of agricultural 
policy: 
 
“Article 39 
 
1. The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: 
a) To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors or production, in particular labour; 
b) Thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture; 
c) To stabilize markets; 
d) To assure the availability of supplies; 
e) To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.” 
 
(The Treaty of Rome, 1957, p. 16) 
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These broadly defined objectives addressed the two burning issues of agricultural policy 
at the time. First of all, the painful memory of World War II was still fresh and food 
security was firmly on everyone’s agendas (Milward, 1994).  The policy was meant to 
prevent a situation in which European citizens suffered from low food consumption 
(Zobbe, 2001). Lack of self-sufficiency was considered a serious political weakness, 
especially in view of the scarcity of foreign currency (Hoffmeyer, 1958). Secondly, the 
issue of income security for farmers was crucial. The agricultural lobby, which was by 
then firmly established, made sure to pressure the governments for their fair share of the 
welfare cake. Points b) and c) relate to the previously mentioned farm income problem; 
the policy was meant to address the poverty and inequality aspects by increasing 
earnings from agriculture and the stability aspect by stabilizing agricultural markets.  
 
The real political discussion about the detailed shape of the policy took place after the 
treaty was already signed (Zobbe, 2001). In July 1958, delegates of the Member States 
met in Stresa, Italy, in order to discuss the detailed regulation of the CAP. As noted by 
Fearne (1997), the outcome of the conference can be summarized by five main points. 
Firstly, agriculture was to remain incorporated in the broad economic strategy of the 
common market. Secondly, the trade between Member States was to be shielded from 
external distortions. Thirdly, the structure of European agriculture was meant to be 
based on family farm units. Fourth, the market organization was to be based on price 
support, complemented by structural policy, in order to guarantee optimal employment 
of factors of production. Finally, the solution to farmers’ income problem would be 
achieved through this combination of price support mechanism and structural 
adjustment measures.  
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The choice of price support as the main instrument of the policy was discussed by 
Zobbe (2001), who claims that it was the only logical solution from the perspective of 
the contemporaneous decision-makers. Understanding why market price support was 
chosen is fundamental to understanding the existing shape of the CAP, as this choice 
determined its path of development up until the current shape. As a consequence of the 
rush in signing the treaty, the agricultural policy had to be implemented through already 
existing domestic policies, and therefore allowed for less flexibility and innovation. All 
the Member States used market price support in one form or another (Ibid., 2001). 
France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg used market organization and government 
intervention to obtain higher prices for main commodities. In the Netherlands, the 
government intervention took place only to maintain price stability. Italy did not have 
an explicit price measure, but implicit policy existed nonetheless, with state control of 
all agricultural trade. 
 
Another reason why price support was chosen was the budgetary consideration (Zobbe, 
2001). When support to farmers is provided through higher level of prices, the 
consumers bear the burden of the policy. European consumers were already used to 
paying high prices for food products. What is more, the Member States had just 
recovered from the post-war depression and were entering a prosperous period of 
economic growth. It was expected that growth of wages would more than offset the rise 
in agricultural prices (Fennell, 1973). On the contrary, any type of direct aid that was 
paid out from the common pool, like for example deficiency payments, burdens the 
budget. Considering the significant size of agriculture in the GDP and employment in 
the 1960s, the choice of deficiency payments would be immensely expensive.  This 
would most likely result in higher taxes, which could potentially slow down economic 
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growth. Additional argument supporting price support were low transaction costs of 
such a policy compared with any payments coming from the European Community’s 
budget. Given all these reasons, the policy makers decided to choose price support as 
the main instrument of the CAP.  
 
In the period 1955-60, the share of agriculture in both national income and overall 
employment began to fall (Holfeither, 2007). By 1960, the share of working population 
employed in agriculture dropped to 21%, or 16 million people (Harvey, 1982). 
Considering the rising labour productivity in agriculture, it was a great opportunity to 
allow for movement of farm labour to other sectors. The European Commission pushed 
the issue, which caused violent opposition from European farmers. In particular, the 
farmers resented the idea of reduction of farm labour and agricultural land, as well as 
the notion of building European agriculture around large farming units (Tracy, 1976). 
The operation of the agricultural lobby got in the way of reform, pushing for the status 
quo. This is a crucial point, since from then on European agriculture suffered from an 
essential structural difficulty. Too many people have been employed in satisfying only 
moderately rising demand for food, and the agricultural units have not been efficient 
enough.  
 
This ideological mistake seems obvious from today’s perspective, however at the time it 
was harder to predict the long-term consequences of giving into the pressure from the 
farmers. Furthermore, policy-making was still largely shaped by the painful memory of 
food shortages during World War II and efficiency was less of an issue. The initial 
shape of the policy was seen as a short-term fix and the policy makers were aware of its 
shortcoming. However, as it turned out, the future development of the policy failed to 
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escape the direction imposed by the initial short-term solutions (Hofreither, 2007). As 
Petrick points out: 
 
“the CAP is but one example of how ameliorative policies motivated in the 
beginning by genuine concerns for significant inequities eventually come to be 
seen as an entirely new variety of a profound political (and budgetary) problem”.  
 
(Petrick, 2008, p. 247) 
 
From thereon, the development of the policy is marked by surplus production and 
excessive spending, widely criticized by public opinion (Ibid., 2008). The issues of 
farming income was not solved successfully either.  In spite of all the support received, 
economic growth continued to widen the gap between industrial and agricultural 
incomes, clearly displaying the structural shortcomings of the policy. The European 
Commission tried to solve the problem with further attempts to put emphasis on 
structural adjustment in the sector; one example would be the 1968 proposal of 
Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, who came up with a vision of  “modern agricultural 
production unit” (Tracy, 1993, p. 186). The concept called for a gradual removal of 
small farming units, aiming to form a more consolidated sector. However, the farming 
community, pushing for their idea of justice, firmly opposed the idea and made sure it 
was removed from the political agenda.  
 
The pressure to reform market interventions as dominant form of support started 
increasing. In the light of widespread academic critique of price support, a new concept 
of direct income compensation emerged among agricultural economists. The first 
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person to mention such a solution was Nash (1965), who already in early 1960s 
advocated withdrawal of support for agriculture, but he argued that some compensatory 
measure was necessary to ease the transition. Consequently, he proposed temporary 
direct payments that would neither influence the productive decisions of farmers nor 
induce to stay anyone who prefers to retire or find another occupation (Nash, 1965). 
That was the prototype of what later became the idea of decoupled direct payment. In 
the late 70s, this notion became hugely popular among the majority of agricultural 
economists (Petrick, 2008). It was believed that such payments, through their stabilizing 
effect on incomes, would reduce the incentives to increase production in the face of 
falling prices. Koester and Tangermann (1977) also advocated the idea of direct 
payments decoupled from production – farmers would receive it regardless of what and 
how much they produced, even if they stopped the production altogether.    
 
As Petrick (2008) points out, farmers quickly recognized that such a scheme would be 
very transparent and the value of transfers to producers would be easy to calculate. This 
could make the general public question how legitimate the support was and would most 
likely induce arguments about distribution of the payments among farmers – which is 
exactly what happened when decoupled payments were introduced around 30 years 
later. Farmers perceived any attempts of reforms as a threat to farm incomes, which 
would have a detrimental effect on social equity between farming and industrial 
incomes, undermining the core principle of the CAP. Consequently, they firmly 
opposed any ideas of breaking the link between prices and incomes. As Germond 
(2011) observes, farmers have been used to protectionism since the 19th century, and 
CAP constituted only an extension to the pre-existing pattern of protection. As such, 
defending CAP was merely a continuation in the tradition of fighting for their 
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privileges. At the time, the still very influential agricultural lobby managed to remove 
the idea of decoupling from political consideration. The decoupled direct payments had 
to wait a few more decades for its role in European agricultural policy. 
 
The dysfunctionality of the CAP was exacerbated in the 70s and 80s. The price support 
kept stimulating production levels and the surpluses became a big problem of the 
European farming (Petrick, 2008). Furthermore, the burden of expanding expenditure 
was apparent, with over 70% of EU’s budget spent on CAP (European Commission, 
2011c). In the 1970s the influence of agricultural lobby, and COPA-COGECA 
especially, was undermined by the Commission who was increasingly worried about the 
scale of surpluses and long-term costs of financing CAP. Nevertheless, COPA-
COGECA could still maintain influence and block reform attempts through cooperation 
with national governments and national lobby groups, which favoured the status quo 
(Germond, 2011). Consequently, after the failure of Mansholt’s plan, the 70’s were 
marked by stagnation of reform proposals. However, the policy’s failures and resulting 
widespread criticism caused resurgence in reforms in the 80s. Production quotas for 
certain commodities, like milk, were introduced, and price support started being 
reduced.  
 
Attempts to control surpluses through production quotas were not successful. The 
ineffectiveness of it can best be displayed by the example of milk quota introduced in 
1984. Although the quota was somewhat successful at constraining the domestic 
production, the limit was set too high for domestic demand. Around 10% of surplus 
production still had to be sold on world markets. Since the EU prices were above the 
world level, dumping was not eliminated. What is more, the excess production pushed 
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domestic prices downwards, so they were hardly above the minimum level in the EU. 
As a result, small dairy farmers continued to go out of business, although perhaps at a 
smaller rate than without the production control (Institute for Agriculture and Trade 
Policy, 2007).  
 
Over time, the importance of agriculture for the whole economy significantly decreased 
– less people were employed in the sector, whose contribution to GDP also shrank. For 
example, the number of people employed in agriculture in West Germany fell from 7 
million in 1950 to 2 million in 1989 (Petrick, 2008, p. 249). The size of average farm 
tripled, and farm households started enjoying higher average income levels. However, it 
must be pointed out that the increase in income was not caused by increase in profits 
from agriculture as much as by diversification of sources of income – most farm 
households started earning additional income through activities other than farming 
(Buckwell, 1997).  
 
The budgetary pressure of the CAP made the national governments more willing to 
support reform, and to reduce the leverage of farming lobby, both at national level, as 
well as from COPA-COCEGA, who turned its lobbying efforts on Member States after 
its relationship with the Commission deteriorated in the 1970s (Germond, 2011). What 
is more, the CAP came under increasing pressure to comply with world trade regimes, 
particularly from GATT.  
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2.2.3 Switch towards direct payments and potential for targeting 
 
In 1985 the European Commission published the Green Paper which officially 
acknowledged the fact that the whole society was concerned about rural regions, and for 
the first time addressed functions other than agriculture (Petrick, 2008). Most 
importantly, however, the paper for the first time officially recognised concerns over the  
redistributive aspects of agricultural policy, that is dealing effectively and 
systematically with income problems of small farms, and the use of direct income aids 
to complement the market price measures (European Commission, 1985).  
 
As a result of both the internal and external pressures, some fundamental reforms to the 
structure of the CAP took place in 1992. The MacSharry Reform1 reduced market price 
support and introduced compensatory direct payments, which included arable and 
headage payments2. They were not fully decoupled from production, and hence were 
later referred to as coupled direct payments (European Commission, 2011c).  The 
switch to direct payments opened up the possibility of addressing the inequality 
concerns and targeting support (Commission of the European Communities, 1991). This 
was initially addressed by the idea of modulating the support (for example by 
introducing thresholds of arable area below which farmers were not required to set land 
aside) in order to redistribute the policy benefits towards smaller producers, however, 
this idea was later abandoned and the modulation measures were not incorporated in the 
reform (Allanson, 1993).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Named after Commissioner Ray McSharry 
2 EU area payments meant that farmers could apply for payments for land on which cereals, oilseed or 
protein crop were cultivated. Two schemes were available: simplified one, where the farmers were not 
required to set any land aside, and it was not specific to any crop; or general one, crop-specific, with set-
aside requirement. Quantity of land on which the payments could be made was limited on a Member State 
basis. EU headage payments included payments linked to production of bovine and ovine animals and 
payments aimed at reducing seasonal variation or extensification (Frandsen et al., 2002) 
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Basing the payments on average regional yields meant that the policy was a step 
forward towards decoupling the support from individual farm production levels. Such 
solution pleased both farmers and agricultural economists were content – the former 
were financially compensated and the latter saw the reform as a shift towards a more 
liberal system (Petrick, 2008).  
 
Although the 1992 reform was a significant move towards market reorientation, the fact 
that payments were linked to fixed areas and fixed number of animals still maintained 
rigidity in farmers’ decisions, not allowing them to fully respond to market signals and 
realize their full production potential (European Commission, 2011c). Another step that 
pushed the change forward was Agenda 2000 reform in 1999, which saw the price 
support even more reduced, together with an increase in direct payments; it was an 
extension and deepening of the 1992 reform.  This was in large part a response to the 
continuing external pressure that WTO exerted on the EU in order to further reduce the 
trade-distorting impact of the support, but also increased the targeting potential of the 
policy. 
 
In addition to that, the reform introduced a second pillar to the policy. From there on 
Pillar I was meant to address producers’ support, while Pillar II was created to deal with 
rural development issues. A new European Model of Agriculture, addressing its multi-
functionality, was established (Ackrill et al., 2008). Rural development measures 
included funding for areas like human resources, processing and marketing, business 
investment or support for Less-Favoured Areas 3 . Besides addressing the multi-
functionality, these measures also allowed to transfer money to producers in a form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “In areas designated as "less-favoured", agricultural production or activity is more difficult because of 
natural handicaps, e.g. difficult climatic conditions, steep slopes in mountain areas, or low soil 
productivity in other less favoured areas” (European Commission, 2009a). 
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which was compatible with Green Box measures since they were justified on grounds 
other than income support. As such, Pillar II payments were not designed to address the 
farm income problem per se, but although this might not be their objective, ultimately 
they still serve as income support for farmers. In addition to funding from the CAP 
(around 10% of its budget), Member States could co-finance these measures with their 
own money (Ibid., 2008). 
 
 
2.2.4 The Single Payment Scheme  
 
 
In 2002, during the mid-term review of the Agenda 2000 reform, Agriculture 
Commissioner Franz Fischler took his opportunity to outline proposals for further 
change. The new idea was driven mainly by continuing trade-related concerns (Ibid., 
2008). The old direct payments were to be replaced by the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS), which, by being completely independent from current production levels, would 
be fully decoupled. What is more, their receipt would be based on the condition of 
complying with certain environmental and animal welfare standards – a new concept 
called cross-compliance. Creation of such payments would allow the EU to move a 
majority of its support from the Blue Box to the Green Box. Just as with the creation of 
Pillar II payments, this would strengthen EU’s position for another round of WTO 
negotiations, the Doha Round, which began in 2001 (Ibid., 2008). The full shape of the 
new reform was finalized in 2003. The new payment was called the Single Farm 
Payment (SFP) and was introduced in the Member States between 2005 and 2007.  
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In order to be disconnected from current level of production, the payments are based on 
past levels of payments received in the reference period 2000 - 2002. They are linked to 
land; farmers are given entitlements with a monetary per hectare value. These 
entitlements are only activated once matched with corresponding hectares of land, and 
they can be traded within the country or a region.  
 
Member States could choose between two methods of implementation of the scheme, 
historic or regional. In the historic model of the SPS, entitlements are determined on an 
individual basis. Each farmer is given entitlements based on the payments received by 
him/her in 2000-2002, divided by the number of hectares farmed in that period. This 
model of implementation essentially maintains the production related distribution of 
payments from the past. The regional model, on the other hand, allows for somewhat 
more redistribution of payments amongst farmers in a given region. Payments received 
in the reference period are summed up for a given region, and then divided by the 
number of eligible hectares in that region in the year the SPS was introduced. 
Accordingly, each farmer in a given region receives the same per hectare rate. However, 
these would vary between regions and the better the quality of land, most likely the 
higher the rate. National governments could also opt for a hybrid model between the 
two, with the ratio staying constant or varying over time (static or dynamic version). 
The option of regional model of distribution allows for more redistribution of support 
and cutting the link between productivity (in the historic sense) and support level. In 
this context, a government which opts for the historic model of the SFP misses a 
potential opportunity of targeting the support to less productive farmers. The scheme 
had to be introduced between 1st of January 2005 and 1st of January 2007. Each 
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country’s budget for the scheme, the National Ceiling (NC), was determined by direct 
aids in the historic reference period (European Commission, 2011c). 
 
Some Member States expressed concerns that full decoupling could cause abandonment 
of certain activities, for example beef production  (Ackrill et al., 2008).  Consequently, 
within certain limits, some of the post-1992 coupled payments could be kept. 
Furthermore, compulsory modulation was introduced. The term modulation in this 
context refers to top-slicing of the payments from Pillar I and using that money for 
Pillar II measures. Up until the 2003 change modulation was voluntary, but according to 
the new rules it became compulsory. Pillar I payments were capped at 3% in 2005, 4% 
in 2006 and 5% from 2007 onwards. Member States had a further choice of increasing 
modulation up to 10% to keep this money a national envelope for Pillar II payments.  
 
Upon the accession of 10 new states in 2004, old Member States were faced with a 
difficult financial issue of how to split the budget. Since the old members were reluctant 
to finance the enlargement from the start, a compromise was reached where the 
accession states would start making EU budget contributions from the start, but would 
be phased into the CAP payments regime from 2007 onwards (Mrak and Rant, 2008). 
The new Member States joined CAP under the Simplified Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS), which was a transitional scheme with a flat rate payment obtained by dividing 
the country’s national envelope by its utilized agricultural area (European Commission, 
2009b). The entitlements in the new Member States are in general a lot lower than in the 
pre-existing member countries. This marks the beginning of another conflict of national 
interests between the old and new Member States, where the former are more interested 
in maintaining the status quo, and new Member States stand to gain from any 
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redistribution through a EU flat rate of SFP (but would benefit even more from any 
shifting of resources towards EU’s structural and cohesion funds). 
 
In 2008, a review of the decoupling reform took place. On the 20th of November, EU 
agricultural ministers agreed on the final outcome of the review called the ‘Health 
Check’. A number of changes to the existing policy were accepted (European 
Commission, 2008). Set-aside requirement was removed. Modulation was increased – 
all payments above 5000 euros were supposed to be cut by 10% from 2012. 
Furthermore, all payments above 300 000 euros were meant to be reduced by further 
4%. Remaining coupled support was removed, leaving only suckler cow, goat and sheep 
premia. In addition, the ‘Health Check’ allowed the Member States that chose the 
historic model of implementation to change it to the regional one; this has been driven 
by a widespread criticism of a model based on a reference period that became harder to 
justify as more time from the period passed by.   
 
2.2.5 The CAP 2014-2020 
 
2014 was the beginning of the new EU financial perspective, and hence new CAP 
budget, which required some decisions about the shape of the future CAP. The 
European Commission launched a wide-ranging debate about the new CAP reform, 
which brought about much reflection, discussion and negotiation. This eventually led to 
a set of legal proposals aimed at making the policy more effective in shaping a more 
competitive and sustainable agriculture in the EU. On the 26th of June 2013, an 
agreement on the shape of the reform has been reached between the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council; this was the first time in the history that the 
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European Parliament acted as a co-legislator with the Council. On the 20th of December 
2013 the reform regulations were officially published. The details of the adaptation of 
the reform are to be decided at a national level in 2014 (European Commission, 2013b). 
 
Following the path of the earlier reforms, this is the first time the whole CAP has been 
reviewed and it resulted in, as claimed by the European Commission, the biggest reform 
of the CAP yet. The Commission identified three long-term objectives for CAP, “viable 
food production, sustainable management of natural resources and climate action and 
balanced territorial development”  (European Commission, 2013b, p.2), and stated that 
CAP instruments need to be adapted in order to meet these objectives. Funding for CAP 
will be frozen at its 2013 level, which will mean a decrease in real terms. The new CAP 
maintains the two pillars, but it increases the links between them. The reform is 
extensive; among other things it includes abolition of production quotas, enhancement 
of producers organisation (through financial incentives and legal framework) and 
closing the gap between science and farming through the Farm Advisory System. 
Detailed description of all the elements of the reform is beyond the scope of this 
chapter; for more details see European Commission (2013a) and Waterhouse (2013). 
However, the most important change, which will be described now in more detail, 
concerns the adjustments to the SPS. 
 
The new direct payments are to be more targeted, but also more complicated. Only 
active farmers will be eligible; in Scotland the farmer needs to be active at the moment 
of application (May 2015) by meeting conditions of article 94. The new payments are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “No direct payments to farmers whose agricultural areas are mainly areas naturally in a state suitable for 
grazing or cultivation who do not carry out on those areas the minimum activity required by the Member 
State. […] No direct payments to claimants who operate airports, railways, waterworks, real estate, 
permanent sport and recreational grounds.” (Waterhouse, 2013, p. 21) 
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very flexible in terms of budgeting and implementation, allowing the Member States to 
tailor the policy in line with national agricultural, environmental, cultural and socio-
economics conditions. Depending on decisions, first pillar support will consist of the 
basic payment5, the greening payment provided greening conditions are met6 (30% 
deduction from the NC) and young farmer top-up for eligible farmers (2% deduction 
from the NC); these three components are compulsory for all Member States. There is 
also a mandatory deduction of up to 3% of National Reserve for future new entrants. In 
addition, some of the NC funding for Pillar 1 can be diverted towards optional schemes:  
- up to 8% for voluntary coupled scheme (VCS) where it is important for 
economic, social or environmental reasons,  
- up to 30% (20% in Scotland’s case) for redistributive payments targeted towards 
small and medium size farms in order to provide more targeted support; it 
should be redistributed to farmers’ first 30 hectares or up to the average farm 
size if it is higher than 30 ha, 
- up to 10% for small farmer scheme (max of 1250 euros per farm) which 
facilitates their access to direct payments and reduces administrative burden, 
- up to 5% for Pillar 1 Areas of Natural Constraint (ANC)7. 
 
Members States also have the option of transferring up to 15% of Pillar 1 funding 
towards Pillar 2. All these options mean that the share of funding allocated to different 
schemes may vary significantly throughout the EU.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 With simplified and more targeted cross-compliance 
6 In order to qualify for this part of the payment, farmers need to maintain permanent grassland and 
ecological focus areas, as well as to engage in crop diversification. Further greening of CAP takes place 
through spending at least 30% of each Rural Development programme budget in Pillar 2 on payments 
which benefit the environment and prevent climate change.  
7 Which would be separate and would not affect ANC/LFA payments under Rural Development in Pillar 
II. 
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A very important change to the direct payments is rebalancing of their value both 
between Members States and within Member States. The discrepancies between 
countries will be reduced through external convergence which consists of gradual 
adjustment towards a minimum national average direct payment per hectare across all 
countries by 2020. In terms of inequalities at national level, the historic model of 
entitlement values will now become obsolete and replaced by area-based payments. 
Member States can either introduce a flat rate equal to the regional average from the 
start (where entitlement is equal to regional budget divided by declared number of 
eligible hectares), or through internal convergence8 gradually move towards flat rates by 
2019.  
 
Member States have further choice regarding whether the flat rate should be introduced 
for the whole country, or for regions, and how to divide the land between regions. The 
options most recently considered by the Scottish Government (Waterhouse, 2013) 
include: 
- use of historic land types, with either 3 land type regions (Arable, Permanent 
Grass, Rough Grazing) or 2 land type regions (Arable + Permanent Grass, and 
Rough Grazing) 
- LCA (Macaulay Land Capability for Agriculture) capability option, with 3 LCA 
regions (1-3.1, 3.2-5.3, 6.1-7.2) or 2 LCA regions (1-3.1, 3.2-7). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This option can be executed by either setting the flat rate equal to regional average in 2019, or by the so 
called Irish channel, where payment entitlements which in 2019 are equal to less than 90% of the regional 
average have the gap to the average closed by one third, with no payment entitlement receiving less than 
60% of regional average (SG presentation). 
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2.3 Conclusions 
 
The farm income problem has three inter-related aspects: poverty, inequality and 
stability. In essence, farmers suffer from low incomes and feel disadvantaged in 
comparison with workers in other sectors, and what is more, the income flows from 
agriculture are very unstable in nature which causes feelings of insecurity among 
farmers.  
 
Because of these factors, agricultural protection in Europe has a long-lived history, 
dating back in its modern from to the late 19th century. When European Economic 
Community was formed in the 1950’s, the national measures of protection were united 
under the Common Agricultural Policy. Two of the main stated objectives in the 
original treaty were a fair standard of living for farmers through increasing earnings 
from agriculture and stability in agricultural markets. These objectives were initially 
met through pure market support measures, however, the shortcomings of such policy 
became apparent over time: market distortions and surpluses, budgetary pressure, trade 
concerns and international pressure for reform. What is more, the lack of structural 
policy measures meant that the issue of lower farming incomes was not successfully 
solved either. The process of reform was long and gradual, with strong opposition from 
the agricultural lobby.  
 
In the 1990's, the MacSharry reform introduced coupled direct payments as a 
compensation for cuts in market price measures. Direct payments offered greater 
transparency in support distribution and a possibility of addressing the concerns over 
who gets the support, that is the redistributive issue. Another big step for the policy was 
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the “decoupling” of support in 2005 with the introduction of the SFP. The option of 
choosing the regional model of implementation was another opportunity to target 
support by cutting the link between historic volumes of production and transfer levels. 
Scotland did not use that opportunity, and opted for the historic model in order to avoid 
the political cost of dissatisfaction from the potential losers of the regional model of 
distribution.  The fact that the modulation measures were dropped from the McSharry 
reform and many governments opted for the historic model of distribution present 
missed opportunities and show that the targeting potential of the direct payments have 
not been fully realized.  
 
The new CAP reform which obliges all the Member States to introduce the area-based 
rates of payments presents an opportunity to cut the link between productive capacity 
and transfer size, which makes the support harder and harder to justify based on equity 
and income support grounds.  However, many Member States, like Scotland, will aim to 
limit the size of redistribution by introducing regional rates of support, in order to limit 
the political costs linked to the losers of the flat rate redistribution. 
 
The research in this thesis, through empirical analysis, will assess the targeting 
performance of the direct payments under the SPS by measuring the redistributive effect 
of support, both under the regional model of distribution and with a counter-factual 
regional distribution. What is more, the role of agricultural policy will be implicitly 
investigated in a dynamic context, by looking at the mobility and stability of 
agricultural incomes in years 1995/1996 to 2009/2010. As such, the analysis aims to 
characterize the performance of agricultural policy in the context of dealing with the 
farm income problem: the incidence of low and unstable agricultural incomes. In line 
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with the main focus of policy concern, the analysis will focus on the current income 
distribution, without taking into account the wealth aspect or the off-farm source of 
incomes of the agricultural households.  
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3 Capitalisation of the Single Farm Payment  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The central purpose of agricultural subsidies is to increase farmers‘ income. However, 
by raising the income from farming, the subsidies increase the returns from resources 
used in farming. Therefore aside from the first order effect of the subsidies, which is the 
increase of income from farming, the financial support causes second-order adjustments 
related to the supply and input ownership chains (Van Herck and Vranken, 2011). 
Accordingly, if the production inputs are not owned by the farmers and their prices 
increase, the farmers‘ benefit from income support is reduced. The degree to which the 
payments are successful at reaching the pockets of their intended beneficiaries is called 
transfer efficiency.  
 
This issue if formally recognized as a significant problem in the design of agricultural 
policy. An influential study by the OECD (2003) concluded that only 20% of all prices 
and market support translated into net gain for farmers, whereas the rest got dissipated 
between the owners of factors of production (Ciaian et al., 2011). 
 
The primary factors of production in farming are land, family labour and capital 
(Latruffe and le Moeul, 2009). Of these factors, land has been given the most attention 
because a substantial share of farmland in industrialized countries is rented and an 
increasing number of payments are tied to land. Accordingly, concern exists over the 
extent to which the payments affect the rental prices of farmland (Halmai and Elekes, 
2006). 
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The process through which subsidies impact land values is called capitalization. 
Farmland values represent the present value of expected future returns from the land 
(Hendricks et al., 2012). Rental rates should therefore reflect the expected return from 
the land in the rental period. When agricultural support becomes part of the expected 
future returns from the land, it gets incorporated into land values and rental rates 
through capitalization (Ryan et al., 2001). In particular, area payments affect farmland 
demand, which together with inelastic land supply will cause the 
payments‘ capitalisation into higher rents or farmland values. Specifically, one 
theoretical prediction is that when the land supply is fixed, the whole subsidy will be 
captured by a higher rent (Ciaian et al. 2011).  As a result, farmers lose and landowners 
benefit from capitalization of the support, in the short term via higher rental rates, and in 
the longer term through capitalization of future support into land values. 
 
These effects, apart from causing misdistribution of benefits between farmers and 
landowners (to the extent that these two groups are not identical), negatively affect land 
mobility and structural change (Van Herck and Vranken, 2011). Specifically, new 
entrants into farming are faced with higher entry costs and existing farmers with higher 
expansion costs.  As a consequence, the movement of land between less and more 
efficient farms will be smaller, which impairs structural adjustment and reduces the 
competitiveness of the sector (Ibid., 2011). Furthermore, higher land values raise 
farmers‘ fixed costs and increase the risk of operating losses when the support is cut 
down or stopped all together (Ryan et al., 2001) – an issue that is particularly 
concerning in the context of CAP reforms and attempts to substantially reduce the level 
of support or remove it all together.   
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The SFP is directly tied to land through the per hectare entitlements and the requirement 
of eligible land to activate them. This fact has caused concerns over the capitalization of 
the payment into land values and its effect on rental rates.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to obtain an average rate of capitalisation of the SFP into 
farmland rents in Scotland using FAS data for production years 2005/2006 – 
2009/2010. The motivation behind this is improving the assumption on the SFP 
passthrough used in the next chapter of the thesis in order to calculate the net value of 
agricultural transfers used in redistributive effect analysis. More specifically, the 
numerical result of the passthrough (1- capitalisation) will be used to multiply the gross 
value of the SFP transfers to tenant farmers in order to obtain the net values. 
Additionally, the estimate of capitalisation rate will illustrate the transfer efficiency of 
the SFP.  
 
The chapter starts with a literature review in section 3.2; first the theoretical 
considerations of the influence of government payments on land values are presented, 
followed by a review of empirical findings. Section 3.3 starts with a discussion of the 
Scottish rental market to inform the subsequent model specification, then variables 
creation is described, followed by a discussion on estimation issues and the presentation 
of the empirical results. The chapter ends with a conclusion section.  
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3.2 Literature review 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
 
Multiple studies have investigated the potential impact of different factors on the degree 
of support capitalization. One such factor is the nature of support payments (Patton et 
al., 2008). Direct support payments can be either coupled or decoupled. A payment is 
coupled when it is somehow linked to the type and level of production, for example a 
payment per hectare planted or head of livestock. On the other hand, with a decoupled 
payment, the link between it and the level and type of production is cut, and in principle 
at least, such a payment should not affect production levels. As far as the impact of the 
rental rates goes, one theory predicts that it is inversely related to the impact on 
production decisions. Roberts et al. (2003) claims that since decoupled payments should 
not affect current production levels, they get fully capitalized into the land value. The 
counter-example of coupled payments helps to understand the mechanism. With 
coupled payments, the production levels are distorted – in order to get more subsidy, 
farmers produce more than they would have under a free market situation. The demand 
for inputs goes up, increasing their prices. At the same time, more output is produced 
therefore the output price falls. These secondary effects offset some of the influence of 
the payment on the rental rates. With decoupled payments, the secondary effects should 
not take place, since the production level remains the same. Consequently, the 
landowner can capture the full benefit of the payment by increasing the rental rate. 
 
Although theoretically decoupled payments should not affect production decisions, 
there are several reasons why they still might do. Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) identified 
five such channels: 
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- the payments affect the risk faced by farmers, reducing the risk itself  (insurance 
effect through a decrease in income variability thanks to the payment) or 
farmers‘ aversion to risk (under the assumption of DARA9, the wealth effect 
from farmer’s increased wealth caused by the payment should reduce the 
aversion to risk), 
- the payments reduce credit constraints faced by farmers, either by improving 
farmers‘ credit worthiness through wealth effect, or allowing them to make their 
own savings and investments, 
- the payments influence farmers‘ labour allocation decisions; specifically by 
increasing their wealth, the payments affect their labour-leisure allocation, 
- the payments affect farmers‘ decisions through expectations about future policy 
payments, 
- finally, authors point out to the actual influence of direct payments on land 
values, prices and rents as a source of impact on production decisions. 
 
Bhaskar and Beghin (Ibid.) reviewed a broad range of papers that empirically test the 
influence of these channels on production decisions, and they concluded that in most 
cases, the effects on production do occur but they are small in magnitude, with the 
impact on land prices being the most significant one. All in all, the fact that decoupled 
payments are in reality not without impact on production decisions can imply that the 
theoretical prediction about their full capitalization into land prices might not 
necessarily apply (Patton et al., 2008). What is more, the prediction of a full 
capitalization of a decoupled payment implies a longer time frame, with a longer period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (Ross, 1981) 
	   	  44	  
necessary for a full adjustment of rents. Full capitalization of a payment in a period of 
few years is unlikely. 
 
The capitalization of an area-based decoupled payment can also be analysed using the 
framework of input subsidies; the link between the payment and land necessary to 
activate the entitlements suggests the payment could be seen as a subsidy to land. 
Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) theoretically analysed the impact of a factor subsidy on 
farmland rental markets and prices and pointed out that the key players affecting the 
degree of the factors subsidies‘ impact are “the relative levels of supply price elasticities 
of inputs as well as the extent of input substitution possibilities in production” (Ibid., 
2009, p.12). Their conclusion was that a simple land subsidy unambiguously increases 
the rental price of land, a reduction in the buying-in price (the opportunity cost) of land 
and an increase in the quantity of land used. However, the degree of these effects is 
positively correlated with the substitution possibilities between land and the non-land 
factor of production.  
 
In summary, area payments that are targeted on land stimulate demand for farmland and 
if this is combined with inelastic land supply, the payments will result in higher rental 
rates for farmland, creating leakages of subsidy money to landowners. In particular, 
with fixed land supply (or land supply elasticity equal to zero), the subsidy is expected 
to get fully capitalized into land rents (Van Herck and Vranken, 2011). 
 
Another aspect that might affect the capitalization rate specifically for the SFP is the 
implementation model used to assign the entitlements and the ratio of entitlements to 
the eligible area. Kilian and Salhofer (2008) investigated the influence of the 
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implementation model on the extent of payment capitalisation into land values; they 
developed a simple graphical model in order to analyse the market, assuming that with 
SFP a secondary market exists – that for SFP entitlements – which are tradable. The 
ratio of eligible hectares to entitlements is crucial. As long as there are more eligible 
hectares than entitlements, the payments will not get capitalized into land values. 
However, if there is excess demand for eligible hectares, the payment will affect land 
values, with different implementation models giving rise to different impacts. With the 
historic model, some of the payment will get capitalized, and the more homogenous the 
entitlements, the bigger the capitalization.  In the extreme case of all payments being 
homogenous – which corresponds to the regional model – the prediction is that the 
whole payment will get fully capitalized. 
 
Swinnen et al. (2009) discussed the impact of tradability of entitlements and concluded 
it matters in some conditions. Specifically, if the eligible area is bigger than the number 
of entitlements, there will be no capitalisation of the SFP into land values with full 
tradability of entitlements. However, the more constraints to trade there are, the larger is 
the extent of capitalisation. Low tradability reduces the incentive to sell entitlements 
because the potential sellers cannot get the desired price. In that case these farmers 
prefer to keep the entitlements and compete for land which then puts upward pressure 
on land prices. When the eligible area is smaller than the total number of entitlements, 
the larger is the degree of capitalisation of the SFP into land values, the lower will be 
the price for entitlements. In the extreme case of full capitalisation of the SFP, the 
market price of entitlements will be zero.  
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Ciaian et al. (2011) argued that the cost of cross-compliance is a factor that limits the 
extent of capitalization of the SFP into land values, because it is an additional financial 
burden on the farmer that imposes a constraint on farm activities. The costs of meeting 
cross-compliance requirements vary by farm, since it is determined by farms‘ 
production structures, available technology and natural endowment. Ciaian et al. believe 
that in the extreme case farmers might choose not to benefit from the SFP if the cost of 
cross-compliance is bigger than the benefits of the payment. According to the 
regulations, in order for a farm to be eligible for the SPS, the entire land cultivated 
needs to meet the cross-compliance requirements (even if only part of it is used to 
activate the payment) (EC, 2003). This means that the costs of cross-compliance are 
linked not to the entitlements but to the land, which reduces the profitability of the land, 
shifting the demand curve down and thus reducing the capitalization rate. 
 
The length of policy implementation is another factor to consider. Van Herck and 
Vranken (2011) pointed out that if subsidies are only implemented for a fixed period of 
time, their capitalization might be limited. The SFP is a compensatory payment of 
temporary nature and it is commonly accepted that it will cease eventually, although the 
exact time frame of this is unknown. This knowledge might act as a limiting factor for 
the extent of payment capitalization into land values. 
 
Last but not least, the structure of land market is an important factor affecting the 
capitalization rate (Ciaian et al., 2011; Van Herck and Vranken, 2011). Rural markets 
are often affected by various regulations and market imperfections, which influence 
how much the rental and land values can absorb subsidies (Ciaian et al., 2008). Ciaian 
and Swinnen (2009a) observed that for farms facing credit constraints the value of the 
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subsidy can close the financial gap and allow for investment and production expansion, 
which implies higher input use, including land, and therefore exerts upward pressure on 
land rents. Land market regulations and institutions, on the other hand, might have a 
restricting effect on the adjustment of the rental rate and the possibility to capture some 
of the payment by landlords. Of particular importance are price restrictions imposed by 
the government and the duration of rental contracts which is determined both by formal 
legislation as well as informal institutions (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2010)10. If a 
maximum price ceiling is imposed on the market, this limits the potential capitalization 
of the SFP. Similarly, ceteris paribus, the longer the length of rental contracts, the 
smaller the scope for landowners to capture the payment by adjusting the rental rate at 
least in the short-term. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical literature review 
 
There exists a vast literature investigating the impact of subsidies on rental rates11 
(Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009). These studies vary according to the type of agricultural 
support investigated. Some consider aggregate support (Kirwan, 2005; Roberts et al., 
2003; Shaik et al., 2005), some look at the effect of price support (Floyd, 1965) and 
others investigate specific payments (Patton et al., 2008). Of particular interest for the 
purpose of this chapter is the literature that analyses the impact of direct payments on 
farmland rental values, especially that of direct decoupled payments paid out on an area 
basis. The majority of such work has been done in North America, with fewer studies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See the discussion on farmland market structure in Scotland 3.3.1. 
11 Majority of research on the agricultural support capitalisation focuses on rental rates rather than 
farmland values. This is because more data is available on the former, and with rental rates less attention 
needs to be paid to factors related to non-agricultural use of land and urban pressure (unlike with land 
values which concern longer periods). 
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performed using European data. However, recently more literature on EU payments‘ 
influence on land has appeared due to increased policy interest in the topic (Van Herck 
and Vranken, 2011). The following section will briefly mention the most frequently 
cited North American papers and then focus on the results of the European studies. 
 
Kirwan (2009) investigated the distribution of income from overall government 
subsidies in America using U.S. census data for years 1992-2002, and found that on 
average tenant farmers capture 75% of subsidies and landowners capture 25%. Using 
U.S. county data for 1996-2000, Lence and Mishra (2003) investigated the impact of 
government payments on farmland rents, controlling for spatial autocorrelation. They 
disaggregated the payments into four types: deficiency payments, market loss assistance 
programme payments, production flexibility contract payments and conservations 
reserve programme payments; the last two types are decoupled payments. Their 
findings indicate a marginal impact of payments ranging from 0.25 to 0.86 cents of 
additional rent for every dollar of payment. Roberts et al. (2003) employed 1992 and 
1997 U.S. Agricultural Census data which compares information prior to and after 
decoupling; they found a capitalization rate of between 0.34 and 0.41 of a payment 
dollar. Both of these papers concluded that decoupled payments affect the land rents 
more than the coupled payments. That accords with the theory and is consistent with the 
assumption that other input suppliers manage to capture some of the subsidy from 
coupled payments by increasing prices. However, Janssen and Button (2004) as well as 
Lambert and Griffin (2004) found the opposite; their empirical results indicate that the 
effect of coupled payments was bigger. These few examples alone show that there is 
lack of empirical agreement on the capitalization rate of government payments, with 
results being very context-specific. 
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Moving onto European studies, Patton et al. (2008) investigated the effect of coupled 
and decoupled payments on farmland rents in Northern Ireland using the data from 1994 
to 2002. Their estimates vary depending on the type of payment. They found that the 
coupled direct payments for the sheep sector were fully capitalised, whereas these for 
the beef sector were not. The estimate of the capitalization rate for the only decoupled 
payment before the introduction of the SFP (Less Favoured Area payment) equals 
120%, but it was statistically insignificant. 
 
Breustedt and Habermann (2010) investigated the impact of EU per-hectare payments 
for arable crop land, which are coupled to production, on the farmland rental rates in 
Germany using data from 2001. The novelty of their research is the use of general 
spatial model, which allowed them to account for geographical correlations between 
farms. Their findings suggest a capitalization rate of the payment of 38%, as well as 
0.72 euro increase in rent for every extra euro paid in rent by a neighbouring farmer. 
 
As as far as the capitalization of the SFP goes, Kilian et al. (2008) analysed its impact 
on land rents in the Bavaria region of Germany using municipal level data from 2005 
(the year SFP was introduced there). Germany used a hybrid model of implementation, 
which allowed the authors to divide payments into their historic and regional 
components, and test earlier theoretical predictions about the influence of the 
implementation model on the capitalization rate (Kilian and Salhofer, 2008).  
Confirming earlier theoretical results, the regional component of the payment 
capitalized more than the historic one, with statistically significant coefficients of 0.41 
and 0.35 respectively 12 . Another important conclusion of the study is that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Although authors did not mention any test of significance of this difference. 
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capitalization rate increased over time (following the introduction of the SFP), with 
between 15% and 19% of every euro of the payments being additionally transferred to 
the landowners in more recent contracts. 
 
Ciaian and Kancs (2012) researched the effect of Simplified Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS) on rental rates in new Member States13. SAPS is the version of the SFP 
introduced in new Member States, who did not receive any payments in the historic 
reference period of 2000-2002. Simplified Area Payments have uniform entitlements 
per region, therefore they are very similar to the regional model of SFP. Ciaian and 
Kancs used farm-level panel data for the years 2004 and 2005 and found that almost 
20% of the payment values is lost by farmers due to higher rents. This result is roughly 
comparable with the findings of Van Herck and Vranken (2011), who also analysed the 
impact of SAPS payments on farm rental rates in the new Member States14 and found it 
to be between 10% and 15%. 
 
Another study of SFP capitalization was performed by Ciaian et al. (2011), who 
employed the generalized propensity score (GPS) matching approach to estimate the 
capitalisation of the SFP using Farm Accountancy Data Network data for years 2004 -
2007 for EU-15 countries15. Their estimate for the weighted average capitalization rate 
of the payment is 6%, and 7% for the UK alone. They note that the relatively low 
percentage compared to results from the US could be caused by the rigidity of rental 
markets in Europe. Ciaian et al. (2011) further stated that the relationship between land 
rents and SFP is non-linear and discontinuous because of the many factors that 
influence it, like cross-compliance costs, entitlements tradability or the SPS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. 
14 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. 
15 The first fifteen members prior to 2004 enlargement. 
	   	  51	  
implementation model. They concluded that there is wide variation in capitalization 
rates for different SFP levels, as well as between Member States – varying between 0% 
and 58%, with the hectare value of SFP being one of the main factors influencing the 
capitalization rate within a member state.  
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3.3 Estimation of the Scottish rental function 
 
 
The aim of this section is to estimate the degree of capitalisation of the SFP into land 
rents in Scotland.  It begins with a description of the Scottish rental market to inform 
the subsequent specification of the empirical rent function, followed by model 
specification, presentation of data summary and variables, and discussion on the choice 
of estimator; it is concluded with the estimation results.  
 
3.3.1 Scottish rental market 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of tenant farms by tenancy type, together with the 
percentage of farms that are tenanting for years 2005 – 2010. There are four main types 
of agricultural tenancy holdings recorded: 
- Short Limited Duration Tenancy (between 1 and 5 years duration), 
- Limited Duration Tenancy (for 10 or more years with specific end date), 
- Small Landholders Act (SLA) (only found outside crofting counties), 
- 91 Act holdings (Tenancy or Limited Partnership). 
 
As can be seen, most tenancies are 91 Act tenancies and so the focus here will be on the 
provision of this type of tenancy. The Scottish legislation on agricultural holdings 
guarantees the ‘Minimum Three Years Rent Review Cycle’, which means that rents 
cannot be changed in a period smaller than 3 years, but if both sides are content with the 
rent, no review needs to take place (Scottish Government, 2013b). There is no minimum 
or maximum price control for agricultural rents in the UK (Swinnen et al., 2009).  
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Table 3.1 Summary of tenant contracts by type in Scotland, 2005-2010.  
 
Source: Scottish Government. 
 
The most recent piece of legislation (for the period studied here) is Act 2003 which 
largely maintains the crucial rules introduced by Agricultural Acts in 1958 and 1983. 
The following provision specifies the market value rule that was initially introduced by 
the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1958: 
 
“For the purposes of determining the rent payable (…) the Land Court shall have 
regard to the (…) current economic conditions in the relevant sector of 
agriculture (…) disregarding any distortions of rent due to scarcity of lets” 
 
                 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 
 
This indicates that the rent should simply be a function of the value of the land in 
agricultural use by the tenant, using comparative valuation and disregarding scarcity of 
lets.  
Tenancy type 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Short Limited Duration Tenancy 
(SLDT) 285 316 344 431 442 447
Limited Duration Tenancy (LDT) 99 119 166 204 242 262
Small Landholders Act (SLA) - - 70 91 94 101
Total 91 Act Tenancy and LTD 
Partnership 7,172 7,049 6,804 6,546 6,399 6,216
of which:
91 Act Tenancy 6,348 6,308 6,051 5,795 5,851 5,722
91 Act Ltd Partnership 824 740 753 750 548 494
All tenancies 7,555 7,484 7,384 7,272 7,177 7,026
Holding with tenancy 
agreements 7,470 7,385 7,202 7,096 7,010 6,841
Total Holdings in Scotland 51,136 51,361 51,365 51,489 52,034 52,314
Percentage of Holdings with 
Tenancy Agreements 14.6% 14.4% 14.0% 13.8% 13.5% 13.1%
	   	  54	  
In the event that the tenant and the landlord cannot agree on the rent, they can take the 
case to the Land Court. Of particular relevance to the current study is the Moonzie Farm 
case (R W Morrison-Low v The Executors of the Late T H Paterson) which concerned 
the disagreement between the landlord and the tenant in relation to how the SFP should 
be treated in the determination of rent. The tenant’s case was that since the entitlements 
belong to the tenant, the flow of income from them should not be included in the rent 
review. The landlord’s view was that this income should be treated as part of the gross 
output derived from the farm. The landlord used an analogy to the treatment of previous 
payments, like Arable Area Payments, Sheep Annual Premium or Suckler Cow 
Premium, whose values in the period 2000-2002 were used as a historic reference to 
determine the value of the replacement SFP. These subsidies were a result of tenant’s 
occupation of the landlord’s land, fixed equipment and improvements and were 
therefore taken into account in setting the earlier rents. Since these coupled subsidies 
are used to determine the value of SFP, the landlord believes that the contribution of his 
land should still play role and therefore current rental rates should include SFP’s 
contribution (CKD Galbraith, 2010).  
 
In its decision on the 2nd of June 2010, the Court sided with the tenant and agreed that 
the SFP is an income support to the farmer, not the farm, and therefore should not be 
treated as part of gross output of the farm. Nevertheless, the Court did decide that the 
tenant should pay an additional £9 per acre of the rent in respect of the SFP (with the 
farm‘s entitlement value of £233 per acre, that makes for 3.86% of the SFP value to be 
included in the rent per acre). This reflects the fact that “a prudent hypothetical tenant 
would expect to pay a rent which was sufficiently high enough to attract the landlord, 
acting reasonably, to let the land to him. The prudent tenant would, therefore, take 
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account of the receipts which are available to him from the SFP as a result of his 
occupying the land” (CKD Galbraith, 2010). 
 
Recognising the importance of this ruling for rent determination in the whole of 
Scotland, the Court observed: 
 
‘’It is clear that the issue of SFP is of critical importance not only to this case but 
to the level of rents across the whole tenanted sector in Scotland.  There can be 
little doubt that, if not all, then the vast majority of tenants who have negotiated 
rents since 2005 have been prepared to treat their income from this source as 
part of the farm income to be shared with the landlord as rent.  Where SFP is 
included in a budget it is typically found to be at a level which makes it the 
dominant element in the ‘profit’ of the whole enterprise.  If such payments are 
not to be included, there will inevitably be a significant fall in rents.’’  
 
(Scottish Land Court, 2010) 
 
CKD Galbraith, the tenant’s representative in the case, inferred that it was the case that 
“the level of rents have not changed following the introduction of SFP which would 
confirm our view that tenants do not consider SFP to be an off-farm subsidy which is 
not taken into account when offering for land to rent” (CKD Galbraith, 2010). While it 
is very likely that the Moonzie case ruling will be of important consequence for the 
future rent review process in Scotland, it looks like up to date landlords have been 
treating the SFP simply as a continuation of previous coupled direct payments.  
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3.3.2 Model specification 
 
According to economic theory, the economic rent of an asset should reflect the flow of 
income from that asset in the rental period (Ryan et al., 2001). The flow of income from 
agricultural land comes from two sources: market returns from the agricultural 
production and agricultural support. 
 
The crucial assumption used in modelling how the rents are set in this study is that 
landowners use past information on market returns and subsidies to set the rental rates. 
Two points justify this assumption. Firstly, rents are not based on contemporaneous 
individual farm returns per se, since the rents for year t will be set before returns are 
realized, given the length of production cycle (in particular, for cropping farms, rents 
will be set in advance of when returns are known since it takes time to plant, grow and 
then harvest crops). Legislation in Scotland requires the landlords to take “current 
economic conditions in the relevant sector of agriculture” (Agricultural Holdings Act, 
2003) into consideration when determining rental rates. It seems reasonable to assume 
that very recent market returns are a relevant source of knowledge for landlords. 
Secondly, Scottish rental market is dominated by long-term contracts and the rent 
reviews are at least three years apart given the periodic review mechanism; thus the 
rental adjustment is not instantaneous and any sudden changes in the profitability are 
not likely to be reflected in rents. 
 
For subsidies, the past information is particularly useful in predicting current levels of 
support. The value of SFP is set based on past payments, with the value of entitlement 
per hectare and the number of entitlements not changing from one year to another 
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(unless the farm purchases additional entitlements). The SFP is the dominant 
component of support from 2005 onwards, but also other types of support are quite 
predictable based on the past payments (examples include Less Favoured Area 
payments). 
 
Taking all this into consideration, the econometric model used to analyse the rental rates 
in Scotland is defined as: 
rit = c+ !syis(t,q)
s=1
3
! + "kgik (t,q)
k=1
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! +uit  (3.1) 
where: 
-  is a rental rate per hectare for farm i at time t, 
-  is a constant, 
- yis(t,q)  is the average of market returns of type s per hectare for farm i in the q years 
before t, where the different types of returns s are cropping, livestock and dairy, 
- gik (t,q)  is the average government subsidy of type k per hectare for farm i in the q years 
before t; the K types of subsidies are identified in the following section, 
- xilt  is additional explanatory variable l; the choice of variables is discussed in the 
following section, 
-  is a disturbance term, 
- βs, αk and λl are the regression coefficients. 
 
Therefore the rental rate reflects the profitability from land that comes from two main 
sources, market returns and agricultural support, but the information on it is assumed to 
come from past realized profitability. Rental rate for a given period is a function of 
averaged lagged market returns and agricultural subsidies from the previous few years 
rit
c
uit
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(so if q=3, rent per hectare in period t is regressed against the average of returns per 
hectare in t-1, t-2 and t-3). The specification is tested for different lag lengths to check 
the sensitivity of results.  
 
The different types of market return variable are obtained by interacting the market 
return with shares of enterprise mix from different agricultural sectors. This separation 
of market return by sector is done in order to control for sector-specific heterogeneity; 
since different sectors have different fixed capital requirements, net returns may 
capitalize differently for the sectors. Patton et al. (2008) dealt with this issue by 
interacting the net return variable with dummy variables for the main sectors they 
identify: dairy, cattle and sheep, and other. This study goes one step further, and instead 
of interacting the net return variable with sectoral dummies, it interacts it with the main 
shares of farms’ enterprise mix: cropping, dairy and livestock. This allows for more 
thorough disaggregation of market return, since when we only look at types, some of 
the farm’s activity is ignored. For example, farms classified as dairy farms could be 
only majority dairy farms, with significant share of agricultural production coming from 
cropping or livestock. Splitting the market return by shares of agricultural production, 
instead of main classification types, allows taking all agricultural activity into 
consideration. 
 
The model can be interpreted as a type of adaptive expectations model in terms of 
landowners expectations of support levels used to set the rents. It smoothly addresses 
the issue of mixed influence of pre-SFP coupled payments and decoupled SFP on rents 
in the proximity of the reform date. The dataset does not contain information on when 
the rent was reviewed last time for specific farms. This means it is impossible to 
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determine precisely when the rental rate is renegotiated to include the SFP in the 
consideration of its value.  For example rents observed in 2005/2006 could have been 
set anytime in the past 3 years, or even earlier (depending on the contract revision 
times), therefore it will presumably reflect the influence of both historic coupled 
payments and the SFP levels if it was set prior to the SPS introduction, but it is hard to 
disentangle the influence of the two. What is more, the conclusions of Moonzie Farm 
case imply that landlords have been treating the SFP simply as a continuation of 
previous coupled direct payments, which also highlights the importance of previous 
coupled payments in rent setting process. These mixed influences are addressed with the 
use of a moving average of past payments, with slow transition from coupled direct 
payments to SFP over the years.  
 
3.3.3 Data summary and variables 
 
The study uses micro-level weighted data from Farm Accounts Survey (FAS). For the 
purpose of rent determination analysis, data for the period 2002-2010 is used. Rents 
from 2006 (2005/06 production year) onwards are used, with the information on lags of 
market returns and subsidies coming from 2002 onwards. The sample is restricted to 
tenanted farms only, in order to simplify the analysis. If the sample included also farms 
with both owned and rented land, there would be issues of possible heterogeneity 
between the two types of land and uncertainty about which land is actually being rented, 
but it would be impossible to distinguish this from the dataset. After restricting the 
sample, there are around 100 observations each year. Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of 
sample in each year by farm type. It needs to be taken into account that the restriction to 
tenanted farms only might introduce some bias in the sample. However, the sample is 
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then weighted with weights adjusted in a way that it still should to be representative of 
the overall populations.  
Table 3.2 Breakdown of sample by farm types16. 
 
 
Here you recalculate the weights in a way that they are representative of the relevant 
populations so the farms are still representative of the populations 
Rents, market returns and subsidies are expressed in per hectare terms, after being 
divided by farmed land (measured using total adjusted agricultural utilized area 
variable). 
The information on rents is directly available in the dataset. The market return variable 
is calculated using farm gross margin information from the dataset. Farm gross margin 
is equal to farm total output minus variable expenditure costs (Defra, 2010). Market 
returns are calculated by further subtracting the value of direct payments, which are 
separately identified in the analysis. Market price support measures are incorporated in 
the market return variable. The market return variable is then interacted with main types 
of enterprise mix shares, which are calculated as ratios of livestock, cropping and dairy 
SGM to the overall SGM.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Although there are 8 farm types in the FAS dataset, the subsequent chapter merged Cattle and Sheep 
Lowland into other types because not enough observations for this type are to perform meaningful 
analysis. Accordingly, the breakdown in this table is only in the 7 types used in chapter 4. 
Number of farms in the sample:
Year All Cereal
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle
Cattle &
Sheep Mixed
2006 112 13 5 7 9 36 27 15
2007 109 12 7 6 6 39 24 15
2008 102 10 8 5 4 35 26 14
2009 104 14 6 5 6 33 21 19
2010 106 14 7 5 8 35 21 16
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 The direct payments separately identified in the regression are: 
- the SFP,  
- crop-related payments (prior to 2005 these include total crop subsidies value 
(like Arable Area Payments) and Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) grants, 
while from 2005 onwards only energy and protein crops schemes),  
- breeding-livestock related payments (prior to 2005 these include Suckler Cow 
Premium (SCP), Sheep Annual Premium (SAP), Beef Special Premium (BSP), 
extensification premiums, Milk Outgoers Schemes, Milk Agrimoney 
Compensation, and Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances; from 2005 it is 
only Scottish Ewe Scheme).   
 
Additionally, other covariates are included in the analysis to control for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity and check the sensitivity of the key results to their inclusion. 
The type of data contained in FAS is focused on farms’ agricultural production; as such, 
the information on farmer and farm characteristics is rather limited. This puts 
restrictions on the possible covariates which can be included in the model. In particular, 
there is no information on any non-agricultural pressure that could impact the value of 
the rents. This, however, is only a minor concern since when rents instead of land 
values are analysed, the impact of non-agricultural pressure is very minor. The 
covariates included are: 
- dummy for Less Favoured Area (LFA) to control for the impact of differences 
in land quality on rent levels,  
- ratio of family labour units to total labour units; this is to account for the fact 
that rent might increase with the share of family labour in overall labour due to 
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differences in productivity between family and hired labour  (Ciaian and Kancs, 
2012), 
- ratio of total fixed assets to fixed assets plus total loans to account for farm’s 
access to credit17 (Ciaian and Kancs, Ibid.). 
 
Table 3.3 shows the summary descriptives of the variables used in the estimation (all in 
per hectare terms). The value of cropping and livestock coupled payments is very small 
from 2005 onwards, as it was largely replaced by the SFP. 
 
Table 3.3 Summary description of the variables 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 When the variable is constructed that way, value of 1 means the farm has no loans, and the smaller the 
ratio, the more loans owned by the farm. 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Per hectare:
Rent 63.08 44.61
Single Farm Payment (from 2005 only) 236.46 107.86
Cropping payments
pre-2005 41.95 53.75
from 2005 0.12 0.54
Livestock payments
pre-2005 121.86 90.66
from 2005 2.06 8.22
Market return 394.10 251.33
Cropping market return 74.08 128.99
Livestock market return 87.38 91.40
Dairy market return 32.04 138.79
Control variables
Family/total labour 0.66 0.29
Assets-to-liabilities 0.84 0.21
LFA farms 73.30%
	   	  63	  
3.3.4 Choice of estimator 
 
The model is estimated using pooled OLS.  In order to justify this choice Table 3.4 
shows the decomposition of the variation in the variables into between-farm and within-
farm components. It can be seen that the majority of the variation in the dataset is 
between farms. There is not much change in the key variables over time for specific 
farms, and the majority of information therefore comes from the differences between 
farms. The lack of within variation suggests that using a fixed effects estimator might 
not be the best econometric strategy and that a pooled OLS approach will be 
preferable18. Furthermore, the type of agricultural production will to a large extent 
reflect the quality of natural resources on the farm, which in the context of rent setting 
constitute the main source of fixed effects. Thus the disaggregation of market return by 
enterprise mix shares controls for unobserved heterogeneity between the farms 
sufficiently to allow for the use of pooled OLS estimator. 
 
Table 3.4 Within and between variation of the key variables 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This was indeed proved by the results from fixed effect estimation, which produced estimates that were 
neither significant nor sensible from theoretical point of view. 
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Overall Between Within
Rent per ha 63.08 44.61 46.95 7.68
Market return per ha 394.10 251.33 223.82 113.79
Cropping market return per ha 74.08 128.99 133.59 23.63
Dairy market return per ha 32.04 138.79 130.21 14.90
Livestock market return per ha 87.38 91.40 92.99 45.07
Single farm payment per ha 236.46 107.86 109.80 38.90
Crop payments per ha
From 2005 0.12 0.54 0.48 0.31
Pre-2005 41.95 53.75 57.81 6.47
Livestock payments per ha
From 2005 2.06 8.22 4.08 7.27
Pre-2005 121.86 90.66 91.17 18.82
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The type of data available in FAS does not allow controlling for spatial correlation in 
the estimation (see Breustedt and Habermann, 2011). This is because the information on 
the location of farms is not specific enough, since it is limited to a location in a 10 km 
grid while the farms are widely spread across the whole territory of Scotland.  
Furthermore, any analysis that assumes a sudden shift in value between years prior to 
SFP and these afterwards, like general propensity score matching approach (Ciaian et 
al., 2011), is not feasible. The rent levels are going to be set for an unknown interval of 
few years around 2005, therefore the analysis must allow for a smooth transition 
between when and how the SFP is incorporated in the rent.  
 
3.3.5 Results 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 presents the first set of results, where the rent per hectare is modelled as a 
function of average lagged market return and government payments, with no additional 
covariates. In the first half of the table, the first column uses a maximum lag of two 
years, and the second and third columns use maximum lags of three and four years 
respectively, where each lag has an equal weight. The comparison across the different 
number of lags is done to check sensitivity of the results to the lag specification. 
Considering the 3-year contract review cycle, no specification with lags beyond 4 years 
are explored. Cluster robust standard errors are reported because of evidence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems in the error terms (see bottom of Table 
3.4). 
 
This is the most basic model, when no additional covariates are included. It can be seen 
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that the results remain quite stable across different lag specifications. Specifically, the 
coefficient on the SFP is between 0.11 and 0.15, which indicates that between 11 and 15 
pence of every pound received by the farmer through the SFP is passed on in the form 
of higher farmland rents. This means the capitalisation rate of SFP is between 11% and 
15%, and hence the passthrough to the farmer is between 85% and 89%. The model 
with 4 years lags has the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the highest R-
squared, and is therefore chosen as the best specification.  
 
Table 3.5 Rent regression, comparison across different lag numbers and weights19. 
 
 
To further check the sensitivity of the results, a regression with weighted averages of 
lags was also performed; these results are presented in the last three columns of Table 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Coefficients are in bold and standard errors are in small print under the estimates. Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted respectively as ***, **, *. 
Equal weights:
2 years lags
Equal weights:
3 years lags
Equal weights: 
4 years lags
Linearly 
decreasing 
weights: 2 years
lags
Linearly 
decreasing 
weights: 3 years
lags
Linearly 
decreasing 
weights: 4
years lags
Subsidies
SFP 0.114*** 0.130*** 0.148*** 0.118*** 0.135*** 0.152***
0.032 0.035 0.039 0.033 0.036 0.039
Crop payments 0.474*** 0.538*** 0.570*** 0.495*** 0.589*** 0.594***
0.076 0.081 0.075 0.077 0.087 0.080
Livestock 
payments 0.034 0.035 0.041 0.039 0.038 0.053
0.044 0.047 0.052 0.044 0.048 0.053
Market return
Cropping 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.136*** 0.151*** 0.144*** 0.137***
0.024 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.023
Livestock 0.020 0.025 0.042 0.015 0.018 0.022
0.028 0.029 0.042 0.028 0.034 0.034
Dairy 0.0742*** 0.0820*** 0.0783*** 0.0722*** 0.0777*** 0.0814***
0.015 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.017
Constant 9.882 6.495 2.943 10.080 7.065 2.986
7.482 7.588 7.206 7.437 7.493 7.236
R-squared 0.583 0.612 0.64 0.579 0.607 0.63
AIC 4428.8 3863.3 3291.8 4433.9 3869.2 3302.3
Observations 465 410 355 465 410 355
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: No first-order autocorrelation Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of dependent variable
2 years lags 3 years lags 4 years lags 2 years lags 3 years lags 4 years lags
F(1,96) = 15.270 F(1,90)=14.996 F(1, 77)=4.566 chi2(1) =21.90 chi2(1)=11.16 chi2(1)=2.81
Prob>F = 0.0002 Prob>F=0.0002 Prob>F=0.0358 Prob>chi2=0.0 Prob>chi2=0.0008 Prob>chi2=0.0938
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3.5. With this specification recent information is given more importance; the most 
recent lag has the highest weight and the weights decrease linearly. It can be seen from 
the table that the results are only slightly affected if the lags are weighted linearly. In 
particular, the capitalization of the SFP remains in the range of 12% and 15%, showing 
good robustness, therefore this option is not pursued further. No non-linear lag 
modelling options were explored. 
 
Table 3.6 Rent regression, comparison of models with additional covariates. 
 
 
 
Model A Model B Model C
Subsidies
SFP 0.148*** 0.190*** 0.139***
0.039 0.047 0.038
Crop payments 0.570*** 0.524*** 0.504***
0.075 0.076 0.080
Livestock payments 0.041 0.006 0.038
0.052 0.056 0.050
Market return
Cropping 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.118***
0.026 0.025 0.027
Livestock 0.042 0.041 0.058
0.042 0.042 0.043
Dairy 0.0783*** 0.0761*** 0.0724***
0.019 0.019 0.018
Year dummies
2006 - 18.380 -
10.050
2007 - 12.010 -
8.112
2008 - 7.706 -
5.479
2009 - 3.527 -
3.190
Control variables
LFA dummy - - -13.410
9.639
Family/total labour - - 6.198
9.058
Assets-to-liabilities - - -20.450
13.660
Constant 2.943 6.697 26.460
7.206 9.695 18.080
R-squared 0.640 0.645 0.658
AIC 3291.8 3295.2 3279.9
Observations 355 355 355
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Table 3.6 shows how inclusion of additional covariates affects the SFP estimate by 
comparing results from three different models; the basic model with lags of 4 years 
(Model A) is re-estimated with time dummies (Model B) and with the earlier specified 
additional explanatory variables (Model C). 
 
Model B uses year 2010 as the base year and includes a dummy variable for each year 
between 2006-2009. With a short time period like this, period-specific systematic 
shocks could be non-negligible (Patton et al., 2008), therefore it is worthwhile to 
control for time effects and see how that affects the results. The direction and magnitude 
of most of the coefficients are not affected by the inclusion of time effects, and the only 
significant difference is a slight increase in the SFP coefficient – from 0.15 to 0.19. 
However, the time dummies coefficients are not only statistically insignificant 
individually, but Wald test failed to reject the null of no joint significance with P-value 
of 0.31. 
 
Model C includes additional explanatory variables available from the dataset that could 
account for some differences in farms’ performance and rent levels. Essentially, the 
inclusion of these covariates is used to check if there is any significant unobserved 
heterogeneity between farms that was not fully accounted for by the disaggregation of 
market return by activity type. The coefficients on the additional covariates are not 
statistically significant individually or jointly, with Wald test failing to reject the null of 
joint significance with P-value of 0.17. The remaining coefficients do not differ much 
compared to Model A. This robustness check supports the assumption that most of the 
heterogeneity between farms is already controlled for by the disaggregation of market 
return by activity type. In particular, the coefficient on the SFP is 0.139, thus the results 
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indicate that the estimate of degree of capitalization of SFP is very stable across the 
different econometric specifications. 
 
While the main focus of this econometric exercise was the coefficient on the SFP, it is 
worth noting that the estimates of capitalization rate for crop and livestock payments are 
also robust, with the coefficients on these payments being in the proximity of 0.5 and 
zero respectively across all model specifications20. The result of high capitalization rate 
for crop payments is in line with expectations since crop payments are more tied to land 
whereas headage payments are not, therefore it is easier for landlords to extract higher 
share of the former and hence the higher capitalisation rate.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
The primary purpose of agricultural payments is to support farmers’ income. However, 
secondary effects of the payments may lead to dissipation of the money to other owners 
of factors of agricultural production, most notably landlords in the case of tenanted land. 
This has been officially recognized as problematic for agricultural policy (OECD, 2003) 
and, consequently, an increasing number of studies have investigated this issue. 
 
From 2005 onwards, the majority of agricultural support in Scotland has been paid out 
in the form of the SFP. While it is decoupled from production levels, it remains linked 
to land - through per hectare entitlements and a requirement to have a corresponding 
number of eligible hectares to activate these entitlements. This link with agricultural 
land causes concern over capitalization of the payment into farmland rents. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Although the result for livestock payments is not statistically significant.  
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The degree by which rents and land values increase as a result of the support is 
important for several reasons. First and foremost, it results in inefficiency and 
misdistribution of benefits between the tenant farmer and landlord. Furthermore, the 
impact on land prices increases fixed costs and the risk of operating losses if the support 
is reduced or stopped all together. Finally, higher land values make expansion of 
successful famers and entry of new farmers harder, which impairs structural adjustment 
in the sector.  
 
This chapter used FAS panel data to estimate the extent to which the SFP received by 
tenant farmers is passed on to landowners through higher rents using data for 
production years 2005/06 - 2009/10. The motivation behind this study was to improve 
the assumptions used in calculating net values of the SFP transfers while measuring the 
redistributive effect of agricultural policy in Scotland in the following chapter.   
 
In order to estimate the capitalisation effect, rent per hectare was regressed against the 
main sources of income from farming land: market return from farming (disaggregated 
by agricultural activity types) and different sources of agricultural support. Of primary 
interest is the coefficient on the SFP, which indicates how much of each additional 
pound of payment per hectare is transmitted into higher rents. In modelling the process 
of setting rents in Scotland it was assumed that landlords use information on past 
market returns and payments to estimate the profitability of agricultural land in order to 
set the rental rates. This is consistent with the reality of the rent-setting process as 
governed by legislation in Scotland.  
 
The average transfer efficiency of the SFP remains in the range of between 81% and 
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89% across a wide range of alternative econometric specifications. The robustness is 
tested by different approaches to modelling the past information, as well as inclusion of 
time fixed effects and other covariates, and the estimate on the SFP always stays within 
this narrow range.  
 
The study concludes that in the production years 2005/06-2009/10 the increase in 
agricultural rents as a result of the SFP is between 11 and 19 pence for every pound paid 
to the tenant farmers. That means the transfer efficiency of the payment is between 81% 
and 89%. Such a passthrough rate is relatively high compared to theoretical predictions 
about the transfer efficiency of decoupled payments which suggested that the 
capitalization rate might reach up to 100%. Comparing it to other available estimates of 
SFP capitalisation, it is lower than the 35% suggested by Kilian et al. (2008), but larger 
than the average estimate of 6% as reported by Ciaian et al. (2011). It is in fact more in 
line with the results of Ciaian and Kancs (2012) and Van Herck and Vranken (2011) 
who analysed the capitalisation rate of the SAPS and obtained estimates of 20% and 
between 10% and 15% respectively. The implied capitalisation rate in Scotland is 
higher than the suggestion of Land Court that landlord should capture around 4% of the 
SFP value in higher rents. 
 
Given that the results from different specifications fall within a narrow range, the 
middle of this range is chosen to calculate passthrough of the SFP for tenant farmers in 
the following chapter – that is the passthrough rate of 85%. While this figure is 
estimated based on tenanted farms sample only, it will be used to calculate the 
passthrough of the SFP also for farmers who rent only part of their land, for the part of 
the SFP tied to the rented share of land. 
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4 Redistributive effect 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Among the multiplicity of objectives that the CAP is required to address nowadays, 
ensuring a fair standard of living for the farming community seems somewhat lost and 
poorly defined. The current distribution of support reflects many different goals, like 
environmental sustainability or rural development. Nevertheless, the income support 
aspect was one of the starting objectives behind CAP, and the biggest part of the current 
support is distributed through the SFP, which is a continuation of compensating farmers 
for cuts in market price measures, and therefore constitutes an income support measure.  
The goals of ensuring a fair standard of living for the farming community and reducing 
income disparities depend on the distribution of support across farms. In this context, 
assessing the redistributive performance of agricultural policy is of great importance, 
and is in accordance with the OECD (1998), which points to equity and targeting as 
operational criteria for the evaluation of agricultural policy. Furthermore, concerns 
about the inequitable distribution of agricultural income support have been expressed by 
the European Commission (1991, 2002). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the redistributive effect of agricultural support 
in Scotland in production years 2005/2006 to 2009/2010. The majority of the support in 
that period comes from the SPS implemented using the historic model under the 
financial framework of the CAP that came into effect in 2005. This task will be 
performed using a formal decomposition of the redistributive effect using methodology 
based on Allanson (2008) which allows us to see how the vertical effect of support, 
associated with progressivity, is reduced by the incidence of different types of 
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horizontal inequality (HI): within and between farm types classical HI and reranking. 
The measurement of redistributive effects is useful for the design of agricultural support 
policy by indicating ways in which it might be made more effective as a tool for 
redistribution of income. 
 
In addition to the analysis of the current situation, results for two hypothetical 
distributions under variations of the regional implementation model are generated in 
order to allow for comparison of redistributive performance between the models. Such 
an exercise is useful in the context of the new reform of the CAP where the historic 
model of distribution will be replaced by area-based flat payments in all Member States.  
 
Section 4.2 provides a literature review of studies on redistributive performance of 
support. This is followed by a methodology section which starts with the description of 
inequality measure and concepts of vertical and horizontal inequality. Next is a 
discussion of relevant literature that contributed to the chosen methodology, the formal 
redistributive effect decomposition method and the estimation procedures. Section 4.4 
starts with a discussion of variables and policy scenarios and ends with a presentation of 
empirical results. Section 4.5 contains conclusions of the chapter.  
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4.2 Literature review 
 
A variety of studies have been performed on the broad concept of distributional 
performance of the CAP, focusing on its different aspects and using a multiplicity of 
methods. A large part of this literature investigates the efficiency aspect of transfers (see 
chapter 3). Research undertaken on the equity of transfers has largely focused on its 
vertical aspect. Thus most of the studies analyse the distribution of support between 
farms with different levels of income, as well as the dispersion of funds between 
Member States of the EU.  
 
Schmid et al. (2006) used budgetary statistics on the allocation of direct payments to 
obtain distribution indicators, including Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, which are 
used to analyse the distribution of payments across farms in the EU-15. These authors 
reached the conclusion that the payments are not distributed equally, with the majority 
of them going to a small number of large farms in a few Member States. Furthermore, 
they looked into the distributional consequences on farm household incomes in Austria 
using the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The measure they employed was 
mean absolute difference (MAD)21, which is robust even with negative incomes. The 
measure is calculated for market income, and market income plus one of the following: 
direct payments from first pillar, LFA payments and agri-environmental payments. The 
conclusions reached in the study indicate that CAP instruments are proportional to farm 
size. In particular, agri-environmental payments and direct payments favour bigger 
farms, which also exhibit economies of scale, and therefore benefit more in both ways. 
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LFA payments have a weakly equalizing effect, and overall the support has only a 
slightly equalizing impact on the distribution of income. 
 
Von Witzke and Noleppa (2007) employed a decomposition of the Gini coefficient into 
the components due to various income sources. The Gini coefficient can be written as a 
sum of concentration coefficients which measure how much income from each source k 
is transferred across population ranked with respect to the level of income received 
multiplied by the relative share of income from that component to the overall income; 
where  . Following Rao (1969), the relative share of 
inequality due to component k is then . The authors separated farm income into 
direct payment and market income components (where market income incorporated 
market support measures). The analysis was done using two samples from the German 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection data; one of 11,756 
family farms from 2005 and one of 481 large incorporated farms from 2004/2005. The 
results showed that direct payments contribute significantly to farm income inequality 
in Germany. Around a third of the observed inequality between family farms and 
roughly two thirds between the large incorporated farms is attributed to direct payments.  
 
Keeney (2000) also used the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income sources, 
but she observed that while it is tempting to assume  is the relative contribution of 
source k to inequality, the decomposition components lack an implicit reference 
distribution and should therefore not be interpreted as a measure of the contribution 
towards income inequality. Furthermore, the summary statistics of the decomposition 
G = µk
µk=1
K
! Ck Ck = 2cov(yk,F) /µk
µk
µ
Ck
µk
µ
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formula should not be used to quantify the income sources contributions without 
returning to the micro data. Accordingly, the contribution of each income source to total 
inequality was evaluated by calculating a reference distribution Gini coefficient with 
each income component set equal to zero in turn but with income units maintaining 
their observed rank in the overall income distribution. Additionally, following Lerman 
and Yitzhaki (1985), Keeney analysed how a marginal increase in one of the 
components impact the overall inequality. She further looked at the contributions of 
changes in the components of income over time to a change in overall inequality, 
separating support into direct payments and market-based support. The data used in the 
study came from the Irish National Farm Surveys (NFS) for years 1992 and 1996 (since 
these two years correspond to the last pre-McSharry reform calendar year and first post-
McSharry calendar year). The conclusions reached indicate that direct payments 
introduced by the MacSharry reform led to a more equal distribution of farm income in 
Ireland. The paper found that relative inequality dropped between 1992 and 1996 by 
13%. In terms of the distribution of direct payments, it is skewed towards richer farms, 
with farms in bottom three deciles of the income distribution, which are drastically 
dependant on the support, benefiting only from 13.9 % of the overall value of direct 
payments.
 
While the DPs are unequally distributed, they are less unequally distributed 
than overall income, with farms below the median income earning 13.8% of income 
while receiving a bit over 29% of direct payments. This statistic indicates a slightly 
redistributive effect of the direct payments. As far as the change in inequality goes, DPs 
were also shown to have reduced inequality whereas market support increased it. 
 
 
Yet another method to compare different policy scenarios was used by Rocchi et al. 
(2005), who employed an amended social accounting matrix (SAM) technique to 
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disaggregate the institutional sectors into agricultural and non-agricultural households. 
This modified framework was then used to perform two types of analyses: a multiplier 
analysis in order to look into the distributive structure of agriculture in Italy, and a 
simulation of the distributive effects of alternative agricultural policy solutions (with 
different degrees of decoupling). The authors concluded that as far as reduction of 
inequality among farmers goes, decoupled payments perform better than market price 
support.  
 
Lastly, the OECD (Moreddu, 2011) carried out an extensive study in the OECD 
Network for Farm Level Analysis that investigated the distribution of agricultural 
income and support in Canada, the United States and the EU. The paper found that 25% 
of largest farms produce 45-85% of gross agricultural output and also receive between 
35% and 75% of all the support. These farms represent between 50% and 75% of all 
income, and their average income is substantially above the average income for all 
farms. In terms of support distribution, market support is closely linked to production, 
so its distribution is less equal than that of payments. Overall, while the distribution of 
support is unequal and skewed towards larger farms with higher average income, 
subsidies, and particularly payments, constitute a higher share of gross receipts for 
smaller farms, making the support distribution slightly less unequal and serving to 
reduce inequality. In terms of differences between farm types, in many countries the 
support is concentrated on a few farm types, like cropping or dairy. Differences in 
average rates of support and income level are bigger by farm type than by farm size. 
This being said, in many cases support reduces the inequality between farms types, 
especially in EU Member States where high earning farms producing commodities like 
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poultry, fruit or vegetables receive less support than low earning grazing livestock 
farms, particularly in less-favoured areas.  
 
The findings of the OECD report are quite informative, however the methodology 
behind it is rather simplistic. In order to analyse the distribution of support, differences 
in average support by farm type, size and region were compared. The distribution of 
support was also compared to that of gross agricultural output and income. Relative 
Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves were calculated for the different measures. It is 
pointed out that in the study the relationship between support and income is “a purely 
static and accounting one” (Ibid., p. 10). The author recognized that the transfer 
efficiency of support is less than one, but the report did not control for this.  
 
As informative as all these studies are, they fail to provide an explicit picture of the 
redistributive performance of a specific policy scenario. In particular, the potential 
impact of horizontal inequalities on the redistributive performance of support has been 
largely neglected as an issue. This is addressed by Allanson (2008) who, in the spirit of 
Kakwani (1984) and Aronson et al. (1994), develops an innovative framework of 
redistributive effect decomposition. This methodology is then used to analyse 
redistributive performance of agricultural policy in Scotland and Italy (Allanson, 2008; 
Allanson and Rocchi, 2008). However, both analyses are performed on Scottish data for 
the period prior to 2005, that is before the introduction of the SPS.  
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4.3 Methodology 
 
 
 
This chapter will analyse the redistributive effect of agricultural support in Scotland as a 
tool to assess the equity aspect of the policy using the methodology of Allanson (2008; 
Allanson and Rocchi, 2008). Adopting the standard change-in-inequality approach, for 
the purpose of agricultural support the redistributive effect can be defined as “the 
difference between the inequality of farm incomes without and with the transfers 
accruing from the provision of support” (Allanson, 2008, p.1).  
 
This section will start with a description of the inequality measure and the notions of 
vertical and horizontal inequality, and is followed by a discussion of the relevant 
literature on which the methodology is based, before moving on to the presentation of 
the redistributive effect decomposition methodology. The section is concluded with an 
explanation of estimation procedures. 
 
 
4.3.1 Choice of inequality measure 
 
 
The key issue in measuring the redistributive effect is the choice of inequality measure. 
What follows is a brief discussion of the most common inequality measures, which vary 
with regards to the sensitivity at different places in the income distribution, concluded 
with the choice of index for the subsequent analysis. 
 
One possible choice of inequality measures is the Generalised Entropy class of indices, 
which have the general formula: 
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where yi is the income of individual i, n is the number of individuals in the sample, and 
y  is the arithmetic mean of incomes across the n individuals. The value of GE ranges 
from 0 to infinity, where 0 represents an equal distribution of income and higher values 
correspond to higher levels of inequality. Of crucial importance is the parameter !  
which represents the weight placed on distances between incomes at different points in 
the income distribution, and can take any real value. Lower values of !  mean that GE 
is more sensitive to changes in the lower end of the distributions, whereas higher values 
of !mean it is more sensitive to changes in the upper tail. The most common values 
used are 0,1 and 2, where 1 gives equal weight across the distribution but 0 and 2 are 
skewed towards the lower and upper tails accordingly. GE measures with parameters of 
0 and 1 become two of Theil’s (1967) measures of inequality, that is the mean log of 
deviation and Theil index, respectively: 
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While with ! =2, the GE measure becomes half the squared coefficient of variation: 
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Moving on, the Atkinson class of measures has the general formula: 
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where ! is an inequality aversion parameter ranging between 0 and infinity. The higher 
the value of ! , the more society is concerned with inequality (Atkinson, 1970). The 
Atkinson class of measures can take on values between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to 
no inequality. If we set ! =1!" , the GE class becomes equivalent to the Atkinson class 
of measures, for values of ! <1  (Cowell, 1995). 
 
The most commonly used measure is the Gini coefficient, an area measure related to the 
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a graph that represents the equality of income 
distribution; it shows the cumulative proportion of the population in the ascending order 
of income units plotted against the cumulative proportion of total income received by 
the given income units (Lambert, 2001). In the case of perfect equality in the income 
distribution Lorenz curve coincides with the 45° line, otherwise it lies below it. The 
Gini coefficient “measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line as a 
fraction of the total area under the 45° line” (Lambert, 2001, p. 27). It can be defined as: 
G = 12n2y yi ! yjj=1
n
"
i=1
n
"              (4.6) 
and it takes value between 0 and 1 where 0 corresponds to no inequality. 
 
While Gini coefficient is not decomposable of the sub-vectors of incomes overlap 
(Litchfield, 1999), it is useful for redistributive purposes and rank dependant measures. 
In particular, its relationship with the concentration index makes it very popular in 
measuring the redistributive effect. Extended Gini coefficient with different degree of 
inequality aversion could also be used. However, the most standard approached is to use 
the regular Gini coefficient for the purposes of analysing the redistributive effect. 
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The redistributive effect can be seen as the magnitude of the shift of the Lorenz curve 
line between pre-support and post-support incomes. Accordingly, the redistributive 
effect can be written as 
! 
R =GX "GY , where 
! 
Gx  and 
! 
GY  are the Gini coefficients of pre-
support and post-support income, respectively. 
 
However, for the purpose of this study the choice of inequality measure is constrained 
since agricultural incomes can be negative, and many standard measures are not defined 
in such a case or result in ill-behaved measures if the income is negative on average 
(Amiel et al. 1996). Specifically, the Gini coefficient is inappropriate since its sign 
depends on the sign of average income. In particular, if the average pre-transfer income 
is negative and the average post-transfer income is positive (which is often the case with 
agricultural support), R will be non-positive, regardless of the effect on inequality 
(Allanson, 2006). To solve this problem, some measure of absolute inequality can be 
used and the absolute Gini index is chosen. It can be defined as “half the average 
absolute difference between all distinct pairs of incomes in the population” (Allanson, 
2008, p. 4): 
! 
A = 12n n "1( )
yi " y j
j=1
N
#
i=1
N
#
$ 
% 
& 
' & 
( 
) 
& 
* & 
            (4.7) 
Thus, following Allanson (Ibid.), with this choice of inequality measure, the 
redistributive effect is redefined as the difference between absolute Gini indices of the 
pre-support income Ax and post-support income Ay: 
! 
R = AX " AY .   
 
 
The useful property of absolute measures is the fact that they are not affected by equal 
absolute changes to all incomes. This means that an equal flat-rate payment to all 
farmers will be distributionally neutral, whereas with relative measure distributional 
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neutrality is achieved through a payment which is the same proportion of everyone’s 
income – meaning that richer farmers receive more as their incomes are bigger. As 
Allanson (2008) points out, the notion of distributional neutrality under the absolute 
measure of inequality seems more in accordance with what is perceived as just by 
society in the context of agricultural policy. 
 
Additionally, the fact that absolute Gini coefficient is equal to the product of the 
ordinary Gini coefficient G and the average income y implies a normative interpretation 
of the redistributive effect with reference to Sen’s (1973) welfare measure W=y(1-
G)=y-A. If WY is the welfare in the post-transfer distribution and WE is the welfare with 
a hypothetical flat rate payments which are equal in total value to the actual support, 
WY !WE = (y ! Ay )! (y ! AE ) = AE ! AY = R  since AE=AX by definition. This can be 
interpreted as the monetary value of redistributive effects of the policy on an individual 
farm basis. In other words, R will represent how much or less money each farmer would 
have to be given under distributionally neutral policy of flat rate payments in order to 
obtain welfare level equal to that with the actual support.  
 
 
4.3.2 Horizontal and vertical inequality 
 
 
Along the lines of Kakwani (1984), the redistributive effect can be decomposed into 
horizontal and vertical components, providing a quantitative framework for the analysis 
of the contributions these two aspects make towards the redistributive effect of policy. 
This provides a better insight into the redistributive properties of the subsidies by 
showing the magnitude of the progressivity of transfers and how it is offset by various 
sources of HI. Such decomposition is informative for improving targeting of the support 
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and the design of policy. 
 
At this stage, some explanation of the notions of horizontal and vertical equity is 
needed. Horizontal equity, in its classical version, refers to equal treatment of income 
equals (Musgrave, 1959) and ensures that there is no discrimination on grounds other 
than income, like race, gender, or, in the context of farms, type of agricultural activity. 
Two main concepts support this principle (Duclos et al., 2003). Firstly, the presence of 
horizontal inequity (HI) undermines the progressive redistribution of income; therefore 
aversion towards it is simply a corollary of general aversion towards any type of 
inequality. Secondly, a system in which comparable individuals are treated differently 
can have negative effects on welfare and social order by causing feelings of resentment, 
injustice and insecurity.  
 
Vertical equity, on the other hand, requires that units with different incomes should be 
treated differently - in other words it calls for reducing wealth gaps. Vertical equity is 
often said to be less ethically sound than horizontal equity, since “depending on the 
retained specification of distributive fairness, the requirements of vertical justice can 
vary considerably, while the principle of horizontal equity remains essentially invariant” 
(Duclos et al., 2003, p. 4). Nevertheless, it remains widely believed that a fiscal system 
should conform to both notions of equality (Kakwani, 1984). Formal decomposition of 
the redistributive effect helps to verify if this is actually the case.  
 
Another notion that needs to be mentioned in relation to income redistribution is 
reranking. Reranking can be defined as the change in the ranking of incomes that occurs 
in the process of transition from pre-transfer to post-transfer distribution. Reranking is a 
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negative outcome of any fiscal system. If it is systematic, it creates income traps – 
situations where it can be more beneficial to be poorer to begin with as the fiscal system 
makes poorer individuals better off after the transfers. Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick 
(1981) almost simultaneously uncovered this effect, which they measured as the 
difference between the Gini coefficient and concentration coefficient22 of the post-
support income ranked by pre-support incomes, 
! 
GY "CY  (Lambert, 2001, p. 40).  
 
Reranking has been identified with horizontal equity, given that absence of the former 
implies a requirement for the latter:  
 
“the tax (fiscal) system should preserve the utility order, implying that if two 
individuals would have the same utility level in the absence of taxation 
(transfers), they should also have the same utility level if there is a tax 
(transfer).”  
 
(Feldstein, 1976, p. 94).  
 
If two unequals are reranked by some redistribution then it could be argued at a 
conceptual level that at a particular point in that process of redistribution, these two 
unequals became equals and were then made unequal (and reranked), thus violating 
classical horizontal equity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The concentration coefficient is 1 minus twice the area under a concentration curve. A concentration 
curve for a given variable y (e.g. post-support income) is “the share of total y received by observations 
with an income of x or less, graphed against the population share of those with an income no greater than 
x” (Jenkins, 1988, p. 66). 
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4.3.3 Relevant literature 
 
The origin of measuring redistributive effect dates back to Kakwani (1977), who first 
defined it as R = g1! g
"
#
$
%
&
'K T
 
where g is the average transfer rate and KT  is Kakwani’s 
index of progressivity, specified as the difference between the concentration coefficient 
of transfers ranked by pre-transfer income and the Gini coefficient of pre-transfer 
income, XT GC ! . The index of progressivity measures the degree of disproportionality 
in the distribution of transfers, i.e. how much more or less unequal is the distribution of 
transfers in comparison with the distribution of pre-transfer incomes. If the index is 
positive (negative), then support is progressive (regressive), meaning that the poorer the 
farmers the more (less) support they receive in relative terms (Kakwani, Ibid.).  
 
Later on Kakwani modified his measure of redistributive effect, having recognized that 
his earlier formula holds only if the transfers do not induce any reranking; otherwise it 
does not measure a net redistributive effect (Kakwani, 1984). He emphasized the 
importance of the distinction between the measure of progressivity and that of 
redistributive effect. His new measure includes the impact that reranking has on the 
redistributive effect, i.e. it takes into consideration the fact that if reranking occurs, it 
offsets some of the redistributive effect. Therefore the new R is  
R =GX !GY = (GX !CY )+ (CY !GY ) =
g
1! g KT + (CY !GY ) =V +H        (4.8) 
The vertical component, V = g
1! g
KT  (equivalent to his old measure) represents the 
gross redistributive impact of the fiscal system brought about by the different treatment 
of different income units, corresponding to the vertical equity component. The new, 
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horizontal component H is zero if the ranking of income units is unaltered in the 
transition process. Violating horizontal equity and therefore causing reranking will 
result in a negative value of H, in which case it will offset some of the redistributive 
effect.  
 
In their seminal paper, Aronson et al. (1994) modified Kakwani’s presentation further 
in a way that allows identifying reranking and horizontal inequality as separate 
contributions to the redistributive effect. They do it by specifying a transfer function 
applicable to all individuals; the HI arises because this function is assumed to be 
stochastic, which means that income units with comparable income receive different 
transfers. Formally, this can be represented as Ti = T xi( )+!i , where  i=1,…n where xi is 
the pre-support income for individual i, Ti is the support received by individual i and !i   
is a disturbance term with zero mean for each pre-transfer income level. This model can 
capture the randomness in the transfers for units with the same level of pre-support 
income. When such randomness occurs, T xi( )  is the expected transfer value for 
individual i and !i  is an assessment error. This methodology is applicable to 
homogenous population (for example cattle farms, or outside of agricultural context, 
single people); hence when heterogeneous groups are analysed one needs to introduce 
types, which will be developed in the following section. 
 
4.3.4 Redistributive effect decomposition 
 
 
Allanson (2006, 2007, 2008; Allanson and Rocchi, 2008), building upon the work of 
Aronson et al. (1994), developed a methodology which decomposes the horizontal part 
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of the redistributive effect into a component induced by reranking and that caused by 
classical horizontal inequalities, where the latter is further separated into the impact of 
discrimination between and within farm types (in the spirit of Kakwani and Lambert 
(1999)). The subsequent presentation follows Allanson’s (2008) notations.  
 
The full decomposition of the redistributive effect can be written as 
 
R = A X!AY = HW +HB +HR +V            (4.9) 
  
where 
! 
HW  and 
! 
HB  represent the redistributive effect of respectively within and between 
type classical HI, CBW HHH =+ . 
! 
HR  measures the reranking effect, and V signifies the 
vertical equity component.  
 
The crucial issue for estimating the classical HI components is the specification of 
reference functions, with each function providing mapping from pre-transfer to post-
transfer incomes in the absence of particular source of HI (Jenkins and Lambert, 1999).  
 
The starting point of the decomposition is the observation that agricultural policy in 
most countries is based on a number of commodity regimes, and the incidence of 
transfers within a specific regime will be usually determined by a combination of 
current and historical levels or factors of production. This means that in order to explore 
the organisation of agricultural policy, one needs to specify separate functions for 
different regimes. Accordingly, separate functions are specified for distinct sub-
populations of farms which produce similar combinations of agricultural products; 
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farms are divided into 7 categories, according to the main commodity produced23. For 
vectors of observations on pre-support incomes
! 
x = x1...,xk,...xK( ) , subsidies
! 
t = t1...,tk ...,tK( ), and post-subsidy incomes 
! 
y = y1,...yk,...yK( )  (with yk, tk and xk being 
sub-vectors of observations on type k farms), by definition y = x + t. In the spirit of 
Aronson et al. (1994) the relationship between the pre-support and post-support income 
for type k can be described as: 
yik = gk xik( )+!ik = E yik | xik[ ]+!ik = xik +E tik | xik[ ]+!ik = xik + tx (xik )+!ik ;              (4.10)      
k = 1,….K;  i=1,….nk. 
 
where xik, yik, tik, and !ik  are pre-support income, post-support income, transfer level 
and disturbance term for farm i in type k. gk (xik ) = xik + tk (xik )  is the expected value of 
post-subsidy income conditional on the farm type and pre-subsidy income, tk(xik) is the 
expected transfer level given farm type and pre-subsidy income, and !ik  is the 
disturbance term with zero mean for each pre-transfer income level. The disturbance 
term represents the possibility that farms of type k which have identical pre-support 
incomes may obtain different levels of transfers due to differences in factors like 
managerial ability, historical developments or natural resource endowments. For 
example, in commodity regimes where the support level is linked to current levels of 
inputs and outputs, any given level of pre-transfer income may be associated with a 
range of input and output combinations, leading to a dispersion of transfer levels. With 
decoupled payment schemes, the link between the incidence of support and pre-transfer 
incomes through current production choices is expressly broken, but the link with 
historical support levels maintains the possibility of a dispersion of transfers.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The FAS dataset separates farms into 8 different types. However, in this analysis Lowland Sheep and 
Cattle category was integrated into LFA Sheep, LFA Cattle or LFA Sheep and Cattle since there were not 
enough observations to perform meaningful analysis for this type.  
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The shape of the reference functions will depend on how expected transfers vary with 
pre-transfer income; in general, the magnitude of both is expected to be more or less 
proportionate to the scale of production. Still, given how complex the commodity 
regimes and agricultural production processes are, it will not be possible to specify the 
precise form of this relationship. For that reason, the set of gk(xik) functions are simply 
assumed to be continuous, smooth functions, which generate a non-parametric model 
with only very weak constraints on its structure. 
 
Given the specification function in equation (4.10), two possible sources of classical HI 
can be identified. Firstly, the within-type HI will be demonstrated by the dispersion 
about the conditional mean E[yik| xik]. Therefore the disturbance term 
! 
"k  captures the 
possibility that farms of the same type with identical pre-support income may obtain 
different levels of transfers. Only when the disturbance term is zero there will be no 
within-type HI and this is represented by a vector of post-support incomes 
hW (x) = [g1(x1),...gk (xk ),...gK (xK )] . If 
! 
AW   is defined as the absolute Gini index of hW(x), 
we can define 
! 
HW = AW " AY , which shows that the within-type HI can be measured as 
the difference in inequality between 
! 
hW (x)  incomes and post-subsidy incomes y, and it 
will be non-positive asymptotically24.  
 
The other source of classical HI is systematic discrimination between farm types. Since 
the reference functions are type-specific, farms that have identical pre-support income 
may be expected to receive different transfers depending on their type, and the size of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is because the Lorenz curve for the reference functions will be situated on or above the Lorenz 
curve for y due to the fact that 
! 
hW (x)  could be obtained by performing a “series of progressive mean-
preserving transfers” (Allanson, 2008, p. 25; Dasgupta et al., 1973). Therefore the inequality of 
! 
hW (x)  
will be less than that for y, and 
! 
HW  will be non-positive asymptotically, but might happen to be positive 
in a finite sample. 
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this divergence reveals the magnitude of between-type HI. There will be no between-
type HI if gk (xik ) = g(xik )  for all k, and thus hw (x) = g(x)  which means a one-to-one 
mapping from pre-transfer incomes to post-transfer incomes for all farms, and t(x) will 
be the non-discriminatory transfer level. For lack of theory to guide the specification of 
this non-discriminatory reference function, it is assumed that between-type HI will 
change the distribution of the transfers, but their overall value for any given pre-support 
income will stay the same (Allanson, 2008). Consequently, the expected value of post-
support income given the pre-support income, but without taking the type of farm into 
consideration, can be obtained as weighted sum of the post-support income functions 
for the different types: 
! 
hB (x) = wk (x)gk (x)
k=1
K
" ;      where 
! 
wk (x) =1
k=1
K
"          (4.11) 
 
The weights, which sum up to a unit vector, are determined locally, in relation to 
relative frequencies of the types of farms at any given pre-support income25. The 
between-type HI can then be measured as the difference in inequality between 
! 
hB (x) 
and 
! 
hW (x) , that is 
! 
HB = AB " AW  , where 
! 
AB  is defined as the absolute Gini index for 
! 
hB (x). Since 
! 
hB (x) is a weighted average of the 
! 
gk (x) functions, its Lorenz curve will 
be situated on or above the Lorenz curve of 
! 
hW (x) , and thus the difference between the 
two Gini indices will be non-positive (Allanson, 2008).  
 
Only when  y = hB (x) there will be a one-to-one mapping from pre-transfers incomes to 
post-transfer incomes which implies no classical HI. The total size of classical HI, that 
is the sum of the within-type and between-type HI, will be reflected by the extent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Instead of being determined globally according to proportions of each type of farms in the population. 
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divergence of post-support income from the non-discriminatory function
! 
hB (x). Putting 
the two components together gives: 
! 
Hw + HB = AW " AY + AB " AW = AB " AY         (4.12)   
As mentioned earlier, the total redistributive effect is given by
! 
AX " AY . This means the 
identification of the classical HI components leaves
! 
AX " AB , which is the measure of 
the difference in inequality between the pre-support incomes and the non-discriminatory 
post-support incomes.  This residual can be further decomposed into vertical and 
horizontal components. Following Kakwani (1984), the decomposition can be written 
as: 
AX ! AB = yB[CB !GB ]+[xGX ! yBCB ]= HR +V        (4.13) 
where 
! 
CB  is the concentration index of non-discriminatory post-support incomes 
ranked by the order of pre-support incomes, 
! 
GX  is the ordinary Gini coefficient of pre-
support income, x  is mean pre-support income, 
! 
GB  is the Gini coefficient of non-
discriminatory post-support income and yB  is the mean non-discriminatory post-
support income.   
 
The horizontal component HR, which measures the reranking effect in the income 
distribution, is the product of the average post-support income yB  and CB !GB , which 
can be identified with the reranking index of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981). This 
component is non-positive, which reflects the fact that reranking causes unfairness in 
the distribution of support and therefore affects the redistributive effect negatively. 
Reranking will not occur if 
! 
hB (x)  is an increasing function of x over the whole range of 
pre-support incomes.  
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The vertical component measures the progressivity of support and can be perceived as 
an index of gross redistributive effect (Allanson, 2008). It can be rewritten as:  
V = [xGX ! yBCB ]= !CTB tB             (4.14) 
where 
! 
t B  is the mean value of non-discriminatory transfers and 
! 
CTB is the concentration 
coefficient of non-discriminatory transfers ranked according to pre-transfer incomes. 
One can define a disparity index D = - 
! 
CTB , which will be positive if support is 
progressive in absolute terms, negative if it is regressive and zero if benefits do not 
depend on the pre-support income. The gross redistributive index is proportional to the 
mean value of non-discriminatory transfers for any given D. The gross redistributive 
effect is in general more positive/ less negative than R due to the presence of different 
types of HI that reduce the redistributive effectiveness of support.  
 
4.3.5 Estimation procedures 
 
The key aspect of obtaining the estimates of different components of R is the estimation 
of the reference functions. Following Allanson and Rocchi (2008), the set of reference 
functions in equation (4.10) can be estimated using a sample of kn observations on pre-
transfer and post-transfer incomes for all types of farms; it can be done parametrically 
or non-parametrically. The first method assumes some pre-specified functional form; 
parametric statistical procedures are based on assumptions about the shape of the 
distribution in the population (normal distribution) and about the form of the 
parameters, like means or standard deviations. Because of the complexity that the 
agricultural production activity and the commodity regimes demonstrate, the precise 
functional form of the function is not specifiable. Accordingly, a non-parametric 
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estimation is employed. Non-parametric statistical procedures can be defined “as a class 
of statistical procedures that do not rely on assumptions about the shape or form of the 
probability distribution from which the data were drawn” (Hoskin, n.d., p.1). The 
functions are assumed to be smooth and continuous, without the need to impose any 
strong constraints on their structure. For the purpose of this study, the variable span 
smoother of Sasieni (1998) is employed to smooth
! 
yk  on
! 
xk .  
“The smooth is a running line fit with a variable span (…) which is chosen at 
each point by cross validation on the mean squared error of prediction. The span 
at each point is smoothed to produce the variable span used to smooth the data” 
 
 (Sasieni, 1998, p. 4).  
 
The number of observations employed at each data point is chosen by the variable span 
of the smoother. The suitability of non-parametric estimation will be tested empirically 
by comparing the predictive power of parametric and non-parametric estimates. 
 
The non-discriminatory function in equation (4.11) can be estimated non-parametrically 
using kernel density estimates of the weight functions wk (xk )  (Kakwani and Lambert, 
1999), but it will not be possible to achieve reliable estimates unless the number of 
observations on each type of farm is large enough. Alternatively, it can also be 
estimated using Sasieni’s technique of variable span smoother, but using the pooled 
sample of n = nk!  observations.  
 
Absolute Gini and concentration indices are obtained using the weighted sample 
formulae of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989), who developed a method to measure the Gini 
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coefficient which does not require grouping of income units and thus disregarding 
differences within groups. They prove that the Gini coefficient is twice the covariance 
between a variable and its rank divided by the product of the variable’s mean and the 
sample size  
G = 2cov[y,F(y)]y              (4.15) 
In a weighted sample, the estimator of the cumulative distribution F(y) is its mid-
interval: 
Fˆi (y) = wj +
wi
nj=0
i!1
"              (4.16) 
This formula can be used to calculate weighted covariance between the variable and its 
cumulative distribution. Hence, for weighted data the formula used is: 
G = 2 wi (yi ! y
i=1
n
" )(Fi ! Fˆ) / y                          (4.17) 
where y is the weighted mean of income. 
 
The standard errors are obtained using bootstrapping (Efron, 1979). Bootstrapping is a 
technique used in statistical interference to measure the properties of an estimator based 
on a sampling distribution obtained through resampling with replacement from the 
sample at hand. A large number of bootstrapping samples of size n from the original 
sample are drawn in order to approximate the distribution of the population (1000 
replications in this case). The relationship of the bootstrapping sample to the original 
sample is like that of the sample to the population. Such an approach allows for the 
estimation of the sampling distribution of a statistic without the need to make 
assumptions about the distribution of the population. 
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4.4 Empirical section 
 
The empirical section starts with the discussion on the data and variables creation; this 
is followed by an explanation of the hypothetical policy scenarios which are modelled. 
Lastly the results are presented; firstly from the actual distribution under historic model, 
and then two alternative scenarios. This is concluded with comparison to Allanson’s 
(2008) results from before the SFP introduction.  
 
4.4.1 Data and variables construction 
The study uses micro-level weighted data from Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) for years 
2006 - 2010, which correspond to production years 2005/06 – 2009/10.   
The measure of post-transfer income used in the study is the Cash Income measure as 
recorded by FAS. It is obtained by calculating the difference between total trading 
revenue (crop and livestock revenues, subsidies and payments) and total trading 
expenditure (variable costs, general overheads26, fuel, repairs, rent paid, paid labour). 
Revenue represents receipts adjusted for debtors and expenditure is purchases adjusted 
for creditors. It represents the cash return to individuals for their managerial and manual 
labour input and on their investment in the enterprise. Factors not included in the 
calculation of cash income are: depreciation on fixed assets, change in the value of 
livestock and crop, imputed labour costs and imputed unpaid labour of non-principal 
partners, directors and their spouses, as well as imputed rents. This means that farms 
which own their land and labour are better off in the analysis than farms which have to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Overheads are expenses which cannot readily be traced to processes that result in particular single 
products. 
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undergo additional expenditure to hire land and labour. This measure is chosen as it 
seems to be the best representative of what is available to farmers for their spending 
purposes and therefore it corresponds closely to the income position as perceived by a 
farmer (Allanson, 2008). 
  
Pre-transfer income is Cash Income minus the net value of the transfers. The gross 
value of support is the total amount of money that farmers receive. Three sources of 
support are distinguished: support through market prices, the SFP, and all other grants 
and subsidies (payments under Pillars I and II, and national grant schemes). Market 
price support is calculated using OECD (2011) data on the gap between domestic and 
international prices for the main commodities, which is measured at farm gate level.  
 
It is recognized that the benefits of support do not always fully accrue to farmers but are 
dispersed among the owners of factors of production (OECD, 2003).  This requires an 
approach to calculate the net value of transfers that accrue to farmers, which depends on 
how much it increases the returns to factors of production owned by farmers, where 
other beneficiaries might include the landlords or hired workers.   
 
Following the and Allanson and Rocchi (2008) follow the OECD (2003) approach to 
calculating transfer efficiency of payments, which is based on the assumption that 
“farmers can capture only that part of the support that remunerates the factors of 
production they themselves own” (OECD, Ibid., p. 8). It is therefore important to know 
the shares of factors of production owned by the farmer. More specifically, the static 
impact on farm incomes from a unit increase in output revenues (due to market price 
support, output payments or a decrease in set-aside requirements) is equal to the 
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combined share of the farm-owned factors of production, whereas that from a unit 
increase in direct payments, or grants and subsidies to individual inputs is equal to the 
farm-owned share of those inputs. In the case of the SFP which is a direct payment to 
land, this would imply that farmers who rent land do not receive any of the value of the 
SFP tied to this rented land, as this will simply be reflected in higher rents.  
 
In terms of technical details behind the methodology, estimates of combined income 
share from land, labour and capital by farm type are obtained by calculating the ratio of 
average gross value added to average output revenue from the farm-level data. Next, 
income shares from land and labour are estimated separately from sub-samples of farms 
with hired labour and rented land only, leaving a residual share accrued to capital. The 
methodology, following Allanson and Rocchi (2008), assumes that farmer maximizes 
profit of the form: 
Π = pY - (rA  +wL + mK + vX) + sA         (4.18) 
Output Y is produced using four factors of production: land (A), labour (L), management 
and capital supplied by the farm (K) and variable inputs (X). s is the value of subsidy 
per hectare. We assume constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The elasticities of factors of production are: α for land, β for labour, γ for management 
and capital, and (1-α-β-γ) for variable inputs. The first order conditions for 
maximization of profit are respectively:  
• (r-s)A = αpY, 
• wL = βpY,  
• mK = γpY  
• vX = (1-α-β-γ)pY. 
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The information on revenue pY, subsidies sA and the value added net of subsidies rA + 
wL + mK = (pY - vX) is available in FAS data irrespective of the ownership of land or 
labour arrangement. The net value added share of market revenues !  = (α + β + γ) can 
be obtained by estimating a weighted average value of the ratio 
!
"  = (pY - vX)/pY. 
Information on wages and rents for unpaid labour and owned land is contained in FAS 
data, thus r and w can be calculated based on it.  
 
Given that, the weighted sample average value of the ratios !ˆ  = (r-s)A/pY and !ˆ  =  
wL/pY can be derived. We can label σA  , σL, σK and σX the proportions of factors of 
production that belong to the farm family, assuming that  σK = 1 and σX = 0. If we define 
the total farm income as 
 I = σArA + σLwL + mK +σA sA           (4.19) 
we can then estimate  
Î = ( !ˆ  - ((1 - σA) !ˆ  + (1 - σL) !ˆ )pY + σAsA.                  (4.20) 
Accordingly, ( !ˆ  - ((1 - σA) !ˆ  + (1 - σL) !ˆ ) proportion of £1 increase in revenue and σL   
proportion of £1 increase in land subsidy will contribute towards higher income for the 
farmers. Such identification allows obtaining the net value of the transfer that benefits 
the farmers. 
 
Since farm-owned shares of factors of production are derived for individual farms, the 
effective passthrough of support can vary between farms depending on the mix of 
support measures and the ownership structure of the farm. 
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This study takes a step further in the approach towards calculation of the decoupled 
direct payments, with the improvement of explicitly estimating the passthrough rate of 
the SFP. The OECD’s approach is very simplified in that it assumes that farmers which 
rent land do not obtain any of the SFP value; such high capitalisation rate is unlikely in 
a short period, and since SFP is a dominant share of support from 2005 onwards, it was 
important to improve the assumption used in calculating its transfer efficiency; an 
empirically estimated passthrough rate improves the accuracy of this assumption. 
Therefore in order to calculate the net value of SFP for farmers who rent the land, the 
estimate of average passthrough from Chapter 3 (85 per cent) is used. This means that 
out of every pound from the SFP transfer, 85 pence goes to the farmer and 15 pence 
goes to the landlord in the form of higher rents. This is used for any SFP payments tied 
to rented land, whether the farmer rents all the land or just part of it; in the latter case 
the share of overall SFP value which corresponds to the share of rented land is 
multiplied by the passthrough rate. 
 
4.4.2 Policy scenarios 
 
The first part of the analysis was performed using data with distribution of support 
based on the historic model (referred to from now on as historic model). Additionally, a 
set of results was generated by simulating what the distribution of support would have 
been with the regional model in place, with two alternative scenarios:  
- flat rate across the whole Scotland (flat rate scenario from now on), 
- one rate for Less-Favoured Areas (LFA) and another for non-LFA (LFA/non-
LFA scenario from now on).  
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The first scenario is in accordance with other small countries that implemented the 
regional model treating the whole territory as one region, for example Slovenia. The 
second scenario limits the extent of redistribution of support by dividing the territory 
into different regions based on land productivity; this sort of model was implemented in 
England. The division of land according to LFA and non-LFA regions is in line with the 
proposal of Pack (2010b) in his final inquiry report into the future or agricultural 
support in Scotland27. The inquiry suggests this method as a “ way of distinguishing 
between types of farming with different needs, opportunities and choices” (Ibid., p. 72). 
The specific classification is proposed because it is widely used across Europe and 
because the distinction has already been mapped and boundaries have been established.  
 
Around 85% of land in Scotland is classified as LFA, and these areas mainly consist of 
permanent grass and rough grazing, which limits the choice of activities for farmers. As 
a consequence, these areas are usually used for ruminants, with suckled beef playing a 
particularly important role. While agricultural production on this land plays an 
important role in terms of provision of public goods, it is also a highly uncompetitive 
way to produce meat, and it is at risk of disappearing without support. The remaining 
15% of Scottish agricultural land is of good quality and not classified as LFA; it can be 
used for a wide range of production and it has high returns to inputs (Pack, 2010b).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Interim report (Pack, 2010a) proposed an alternative solution, with regions divided according to 
land capability using Macaulay Land Capability for Agriculture (LCA) classification, with three rates of 
support available. The final report walked away from this solution since modelling showed that it “led to 
significant reductions in support across many of the farm types important to Scotland” (Pack, 2010b, p. 
106) and also due to technical difficulties with the implementation.  
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4.4.3 Results 
4.4.3.1 Historic model 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 presents weighted summary statistics by year for all farm types under the 
actual distribution of support with historic model in place. The low value of average 
pre-transfer income (with negative figures in 2006 and 2007), together with the high 
percentage of farms that suffer from negative pre-transfer income, highlight the chronic 
dependence of Scottish agriculture on support. Average post-transfer income is positive 
in every year, however, between 5% and 8% of farms suffer from negative income even 
after the support was provided.   
 
The average pre-transfer income has increased from negative figures in 2006 and 2007 
to positive ones in the last three years of the study. This reflects positive market trends 
in those years: rising global demand for crops, favourable currency exchange which 
increased the value of the SFP, good prices for finished cattle and calves, and high 
prices for sheep (SGRERAD, 2009 - 2012). The increase in the average pre-transfer and 
post-transfer incomes throughout the sample period might suggest a positive trend in 
Scottish agricultural incomes with a corresponding slight reduction in the degree of 
dependency on the support, but a longer time horizon would need to be studied to draw 
more definite conclusions.  
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Table 4.1 Weighted summary statistics by year, actual distribution. 
 
 
The mean value of support ranges between 53337 in 2008 and 61299 in 2010. However, 
leakages to other factors of production meant that farmers did not receive the full value 
of this support, with the percentage of passthrough ranging between 68% in 2006 and 
77% in 2010. The Single Payment is the main source of support, on average accounting 
for between 49% to 63% of gross transfers; its contribution to net support is higher, in 
the range of 68% and 78%. The passthrough of SFP is higher than for market price 
support and other grants and subsidies, hence bigger role played in net support. Over the 
study period, the share of Single Payment in the net transfer increased, reducing the 
contribution of market price support and other grants and subsidies in net transfers from 
16% each in 2006 to 10% and 12%, respectively, in 2010. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of observations 474 458 443 479 484
Farm business size (ESU) 54 55 55 58 59
Post-transfer income  (£) 31263 34245 44568 47465 48935
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 6% 7% 8% 8% 5%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -8320 -5065 4865 5850 1753
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 68% 63% 51% 52% 54%
Gross support (£) 57913 57179 53337 54152 61299
Components:
Market price support 18235 19210 13434 11689 13697
Single Payment Scheme 28496 29646 29235 33598 38563
Other grants and subsidies 11182 8323 10668 8864 9039
Net transfer to farmers (£) 39583 39311 39703 41615 47182
Components:
Market price support 6354 6467 4890 4225 4948
Single Payment Scheme 26953 28045 27735 31912 36614
Other grants and subsidies 6276 4799 7078 5478 5620
Net support as % of post-support income 127% 115% 89% 88% 96%
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Table 4.2 Weighted summary statistics by farm type, actual distribution. 
 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results by farm type, averaged across the years. It can be seen that 
pre-transfer incomes are consistently negative for livestock farms, which are usually 
enterprises of smaller economic size with worse quality land, and for mixed farms. 
General Cropping and Dairy farms have the highest average pre-transfer and post-
transfer incomes. The lowest average post-transfer incomes are received by livestock 
farms, particularly Sheep; Sheep farms are also the ones that receive the lowest average 
value of support. Specialist Cattle and Cattle & Sheep farms, on the other hand, 
received the highest mean support, closely followed by Dairy farms. The standard 
deviation of net transfers across farm types is significantly lower than for gross support 
(it goes down from 15324 to 7491), which indicates that transfer efficiency which will 
vary for different combinations of support types act to reduce dispersion in average 
transfer levels between farm types.  
 
Comparison of the standard deviations for pre-transfer versus post-transfer incomes by 
farm type reveals a reduction in the degree of dispersion (from 15412 to 14928). By 
implication the provision of support on average acted to reduce income disparities 
All Cereal
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle
Cattle &
Sheep Mixed
Number of observations 468 66 46 58 41 121 70 65
Farm business size (ESU) 56 62 104 103 15 39 42 58
Post-transfer income  (£) 41295 45847 59452 64573 22470 31842 36153 44420
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 7% 10% 4% 4% 3% 9% 7% 7%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -184 10926 22690 21396 -6245 -14018 -11453 -4267
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 58% 36% 35% 31% 68% 76% 72% 59%
Gross support (£) 56776 38400 46137 62838 33994 67001 70849 67542
Components:
Market price support 15253 1694 9032 28873 5904 19983 18706 20005
Single Payment Scheme 31908 34543 34221 30380 17620 32327 34383 39413
Other grants and subsidies 9615 2163 2883 3585 10469 14691 17760 8123
Net transfer to farmers (£) 41479 34921 36761 43176 28716 45860 47606 48686
Components:
Market price support 5377 473 2691 11256 3940 6578 6129 6289
Single Payment Scheme 30252 33048 32295 29674 16875 30530 31952 37285
Other grants and subsidies 5850 1399 1776 2246 7901 8752 9525 5113
Net support as % of post-support income 103% 83% 67% 70% 133% 146% 135% 111%
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between farm types in Scotland, contrary to the findings of the OECD (2003) report that 
agricultural support increases income disparities between farm types in most countries.  
 
The SFP constitutes the main source of support for all farm types, however, there are 
some differences between farm types in terms of the contribution of different support 
types. Market price support on average constitutes 13% of net support, but for Dairy 
farms this figure is 26% as historically the majority of support to dairy farmers was 
delivered through market price support (OECD, 2005) and prices for dairy products in 
the EU are still considerably higher than the world prices (European Commission, 
2011b). While the average share of other grants and subsidies in net support is 14%, for 
Specialist Sheep and Specialist Cattle farms this figure is higher, at 28% and 19% 
respectively. This is because the livestock farms are on poor quality land and they 
benefit from various agri-environmental and LFA payments. The SFP on average 
accounted for 73% of net support, but for farm types that now benefit relatively little 
from market price support and other grants and subsidies this figure was higher; on 
average Cereal farms got 95% of net support from the payment and General Cropping 
farms got 88%.  
 
Figures 4.1 - 4.5 plot the estimation results for each year: scatterplot of  observations on 
pre-support incomes and transfer levels together with the results from the nonparametric 
estimation of the non-discriminatory transfers plotted against pre-support incomes in 
Panel A, and the set of farm type specific transfer functions tk (xik )   (from equation 
(4.10)) plotted together with the non-discriminatory transfer function against pre-
support incomes in Panel B.  
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Figure 4.1 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, historic model, 2006. 
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Figure 4.2 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, historic model, 2007. 
Panel A 
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Figure 4.3 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, historic model, 2008. 
Panel A 
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Figure 4.4 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, historic model, 2009. 
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Figure 4.5 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, historic model, 2010. 
Panel A 
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Panel A in each figure provides scatterplots of observations on pre-transfer incomes and 
transfers, linear regression of the transfers on pre-transfer incomes and the non-
discriminatory transfer functions. The purpose of this graph is to show the shape of the 
relationship between pre-support incomes and transfer levels, and to further show that 
the non-parametrically estimated transfer function fits this shape better than the linear 
prediction. From the scatterplots we can see that in general the observations are not 
monotonic, but instead are V-shaped. The graphs show that the non-parametric function 
fits the observations better than the linear prediction line because it fits this V shape 
better than a flat line. This is further reinforced by the information in Table 4.3, which 
shows that the predictive power of the reference function is consistently higher than that 
of the linear regression for every year of the sample. 
 
Table 4.3 Predictive power of the transfer functions and F-test results, historic model. 
 
 
Furthermore, using an F-test procedure (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988, p. 599), it was 
determined that the pre-transfer incomes are highly significant in the linear model, but 
Predictive power of: 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Linear regression
model 0.30 0.47 0.46 0.69 0.01
Non-discriminatory 
transfer function 
0.46 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.23
Specific transfer
function by farm
type
0.58 0.69 0.59 0.80 0.38
F-test:
1% 
significance 
critical 
1% 
significance 
critical 
1% 
significance 
critical 
1% 
significance 
critical 
1% 
significance 
critical 
values of the
F statistic
values of the
F statistic
values of the
F statistic
values of the
F statistic
values of the
F statistic
Pre-transfer income
effect for the linear
model
205.36 7.20 406.80 7.15 371.82 7.27 1046.77 7.03 7.31 7.18
Linearity of the non-
discriminatory 
function
46.34 4.24 47.83 3.87 7.19 4.35 68.34 4.50 47.54 4.65
Farm-type effects for 
the specific functions 4.26 1.80 3.45 1.84 4.41 1.91 2.27 1.86 4.26 1.95
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the assumption of linearity is rejected in favour of the non-parametric specifications – 
the null of the linearity restrictions was rejected at 1% significance level in all years. 
The kinked shape of the non-discriminatory non-parametric transfer function constitutes 
a very noticeable feature; the function is downward sloping for pre-support incomes 
below zero, and upward sloping for positive pre-support incomes. A downward sloping 
line represents progressivity in absolute terms, and an upward sloping line represents 
regressivity. This combination of both slopes means that the support works in a 
different manner depending on the value of pre-support incomes. The support is 
regressive, meaning it benefits richer farms more, for the range of farms which break 
even without the support. For farms in range of negative pre-support incomes, the 
support is highly progressive. Farms in that range are mainly livestock grazing farms, 
which would go out of business were it not for the provision of support, and even after 
provision of transfers, they remain barely profitable. 
 
The graphs also include a breakeven line which plots the level of net transfers that 
farmers with negative pre-transfer incomes would need to receive in order to breakeven. 
The logic behind this is that for all the farms that generate negative pre-support 
incomes, the transfers need to be equal at least to the opposite of the pre-support 
incomes in order for the farm to break even. Thus the line demonstrates a certain type of 
sample selection for observations above it that would lead to a bias in the transfer 
function if it were estimated linearly. Farms which would suffer from very negative 
post-transfer incomes are simply not observed in the sample as they would have gone 
out of business, leaving those observations in the range of negative pre-transfer incomes 
that have post-transfer incomes close to zero – the support system keeps them in 
business. The fact that the transfer function roughly overlaps with the breakeven line 
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(being slightly above it in most years) emphasises the role of support keeping the loss-
generating farms in business for the range of negative pre-support incomes. There are 
some farms just below the line, and this represents the percentage of farms that make 
losses even after provision of support in any given year. However, farms which would 
consistently suffer losses or would be very far away from the breakeven line go out of 
business and are not observed in the dataset.  
 
Panels B in Figures 4.1 – 4.5 repeat the non-discriminatory transfer functions from 
Panels A, but also show the farm type specific transfer functions. The purpose of this is 
to show the dispersion between the farm type specific functions around the non-
discriminatory transfer functions, which will portray the degree of between-type 
horizontal inequality. Looking at the set of farm type specific transfer functions, one can 
clearly see the dispersion between the transfer functions for different farm types, which 
indicates the between-type inequality. Table 4.3 shows that the predictive power of farm 
specific functions is higher than that of non-discriminatory function. Furthermore, the 
F-test rejects the restrictions of no farm-type effects at 1% significance level in all 
years. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the decomposition results for the actual policy regime across all sample 
years.  Using the example of 2010, the absolute Gini index for pre-transfer income (AX) 
was 18748, which is equal to half the average absolute difference between all distinct 
pairs of pre-support incomes in the sample. The corresponding value for post-transfer 
income (AY) is 23483. As can be seen, the difference between those two values, which 
represents the redistributive effect, is substantial. The average absolute difference 
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between all pairs of incomes increases, which means that absolute inequality is higher 
with the support in place.  
 
This pattern is repeated for all years: the redistributive effect was always negative and 
the provision of agricultural support increased the level of absolute income inequality – 
a result that is consistently statistically significant at 5% level. The percentage increase 
in inequality due to the agricultural support ranges between 13% in 2009 and 25% in 
2010.  
 
Table 4.4 Redistributive effect decomposition by year, historic model28. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For all tables, the results are in bold and the bootstrap standard errors are in small print under each 
value. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted respectively as ***, **, *. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Absolute Gini index of post-transfer income 15449 *** 17975 *** 23900 *** 24613 *** 23483 ***
693 970 1087 1303 1081
Absolute Gini index of farm type specific reference 10150 *** 12939 *** 18815 *** 19828 *** 17383 ***
income 786 1068 1163 1391 1184
Absolute Gini index of non-discriminatory reference 8534 *** 11004 *** 17713 *** 19038 *** 16143 ***
 income 790 1057 1157 1383 1254
Absolute concentration index of non-discriminatory 8506 *** 10987 *** 17712 *** 19030 *** 16112 ***
reference income (by start income) 841 1130 1176 1403 1308
Absolute Gini index of pre-transfer income 12903 *** 14455 *** 20943 *** 21688 *** 18748 ***
696 979 1024 1294 915
Index of redistributive effect -2546 *** -3520 *** -2957 *** -2924 *** -4735 ***
695 646 642 733 776
Index of vertical redistribution 4397 *** 3468 *** 3231 *** 2659 *** 2637 ***
757 810 718 761 958
Disparity of net transfers 0.11 *** 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mean non-discriminatory transfers 39583 *** 39311 *** 39703 *** 41615 *** 47182 ***
721 768 900 785 952
Disparity of net market price support -0.03 -0.03 0.07 ** -0.02 0.02
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Disparity of net Single Farm Payment 0.12 *** 0.08 *** 0.02 0.03 0.03
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Disparity of net other grants and subsidies 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.17 ***
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Index of systematic reranking -28 -17 -1 -8 -31
351 372 119 220 312
Total classical horizontal inequality -6915 *** -6971 *** -6188 *** -5575 *** -7340 ***
506 543 544 451 607
Of which:
Between farm type -1616 *** -1935 *** -1102 ** -791 ** -1241 **
477 476 481 385 533
Within farm type -5299 *** -5036 *** -5085 *** -4784 *** -6100 ***
396 407 439 368 445
AY
AW
AB
AX
yBCB
R
V
D
tB
HR
HB
HW
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However, the vertical stance of transfers, measured as the product of the progressivity 
of support D and the mean value of non-discriminatory transfer tB , is positive in all 
years; the result is also always statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that 
agricultural support is progressive in absolute terms, implying that poorer farmers get 
more than their equal share of non-discriminatory transfers. Such a finding might seem 
surprising given that CAP support under the historic model is linked to the historic 
levels of support, and through this to the historic volume of production. Given the 
structure of the industry has not changed much, one can expect this to mean that farms 
which are larger in terms of economic size will be getting more support. However, the 
reality of agricultural production in Scotland means that not all large farms (in terms of 
economic size units) generate high pre-transfer incomes. This is because many 
agricultural activities in Scotland would be loss-making in the absence of support, yet 
farmers continue to engage in these activities to qualify for support (Allanson, 2008). 
Accordingly, for some farm types gross support, transfers and non-discriminatory 
transfers are negatively correlated with pre-transfer incomes. The implications of this 
are such that the support often keeps loss-making farms of large economic size in 
business, which makes it more progressive. However, if the justification for support 
linked to the production size is to reward the most productive farmers, this is not 
realized with these loss-making farms which are highly dependant on support to remain 
in business. 
 
The disparity index D is also calculated separately for different types of support: market 
price measures, the SFP and other grants and subsidies. The distribution of other grants 
and subsidies is the most progressive one among all sources of support, as indicated by 
the highest D index, and it is the only result consistently statistically significant. SFP 
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distribution is also progressive, although less than other grants and subsidies, and the 
value of D is low and statistically insignificant in 2008 - 2010. The results for market 
price support are mixed and statistically insignificant, with the exception of 2008 when 
the progressivity of this type of support was the highest of all years and higher than for 
SFP.  
 
In terms of specific examples to illustrate why overall the support is progressive in 
Scotland, large Cattle and Sheep farms are likely to have been making losses without 
support since meat production on LFA is a highly uncompetitive way to produce meat. 
While these farms are of smaller economic size than the average across farms, they 
receive higher values of support which keeps them in business. Furthermore, some of 
these farms that might be of large economic size will be receiving high values of 
transfers, but since they are loss-making, the pre-transfer incomes would be largely 
negative. This illustrated that there is no obvious story between the economic size of an 
enterprise and its profitability in Scotland, and that overall, the support the loss-making 
farms receive will contribute to the progressivity of support, even if their economic size 
is large – because their pre-support incomes are low.  
 
As seen earlier, the shape of the non-parametric non-discriminatory transfer functions 
with the kink shows the line is downward sloping for farms with negative pre-support 
incomes, which means that the support is progressive for these farms. However, the 
slope of the function is upward sloping for positive pre-support incomes, which implies 
regressivity of support for this range. As such, the result of overall progressivity of the 
support in Scotland is driven by the progressivity in the range of negative pre-support 
incomes – where the farms are loss-making and the support keeps them in business. 
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The net result of negative redistributive effect in the presence of progressive transfers 
means that agricultural support would have reduced absolute income inequality if it 
were not for the presence of large horizontal inequalities, which offset the inequality-
reducing impact of the vertical component. The magnitude of combined horizontal 
inequalities shows that net transfers could have been cut by between 7400 and 5600 
pounds per farm in specific years without any impact on the level of welfare if a 
horizontally equitable system of provision was created, as measured by the Sen (1973) 
welfare function (see section 4.3.1). This financial measure indicates how important and 
costly the issue of horizontal inequalities is.  
 
Classical horizontal inequalities make a very large contribution to the increase of 
absolute income differentials in the process of support distribution. Specifically, the 
within-type inequality is a lot bigger than the between-type one, accounting for between 
72% and 86% of total classical HI. While the within-type inequality is measured by the 
dispersion of post-transfer incomes around the farm type income reference functions 
hW(x), the between-type inequality comes from systematic divergences between the non-
discriminatory reference function hB(x) and the farm type ones hW(x). Both types of 
results are statistically significant at 5% level.  
 
These results indicate some degree of discrimination in the provision of agricultural 
support between farm types, which is, perhaps not unexpected, given the commodity 
basis of the original CAP regime. Nevertheless, the dominant disequalizing role is 
played by within-type inequality which shows that factors other than farm type were 
most important in influencing the divergences in the value of support received by 
individual farms with specific level of pre-transfer incomes. Given the link of current 
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support levels with historic support levels and therefore historic production volumes, 
and the assumption that structure of the industry has not changed much since the 
reference period, it can be implied that the factors which cause within-type inequality 
will be related to divergences in the production and income-generating capacity of 
farms. Research by the Scottish Government suggests that a large proportion of the 
variation in farms’ income generating capacities is not explained by size differences, 
with other factors which influence it including: managerial ability, natural constraints, 
reasons for farming, attitudes towards environmental practices, farms fixed costs, 
interactions with other enterprises within the farm business and the nature of contracts 
with food retailers and suppliers (RESAS, 2012). 
 
The systematic reranking component, while negative, is very small and does not 
contribute much to offsetting the progressivity of support; the result is consistently 
statistically insignificant at 10%. However, this does not mean that the provision of 
support did not result in substantial reranking of individuals in the income order. Instead 
it implies that, after accounting for the classical horizontal inequalities, there is no 
significant evidence that the provision of support generates income traps where some 
farmers with higher ranks in the pre-transfer incomes end up with lower ranks in the 
expected post-transfer incomes order.  In all the analysed years, the reranking 
component accounts for less than 1% of all horizontal inequalities.  
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4.4.3.2 Flat rate scenario 
 
 
Underlying the introduction of a flat national rate of SFP entitlement is a particular 
notion of procedural justice. Specifically, the common belief is that different entitlement 
values based on historic reference payments are becoming harder to justify and that the 
adoption of a flat rate model would therefore be fairer (Pack, 2010a). With the historic 
model, the entitlement values are very heterogeneous, and typically higher for farms 
that were more productive in the past, which meant they received higher values of 
coupled payments that subsequently served as the basis to calculate the value of the SFP 
entitlements. In this context, the introduction of the flat rate model would eliminate 
these historical anomalies but in the process create substantial redistribution of support 
from farms with currently higher value entitlements to farms with lower value 
entitlements. The redistributive implications of this scenario are discussed in this 
section by comparing actual outcomes over the period 2006-10 with what would have 
been observed if the flat rate model had been in place. Table 4.5 shows the weighted 
summary statistics of the flat rate regional model alternative distribution by years, and 
Table 4.6 shows the statistics by farm type.  
 
The gross value of support is identical between the two scenarios (see Tables 4.5 and 
4.1) for a given year, however, the net value of transfer varies, which is due to the 
difference in the net value of the SFP. This is caused by the earlier assumptions made 
about the passthrough of the SFP; it is full for farmers who own their land and 85% for 
tenant farmers. Alternative scenarios will distribute the payment differently between 
tenant farmers and those who own their land, which will result in a slightly different 
mean value of net SFP transfer. 
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Table 4.5 Weighted summary statistics by year, flat rate model. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Weighted summary statistics by farm type, flat rate model. 
 
 
The share of farms with negative post-support income is consistently higher by a few 
percentage points with the flat rate compared to the historic model. This implies the 
redistribution of support under flat rate would impact negatively some of the farms that 
make pre-support losses by reducing their support levels, and consequently these farms 
would not break even with the support in place.  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of observations 474 458 443 479 484
Farm business size (ESU) 54 55 55 58 59
Post-transfer income  (£) 31089 34057 44344 47274 48512
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 15% 13% 12% 11% 12%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -8320 -5065 4865 5850 1753
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 68% 63% 51% 52% 54%
Gross support (£) 57913 57179 53337 54152 61299
Components:
Market price support 18235 19210 13434 11689 13697
Single Payment Scheme 28496 29646 29235 33598 38563
Other grants and subsidies 11182 8323 10668 8864 9039
Net transfer to farmers (£) 39409 39123 39479 41424 46759
Components:
Market price support 6354 6467 4890 4225 4948
Single Payment Scheme 26779 27857 27511 31721 36190
Other grants and subsidies 6276 4799 7078 5478 5620
Net support as % of post-support income 127% 115% 89% 88% 96%
All Cereal
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle
Cattle &
Sheep Mixed
Number of observations 468 66 46 58 41 121 70 65
Farm business size (ESU) 56 62 104 103 15 39 42 58
Post-transfer income  (£) 41055 29568 44560 49387 64015 23664 64277 27877
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 13% 18% 11% 11% 2% 17% 7% 18%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -184 10926 22690 21396 -6245 -14018 -11453 -4267
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 58% 36% 35% 31% 68% 76% 72% 59%
Gross support (£) 56776 21393 30392 47321 78098 58408 101531 50039
Components:
Market price support 15253 1694 9032 28873 5904 19983 18706 20005
Single Payment Scheme 31908 17536 18477 14862 61725 23734 65065 21910
Other grants and subsidies 9615 2163 2883 3585 10469 14691 17760 8123
Net transfer to farmers (£) 41239 18642 21870 27990 70260 37682 75731 32144
Components:
Market price support 5377 473 2691 11256 3940 6578 6129 6289
Single Payment Scheme 30012 16770 17403 14488 58419 22353 60077 20742
Other grants and subsidies 5850 1399 1776 2246 7901 8752 9525 5113
Net support as % of post-support income 103% 78% 57% 61% 110% 166% 119% 121%
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Comparing the summary statistics by farm type in Table 4.6 with the results from actual 
distribution in Table 4.2 reveals more information on the winners and losers of the 
redistribution under the flat rate model, which makes some farm types better off and 
others worse off. These results should be interpreted bearing in mind that they concern 
only the average impact within each farm type, and in reality some variation within each 
type exists. All farm types but two lose out under the redistribution; Specialist Sheep 
and Cattle & Sheep farms are the big beneficiaries, whose average values of (net) SFP 
transfers increase by a staggering 250% and 90%, respectively. Specialist Cereal, 
General Cropping, Dairy and Mixed farms on average suffer similar losses, with the 
drop in the average value of net SFP transfer in the proximity of 50%. Also Specialist 
Cattle farms lose out under the flat rate, but with a smaller average reduction in the net 
value of SFP transfers of 30%. All of the farm types that suffer a reduction in average 
SFP transfers under the flat rate model also experience a substantial increase in the 
percentage of farms making post-support losses. 
 
Table 4.7 Weighted summary of entitlement value and quantity by farm type, historic model. 
 
 
In general, the expectation is that the flat rate model would benefit LFA farms (mostly 
livestock grazing), where the reference payments were lower (due to lower stocking 
Farm type Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Specialist Cereal Entitlement value 331 244.9 58.4 120.4 493.6
Quantity of entitlements 331 132.9 71.8 14.0 400.1
General Cropping Entitlement value 232 233.4 45.5 91.2 386.6
Quantity of entitlements 232 141.3 136.3 11.4 1986.0
Dairy Entitlement value 290 240.8 103.4 58.9 787.3
Quantity of entitlements 290 125.2 68.9 28.0 822.9
Specialist Sheep Entitlement value 203 73.2 67.1 4.5 237.9
Quantity of entitlements 203 537.7 612.3 47.6 6472.0
Specialist Cattle Entitlement value 605 191.9 76.7 18.5 501.8
Quantity of entitlements 605 202.3 247.3 19.7 2641.3
Specialist Cattle & Sheep Entitlement value 346 117.1 77.3 5.3 460.6
Quantity of entitlements 346 560.8 989.9 0.0 7904.9
Mixed Entitlement value 327 253.3 123.3 18.2 1681.9
Quantity of entitlements 327 180.0 197.0 16.8 2197.8
Flat rate entitlement value: 104.4
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rates) and thus the values of entitlements are lower. Thus averaging out the entitlements 
with more productive farm types (mostly on non-LFA land) should increase the SFP 
entitlement values on LFA farms. However, the results indicate that Specialist Cattle 
farms, which are mostly LFA holdings, also lose out under the flat rate model. More 
insight into why this is the case can be gained from Table 4.7 which shows the 
(weighted) mean values of SFP entitlements and quantities of entitlements per farm for 
different farm types under the actual distribution.  
 
As can be seen, the value of entitlements for Sheep and Cattle & Sheep farms are on 
average much lower than for other farm types, but their quantity is very high, reflecting 
the fact they are very large holdings in terms of eligible land area. At the same time, 
Cattle farms on average have higher value of entitlements and less of them (roughly 
comparable to other farm types in terms of number of hectares, and hence number of 
entitlements). Thus when the entitlement values are averaged across Scotland under the 
flat rate model, large Sheep and Cattle & Sheep farms benefit a lot because their 
entitlement values increase29. However, this happens at a cost to all other farm types, 
including Cattle farms (which lose relatively less compared to other disadvantaged farm 
types as their average entitlements are slightly lower). 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results of the redistributive effect decomposition for the flat rate 
scenario (where the pre-support incomes for historic and flat rate scenarios are 
identical). It can be seen that the redistributive effect is more negative than with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The cited flat rate value of entitlement is in fact lower than the average historic entitlement value for 
Specialist Cattle & Sheep farms. However, they still gain from the flat rate scenario on average, which 
suggests that many farms in this type currently have entitlements values lower than the flat rate of 104.4, 
and the gains these farms make outweigh the losses of farms with historic entitlement values above 104.4. 
Presumably, the higher the share of sheep production to cattle production on the farm, the lower the 
entitlement value. 
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actual distribution in Table 4.4, which means that the flat rate regional model increases 
absolute income inequality more than the historic model. Further inspection into the 
redistributive effect components reveals a number of interesting points.  
 
First of all, the flat rate model would result in greater vertical redistribution V for all 
years compared to the historic model. With broadly similar mean transfer values for 
both scenarios, this effect is entirely due to the difference in the disparity index D, 
which means that the flat rate distribution model results in more progressive distribution 
of support. This result is statistically significant at 1% level for all years, with the 
exception of 2010. Introduction of the regional model would cut the link between the 
historic volumes of production and the values of entitlements, and this would cause a 
redistribution of support from farms that were more productive in the past and hence 
had higher values of coupled payments in the historic reference period, to less 
productive farms with lower value of reference payments. Consequently, a flat rate 
support would generate higher transfer values for some poorer farms and this leads to 
the result of higher progressivity. However, taking into account the summary statistics 
by farm type, this result is driven by the gains experienced by Specialist Sheep and 
Cattle & Sheep farms, since all other farm types lose out on average. Furthermore, in 
spite of the overall increase in progressivity, some of the farms that lose out under this 
scenario are farms which make pre-support losses, seeing that the percentage of farms 
with post-support losses increases compared to the historic model. This implies that 
under flat rate, the levels of payments do not reflect the levels of disadvantage among 
farms that make losses in the absence of support as well as under the historic model, 
where more pre-support loss making farms broke even with the help of support. 
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A second point revealed by this part of the analysis is the sharp increase in classical 
horizontal inequalities under the flat rate model; in particular, the between-type 
component is a lot larger than under the current historical payment model. While 
within-type inequality increases somewhat under the flat rate model, the between-type 
component increased by between 3.5 and 7.7 times (where the level of between-type 
inequality is statistically significant across all the years). Whereas with the historic 
model the between-type inequality is relatively small, these results indicate that under 
the regional model there would be a sharp increase in discrimination between different 
types of farms. To understand this result, one needs to think about the nature of the 
CAP. The coupled payments replaced by SFP were determined by historic levels of 
production where the level of support will have been calibrated to some extent to the 
relative profitability of different enterprises so as to make all commodities comparably 
profitable, at least at the margin, with the support in place. If this had not been the case 
then farmers would have switched production to those commodities that were more 
profitable, resulting in excess supply of some products and underproduction of others. 
The switch to coupled payments first and then to the historic SFP model maintained that 
balance to some extent, hence relatively little between-type discrimination occurred 
under the latter model of distribution. However, if the SPS mechanism was changed to 
the flat-rate regional model, this link would be cut, and discrimination between farm 
types would significantly increase.  
 
The impact of systematic reranking is slightly higher with the flat rate model, but the 
magnitude of it still remains low in relation to other components (and consistently 
statistically insignificant). This indicates that introducing the regional model would not 
create a system with income traps, whereby farmers higher up in the ranks of pre-
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support income would systematically end up lower on the income ladder after the 
provision of support.   
 
Table 4.8 Redistributive effect decomposition by year, flat rate model. 
 
 
 
Figures 4.6 - 4.10 plot the non-discriminatory and farm-type specific transfer functions 
under the flat rate model. As in the comparable figures for the historic model, Panel A 
depicts the non-discriminatory transfer functions and Panel B the farm type specific 
transfer functions. 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Absolute Gini index of post-transfer income 20842 *** 21908 *** 26732 *** 28945 *** 31452 ***
1480 1603 1722 2013 2357
Absolute Gini index of farm type specific reference 14761 *** 16050 *** 20666 *** 22341 *** 24383 ***
income 1476 1794 1812 1963 2591
Absolute Gini index of non-discriminatory reference 8136 *** 9307 *** 13822 *** 16260 *** 15730 ***
 income 1169 1303 1362 1685 2040
Absolute concentration index of non-discriminatory 8104 *** 9109 *** 13792 *** 16132 *** 15725 ***
reference income (by start income) 1421 1468 1510 1759 1941
Absolute Gini index of pre-transfer income 12903 *** 14455 *** 20943 *** 21688 *** 18748 ***
689 867 1002 1223 934
Index of redistributive effect -7939 *** -7453 *** -5789 *** -7257 *** -12704 ***
1496 1462 1508 1769 2320
Index of vertical redistribution 4799 *** 5346 *** 7151 *** 5556 *** 3024
1291 1249 1189 1350 1841
Disparity of net transfers 0.12 *** 0.14 *** 0.18 *** 0.13 *** 0.07
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Mean non-discriminatory transfers 39409 *** 39123 *** 39479 *** 41424 *** 46759 ***
1692 1796 2011 2002 2426
Disparity of net market price support -0.03 -0.03 0.07 ** -0.02 0.02
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Disparity of net Single Farm Payment 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.03
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Disparity of net other grants and subsidies 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.17 ***
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Index of systematic reranking -32 -198 -29 -128 -6
1318 1613 976 1376 702
Total classical horizontal inequality -12706 *** -12601 *** -12911 *** -12685 *** -15722 ***
1343 1183 1491 1567 1532
Of which:
Between farm type -6625 *** -6743 *** -6844 *** -6080 *** -8652 ***
1147 1270 1504 1318 1626
Within farm type -6082 *** -5858 *** -6066 *** -6605 *** -7070 ***
747 747 809 1006 989
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Figure 4.6 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, flat rate, 2006. 
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Figure 4.7 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, flat rate, 2007. 
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Figure 4.8 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, flat rate, 2008. 
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Figure 4.9 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, flat rate, 2009. 
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Figure 4.10 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, flat rate, 2010. 
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The graphs reveal some interesting points about the result of increased progressivity 
under regional model. Comparing Panel A’s in the two sets of graphs, the non-
parametric line is a lot flatter for positive pre-transfer incomes under the flat-rate model. 
While the kink in the function still exists, the V shape is less pronounced because of this 
flattening, which means that the result of increased progressivity with the flat rate is 
largely driven by the reduction of the regressivity of support in the range of positive 
pre-support incomes. The slope of the non-parametric function for the range of negative 
pre-support incomes is also flatter under the flat rate than with historic model. This 
reflects the negative impact on the farms which make pre-support losses and stand to 
lose under the flat rate model, and in particular on the farms with very large pre-support 
losses, as transfer levels received by them in any given year will strongly influence the 
slope of the function. 
 
Inspection of farms with largest pre-support losses in all the years reveals that this is 
quite a mixed group; there are farms of all types, but with relatively few sheep holdings. 
Therefore most of the farms with the largest pre-support losses see a drop in transfer 
levels under the flat rate model. As such, while overall the introduction of the flat rate 
increases the progressivity of support, at the same time it makes some of the farms that 
would make the largest losses in the absence of support worse off. This is further 
reflected in the increase in the number of farms below the breakeven line compared to 
the historic model; not only there are more of them, but many are located further away 
from the breakeven line, which means the scale of their post-support losses is larger. 
 
Comparing the Panel B’s in Figures 4.6 – 4.10 with those on Figures 4.1 – 4.5 reveals a 
marked increase in the dispersion of the farm-type specific functions under the flat rate 
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model. This reflects the increase in between-type discrimination. The two farm types 
that are most displaced from the non-discriminatory transfer function are Specialist 
Sheep and Cattle & Sheep, the big beneficiaries under the flat rate model; the large 
increase in between-type inequality is to a large extent driven by the gains of these two 
farm types at the cost of all other types. 
 
4.4.3.3 LFA/non-LFA scenario 
 
 
The introduction of two different rates of entitlements, one for LFA farms and the other 
for non-LFA farms, has been proposed as a way to mitigate the extent of redistribution 
of support that would otherwise arise under the flat rate, since in general LFA holdings 
have higher value of entitlements than non-LFA holdings (Pack, 2010b). As such, the 
LFA/non-LFA model represents a sort of intermediate solution between the historic and 
the flat rate models. The redistributive implications of the split rate scenario are 
discussed in this section. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the weighted summary statistics of the LFA/non-LFA regional model 
distribution by years, and Table 4.10 shows the statistics by farm type. In addition, 
Table 4.11 presents the (weighted) mean values of SFP entitlements and quantities of 
entitlements per farm for different farm types under the actual distribution, but unlike 
earlier in Table 4.7, within each farm type, the farms are split into the LFA and non-
LFA holdings. Information from this table will be helpful for the interpretation of the 
redistribution results that follows. 
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Table 4.9 Weighted summary statistics by year, LFA/non-LFA model. 
 
 
 
As can be seen, with the LFA/non-LFA model the percentage of farms with negative 
post-support income is larger than with the historic model. However, the negative 
impact of the regional model on the farms which make pre-support losses is slightly 
mitigated with the LFA/non-LFA scenario compared to the flat rate one; the percentage 
of farms with losses after the provision of support is smaller in 3 out of the 5 years 
compared to the flat rate scenario and broadly similar in the other two.  
 
Comparing the net SFP transfers by farm type to the values under the historic and flat 
rate models reveals that Specialist Sheep and Sheep & Cattle farms are still the biggest 
beneficiaries of the redistribution of support; their gains are not as large as with the flat 
rate, but still substantial, with the average net SFP transfer levels increasing by around 
170% and 50% respectively, compared to the historic model.  
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of observations 474 458 443 479 484
Farm business size (ESU) 54 55 55 58 59
Post-transfer income  (£) 31146 34062 44388 47299 48558
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 12% 12% 12% 12% 8%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -8320 -5065 4865 5850 1753
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 68% 63% 51% 52% 54%
Gross support (£) 57913 57179 53337 54152 61299
Components:
Market price support 18235 19210 13434 11689 13697
Single Payment Scheme 28496 29646 29235 33598 38563
Other grants and subsidies 11182 8323 10668 8864 9039
Net transfer to farmers (£) 39466 39128 39523 41449 46805
Components:
Market price support 6354 6467 4890 4225 4948
Single Payment Scheme 26836 27862 27555 31747 36236
Other grants and subsidies 6276 4799 7078 5478 5620
Net support as % of post-support income 127% 115% 89% 88% 96%
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Table 4.10 Weighted summary statistics by farm type, LFA/non-LFA model. 
 
 
 
 
For General Cropping farms the average value of transfers with the split rate of 
entitlements is almost identical to the level with the historic model. The remaining farm 
types still suffer losses in relation to the distribution with the historic model, but for 
Specialist Cereal, Dairy and Mixed farms, these losses are smaller than in the flat rate 
scenario. For Specialist Cereal, the extent of losses is mitigated substantially, since the 
reduction in the average SFP transfer value relative to the historic model is only 7%, 
compared to almost 50% with the flat rate. This mitigation in the extent of redistribution 
for Specialist Cereal and General Cropping farms reflects the fact that these farms are 
mostly on non-LFA land (as shown by Table 4.11); averaging rates between LFA and 
non-LFA holdings means that most of the farms within these two types enjoy support 
levels comparable to those under the historic model.  
 
All Cereal
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle
Cattle &
Sheep Mixed
Number of observations 468 66 46 58 41 121 70 65
Farm business size (ESU) 56 62 104 103 15 39 42 58
Post-transfer income  (£) 41091 43688 59589 50650 50657 19847 53242 32077
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 11% 12% 4% 9% 2% 19% 8% 16%
Pre-transfer income  (£) -184 10926 22690 21396 -6245 -14018 -11453 -4267
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 58% 36% 35% 31% 68% 76% 72% 59%
Gross support (£) 56776 36143 46395 48579 63981 54393 89588 54592
Components:
Market price support 15253 1694 9032 28873 5904 19983 18706 20005
Single Payment Scheme 31908 32286 34479 16120 47608 19719 53121 26463
Other grants and subsidies 9615 2163 2883 3585 10469 14691 17760 8123
Net transfer to farmers (£) 41274 32762 36899 29253 56902 33865 64696 36343
Components:
Market price support 5377 473 2691 11256 3940 6578 6129 6289
Single Payment Scheme 30047 30889 32432 15752 45061 18535 49042 24942
Other grants and subsidies 5850 1399 1776 2246 7901 8752 9525 5113
Net support as % of post-support income 103% 82% 67% 62% 113% 178% 123% 118%
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Table 4.11 Weighted summary of entitlement value and quantity by farm type & LFA status, historic model. 
 
 
The story is different with Dairy, Mixed and Specialist Cattle farms. As Table 4.11 
shows, among these three types, many farms are LFA holdings, but the average value of 
entitlements on these LFA farms is substantially higher than for Specialist Sheep and 
Cattle & Sheep LFA farms. As such, the LFA Dairy, Mixed and Specialist Cattle farms 
would be worse off with the split rate rather than the flat rate model, since their 
historical entitlement values would be averaged with LFA Specialist Sheep and Cattle 
& Sheep farms only, without the inclusion of non-LFA farms to bring the average value 
up as under the flat rate model. Taking this into consideration, the impact of the split 
rate model on the average SFP transfer level in Table 4.10 will depend on the ratio of 
LFA to non-LFA farms within a given type. For Dairy and Mixed farms this ratio is low 
enough such that the reduction in average transfer levels compared to the historic model 
Farm type Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Specialist Cereal, LFA Entitlement value 24 280.0 72.7 168.6 493.6
Quantity of entitlements 24 125.5 70.9 14.0 324.3
Specialist Cereal, non-LFA Entitlement value 307 241.9 56.1 120.4 480.3
Quantity of entitlements 307 133.5 71.9 31.8 400.1
General Cropping, LFA Entitlement value 9 189.3 55.1 91.2 295.2
Quantity of entitlements 9 228.5 182.0 38.3 503.9
General Cropping, non-LFA Entitlement value 223 235.0 44.5 91.4 386.6
Quantity of entitlements 223 138.2 133.8 11.4 1986.0
Dairy, LFA Entitlement value 205 230.9 105.9 58.9 787.3
Quantity of entitlements 205 132.7 71.8 28.0 822.9
Dairy, non-LFA Entitlement value 85 264.3 93.3 67.2 552.8
Quantity of entitlements 85 107.5 58.3 30.4 370.3
Specialist Sheep, LFA Entitlement value 202 72.1 66.1 4.5 237.9
Quantity of entitlements 202 541.2 613.1 58.7 6472.0
Specialist Sheep, non-LFA Entitlement value 1 228.9 . 228.9 228.9
Quantity of entitlements 1 47.6 . 47.6 47.6
Specialist Beef, LFA Entitlement value 564 186.9 73.4 18.5 474.9
Quantity of entitlements 564 208.7 254.1 31.5 2641.3
Specialist Beef, non-LFA Entitlement value 41 252.1 90.1 119.7 501.8
Quantity of entitlements 41 125.6 120.3 19.7 874.6
Mixed Cattle & Sheep, LFA Entitlement value 319 105.0 71.7 5.3 460.6
Quantity of entitlements 319 612.0 1038.0 0.0 7904.9
Mixed Cattle & Sheep, non-LFA Entitlement value 27 207.6 54.9 67.6 312.5
Quantity of entitlements 27 170.1 256.9 19.7 885.8
Mixed, LFA Entitlement value 172 227.2 72.9 18.2 451.4
Quantity of entitlements 172 219.9 252.6 41.7 2197.8
Mixed, non-LFA Entitlement value 155 283.3 158.1 91.3 1681.9
Quantity of entitlements 155 134.0 78.9 16.8 500.2
LFA entitlement value: 226.9
Non-LFA entitlement value: 81.6
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is smaller than under the flat rate model as a result of the gains experienced by non-LFA 
Dairy and Mixed farms. However, Specialist Cattle farms are mostly LFA holdings, 
thus the losses made by the LFA cattle farms more than offset the gains experienced by 
the few non-LFA Specialist Cattle farms. Consequently, the average SFP transfer 
received by Specialist Cattle farms under the split rate model is lower compared to the 
flat rate one. 
 
Table 4.12 shows the results of the redistributive effect decomposition for the LFA/non-
LFA scenario. In all years, the overall redistributive effect is more negative than with 
the historic model, but less negative than with the flat rate; this reflects the intermediate 
nature of this model.  
 
The LFA/non-LFA model is not as progressive as the flat rate. The disparity index D is 
higher than under the actual programme for only 3 out of the 5 years (and the increase is 
not as big as under the flat rate scenario), and it is in fact lower for 2 remaining years, 
which means that the impact of this model on progressivity of support is somewhat 
ambiguous. The vertical redistribution index is statistically significant at 1% level for 
all years, with the exception of 2010.  
 
The LFA/non-LFA rates still cut the link to the historic value of support, but in a 
different way, allowing for the distinction between better and worse quality of land, 
where payment rates per hectare were traditionally higher on better quality non-LFA 
land; this differentiation of entitlement rates reduces the level of redistribution 
compared to the flat rate model. The earlier discussion of losers and winners under the 
split rate scenario showed that LFA Sheep and Cattle & Sheep farms would see an 
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average increase in transfer values with this model, while all other LFA farms would 
suffer a reduction in their entitlement values. This suggests that in 2006 and 2010 when 
the split rate model is less progressive than the historic one, the negative impact on the 
farms that lose with split rates outweighs the positive impact on farms that would see 
their transfer levels increase. 
 
Table 4.12 Redistributive effect decomposition by year, LFA/non-LFA model. 
 
 
The classical horizontal inequalities increase substantially compared to the historic 
model, but this disequalizing impact is smaller than with the flat rate scenario. More 
specifically, the level of within-type inequality is roughly comparable between both 
regional model alternatives, but the between-type inequality is smaller with the split rate 
model (although still between 1.8 and 4.4 times higher than with the historic model). 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Absolute Gini index of post-transfer income 18558 *** 20416 *** 26503 *** 27881 *** 29329 ***
1235 1392 1389 1726 1926
Absolute Gini index of farm type specific reference 12243 *** 14863 *** 20881 *** 21432 *** 22090 ***
income 1225 1568 1501 1702 2051
Absolute Gini index of non-discriminatory reference 9289 *** 10499 *** 17447 *** 18138 *** 16634 ***
 income 995 1200 1300 1578 1637
Absolute concentration index of non-discriminatory 9273 *** 10434 *** 17440 *** 18134 *** 16621 ***
reference income (by start income) 1107 1334 1450 1719 1792
Absolute Gini index of pre-transfer income 12903 *** 14455 *** 20943 *** 21688 *** 18748 ***
701 906 1010 1241 916
Index of redistributive effect -5655 *** -5960 *** -5560 *** -6193 *** -10580 ***
1209 1219 1112 1361 1801
Index of vertical redistribution 3631 *** 4021 *** 3503 *** 3555 *** 2127
991 1041 1029 1106 1696
Disparity of net transfers 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.05
0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Mean non-discriminatory transfers 39466 *** 39128 *** 39523 *** 41449 *** 46805 ***
1347 1501 1625 1629 2050
Disparity of net market price support -0.03 -0.03 0.07 ** -0.02 0.02
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Disparity of net Single Farm Payment 0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.03 0.07 ** 0.01
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Disparity of net other grants and subsidies 0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.17 ***
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Index of systematic reranking -17 -65 -7 -4 -13
922 1107 636 730 990
Total classical horizontal inequality -9269 *** -9916 *** -9056 *** -9743 *** -12694 ***
1053 1029 1201 1294 1384
Of which:
Between farm type -2954 *** -4364 *** -3434 *** -3294 *** -5456 ***
863 1111 1171 996 1405
Within farm type -6316 *** -5552 *** -5622 *** -6449 *** -7238 ***
668 684 656 908 887
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This reflects the intermediate nature of the LFA/non-LFA split; the distinction between 
different types of land reduces the extent to which regional model cuts the link with the 
previously discussed historic coupled system that broadly served to keep all 
commodities comparably profitable at the margin. 
 
The impact of systematic reranking is even smaller than with the flat rate model and 
consistently statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
 
Moving onto the graphical presentation of results in Figures 4.11 – 4.15, the slope of the 
non-discriminatory transfer function in the range of positive pre-transfer incomes is not 
flattened as much relatively to historic model as with the flat rate scenario; in fact it is 
roughly between the historic and flat rate slopes. This is to be expected given the 
intermediate nature of this model, reflecting the absence of any redistribution from 
wealthier non-LFA holdings to poorer LFA farms.  
 
There is another difference between the two regional models. With flat rate across 
Scotland the non-discriminatory transfer function for negative pre-support incomes also 
flattened substantially compared to the historical model, while with the LFA/non-LFA 
scenario the function in that range flattens less, and in some years there is almost no 
difference in  the slope  of  the  line  between  historical  model  and  the  LFA/non-LFA 
alternative. This is because some of the farms with the pre-support losses are non-LFA 
holdings, which means they are better off with the split rate rather than the flat rate 
model. The positive impact of the LFA/non-LFA model on the non-LFA farms with 
pre-support losses helps to explain why the percentage of farms with negative post-
support income would be smaller in some years than with the flat rate model, which is 
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Figure 4.11 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, LFA/non-LFA, 2006. 
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Figure 4.12 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, LFA/non-LFA, 2007. 
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Figure 4.13 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, LFA/non-LFA, 2008. 
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Figure 4.14 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, LFA/non-LFA, 2009. 
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Figure 4.15 Non-discriminatory transfer function and farm type specific functions, LFA/non-LFA, 2010. 
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also reflected in a slightly smaller number of farms below the breakeven line. However, 
the farms with the largest pre-support losses are a heterogeneous group (in terms of 
farm type and LFA status) that changes between the years, and since these farms will 
have strong influence on the slope of the function, the impact of two rates on the 
transfer function slope varies between the years and no simple story can be told to 
explain this impact. 
 
Summing up, switching to either version of the regional model solutions would have 
caused an increase in absolute income inequality, which contrasts with the popular 
belief that the redistribution of support between farms and regions would somehow be 
more equitable. From procedural point of view the regional model may be considered 
fairer, but the analysis shows that actually it is a more disequalizing solution. The extent 
of the redistribution of support and its disequalizing consequences are mitigated in the 
LFA/non-LFA model compared to the flat rate one. The LFA/non-LFA model would 
both lead to a smaller extent of discrimination between farm types and reduce the 
percentage of farms with post-support losses compared to the flat rate solution, as 
reflected in the number of farms below the breakeven line (this is true for most, but not 
all years). However, Dairy, Mixed and Specialist Cattle farms on LFA land would see 
their transfer levels diminish compared to the historic model due to averaging of 
entitlement values with LFA Specialist Sheep and Cattle & Sheep farms (which would 
still benefit relatively to historic model but less than under flat rate). These results bring 
up the issue of profitability of certain commodities under regional model, and in 
particular they support concerns about the viability of beef production and resultant 
calls for retention of some form of coupled support to help these enterprises (Pate, 
2014). 
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4.4.3.4 Comparison with Allanson’s results 
 
 
 
In his study Allanson (2008) looks at the redistributive effect in the years 2001 - 2005. 
It is useful to compare his set of results from Tables 4.13 and 4.14 to the results from 
historic model in this study in order to contrast the redistributive effect of the policy 
with and without the SPS. It needs to be noted that Allanson’s results were calculated 
using different assumptions on the incidence of direct payments (see section 4.4.1). 
 
Table 4.13 Weighted summary statistics by year 2001 -2005.  
 
Source: Source: Allanson, 2008. 
The redistributive effect is negative for all years for both study periods. The average for 
2001 - 2005 is -3091 and for 2006 - 2010  is -3336, implying that the reform slightly 
increased the disequalizing impact of the policy.  
 
The channel through which the disequalizing impact worked can be seen by inspecting 
the subcomponents of the effect. The vertical component is on average higher in the 
post-reform period, with the mean value of 3278 compared to 2574 in the pre-reform 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of observations 450 386 376 444 460
Farm business size (ESU) 63 63 64 53 54
Post-transfer income  (£) 28641 29523 27610 36570 36327
% of farms with post-transfer income<0 6% 8% 10% 4% 6%
Pre-transfer income  (£) 304 1411 -2650 4661 -1551
% of farms with pre-transfer income<0 58% 57% 58% 52% 57%
Gross support (£) 41975 42631 46771 49711 57007
Components:
Market price support 16712 17272 19041 20514 20529
Single Payment Scheme 20627 20226 22154 24579 29357
Other grants and subsidies 4636 5133 5575 4618 7121
Net transfer to farmers (£) 28337 28112 30260 31909 37878
Components:
Market price support 9497 9710 10589 11686 11629
Single Payment Scheme 16254 15522 16766 17879 22811
Other grants and subsidies 2586 2880 2905 2344 3437
Net support as % of post-support income 127% 115% 89% 88% 96%
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period. However, a closer inspection reveals that the higher progressivity is entirely due 
to an increase in the mean non-discriminatory transfer from 31691 to 4147930, while the 
average disparity index in both periods is 0.08. 
 
 
Table 4.14 Redistributive effect decomposition 2001 – 2005.  
 
Source: Source: Allanson, 2008.  
The increase in mean value of transfer needs to be taken into context also when 
analysing the classical horizontal inequalities component; while both between and 
within type inequality indices are slightly higher for the post-2005 period, this result 
should be considered in terms of a ratio to the mean net transfer value. When we look at 
the ratio for both components, it remains pretty stable across the years. As such, the 
results indicate that the increase in absolute inequality is due to the increase in average 
value of transfers, but relative to the value of support, the disequalizing classical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Where part of this will be due to differences in the assumptions about transfer efficiencies, and part due 
to the change in average gross support levels. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Absolute Gini index of post-transfer income 15754 *** 16350 *** 14299 *** 16532 *** 17788 ***
1214 853 793 915 897
Absolute Gini index of farm type specific reference 12324 12788 *** 10197 *** 12868 *** 12266 ***
income 13411 981 973 1128 1038
Absolute Gini index of non-discriminatory reference 10550 *** 12008 *** 7701 *** 11257 *** 10550 ***
 income 1441 1095 1206 1282 1245
Absolute concentration index of non-discriminatory 10217 *** 12005 *** 7503 *** 12005 *** 10217 ***
reference income (by start income) 1500 1300 1449 1421 1505
Absolute Gini index of pre-transfer income 14188 *** 13212 *** 10664 *** 13730 *** 13473 ***
1030 818 649 759 796
Index of redistributive effect -1566 ** -3137 *** -3635 *** -2802 *** -4315 ***
659 703 795 578 857
Index of vertical redistribution 2748 *** 1972 ** 3161 ** 1725 3256 **
898 960 1511 1110 1366
Disparity of net transfers 0.10 *** 0.07 ** 0.10 *** 0.05 * 0.09 ***
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Mean non-discriminatory transfers 28325 *** 28949 *** 30987 *** 32638 *** 37557 ***
2257 2380 2831 2748 3147
Index of systematic reranking -156 -17 -198 -3 -334
281 538 574 322 659
Total classical horizontal inequality -4159 *** -5093 *** -6598 *** -4524 *** -7238 ***
600 744 1034 728 894
Of which:
Between farm type -728 * -1513 *** -2496 *** -860 * -1716 ***
409 487 664 454 646
Within farm type -3431 *** -3561 *** -4101 *** -3664 *** -5522 ***
394 496 647 478 585
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horizontal inequalities remain roughly constant. In other words, the distribution of 
support does increase absolute inequality more in the years with SFP, but not due of the 
design of the policy. Instead, more money is redistributed through the policy post-2005 
and therefore there is more scope for it to increase the income differentials. While the 
gross value of support has increased between the two periods, the transfer efficiency is 
slightly different due to the assumptions made, and therefore the increase in net transfer 
is even larger. For Allanson’s results without SFP, the transfer efficiency oscillated 
between 64% to 68%, whereas with the SFP in place it ranges between 68% and 77% 
(see Table 4.11 and Table 4.1). As such, the results are not directly comparable. 
 
However, correcting for the higher value of transfers, the comparison shows that not 
much has changed in redistributive performance between the years prior to the 
introduction of the SFP and post its introduction. The Scottish Government’s adopted 
the historic model  “as a measure that would limit the redistribution that would occur 
with a move away from payments that were linked to production” (Pack, 2010b, p. 47). 
In this context, the choice of the historic model appears to have met the government’s 
goal of not to create winners and losers with the introduction of the SFP. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the redistributive effect of agricultural policy 
in Scotland with the SPS implemented using the historic model in the production years 
2005/06 to 2009/10. In addition, the redistributive effect under current arrangement was 
compared to the effect of two hypothetical scenarios where the scheme is put in place 
using alternative versions of the regional model of distribution.  
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The focus of this exercise on the equity aspect of agricultural policy can be criticized 
considering the policy has many objectives other than income support, such as 
environmental protection, rural development or sustainability. Nevertheless, the 
equitable distribution of farming income is a very important aspect of the policy that has 
been recognized as problematic by officials at national (Pack, 2010a) and international 
levels (OECD, 2003). 
 
The methodology, following Allanson (2008), is based on the measurement of 
redistributive effect as the change in absolute income inequality, which can be 
interpreted as the monetary value per farm of the inequality change resulting from the 
provision of support. The measure is then broken down into vertical and horizontal 
equity components. It provides an explicit picture of the redistributive performance of a 
support scheme, and is informative for the targeting aspect of policy. Specifically, the 
methodology addresses the problem of horizontal inequalities in provision of support 
which is largely neglected by pre-existing literature. 
 
The analysis of the current arrangement highlights the chronic dependence of 
agriculture on financial support. Over half of the Scottish farms would be experiencing 
negative incomes in the absence of support, and between 5% and 8%, depending on the 
year, suffer from negative incomes even after the support is provided.  
 
The provision of support reduced income disparities between farm types on average, 
since the dispersion of post-transfer incomes between types of farms was actually 
smaller than that of pre-transfer incomes. However, the distribution of support leads to 
an increase in absolute income inequality among farms. 
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The transfers are progressive in absolute terms, which means that poorer farmers (that is 
farms at the bottom of pre-support income distribution) got more than their equal share 
of non-discriminatory transfers, in spite of the common belief that CAP provides most 
support to big and affluent farms (European Commission, 2002). This contradiction can 
be easily explained since the common belief is based on the assumption that agriculture 
would have been profitable even without the provision of support (Allanson, 2008). In 
reality however, as the results indicate, some farms would not be able to stay in 
business without financial aid. Many farms that received high payments in the reference 
period, and accordingly large transfers under the SFP, are also some of the farms that 
would go out of business without the transfers, since they would generate huge losses 
on their level of agricultural activities. This can be seen in the shape of the non-
discriminatory reference function which is downward sloping for the negative pre-
transfer incomes range, indicating that the progressivity of support is largely driven by 
these farms receiving more than their equal share of support. 
 
Despite the fact that actual money transfers are progressive in absolute terms, the 
absolute inequality increases with support as an effect of large horizontal inequalities. 
The results show that these inequalities resulted mainly from unequal treatment of pre-
transfer income equals rather than from systematic reranking of farms in the distribution 
of support. Furthermore, the main driver of the classical horizontal inequalities was the 
weakness of the relationship between pre-transfer incomes and transfers within a 
specific farm type, rather than discrimination between farm types producing different 
commodities. This weakness of the relationship between pre-support incomes and 
transfer levels implies the inability of support to target farms in need accurately through 
the existing support system. More specifically, policies designed to focus support on 
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farms with low income by limiting the size of payments received by large farms under 
current arrangement (e.g. modulation) would be largely ineffective (Allanson, 2008) 
given the wide variation in transfers received by farms with similar pre-transfer 
incomes.  
 
After comparing the results of this analysis to the results of Allanson (2008) who looked 
at the redistributive effect in years 2001 – 2005, it can be concluded that the SFP 
introduction under the historic model did not significantly change the redistributive 
performance of support. As such, the historic model met its objective of minimising the 
redistribution of support in Scotland compared to distribution under the coupled direct 
payments. 
 
Since the historic model will become obsolete with the new CAP reform, which aims to 
introduce area-based entitlement rates across regions and countries, the results from the 
regional model simulations are of particular interest. The analysis of alternative 
scenarios under the regional model looked at support distributions based on two 
implementation approaches: Scotland as one region with flat rate of entitlements or 
Scotland with two rates divided according to LFA and non-LFA areas. The regional 
model is widely believed to be more equitable, since the distribution of support does not 
depend, or depends to a lesser degree, on the level of support in the reference period and 
therefore it allows for more support going to farmers who were less supported in the 
reference period. On the other hand, such redistribution would also create losers in the 
sense that farms which previously received higher levels of support would see it being 
reduced; this existence of losers makes this model problematic in terms of political cost.  
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The results from the flat rate scenario indicate an increase in the progressivity index, 
which is higher than with the historic model for all years. However, further analysis 
shows that the higher progressivity with the flat rate is largely due to lower regressivity 
of support for farms which break even in the absence of subsidies, while the impact on 
farms which are loss-generating without support would be mixed. More specifically, the 
flat rate leads to a redistribution of support towards Specialist Sheep and Cattle & Sheep 
farms, but this happens at a cost to all other farm types. Some of the farms with 
negative pre-support income see their support levels reduced with the flat rate, which is 
reflected in an increase of the number of farms that do not break even with the support 
in place. The redistribution of support between farm types leads to a large increase in 
between-type classical horizontal inequality compared to the historic model; because of 
this the flat rate model is more disequalizing than the historic one. 
 
The increases in progressivity of support and the extent of between-type inequality were 
mitigated under the LFA/non-LFA scenario, which reflects the reduced degree of 
redistribution and intermediate nature of the model. This scenario would allow the non-
LFA holdings to enjoy transfer levels comparable to the historic model ones. However, 
while Sheep or Cattle & Sheep farms on LFA land still benefit from this scenario 
relatively to the historic model, other farm types on LFA land would be largely 
disadvantaged by the two rates solution because averaging their entitlement values with 
the low level of per hectare support on Sheep and Cattle and Sheep farms (without the 
non-LFA farms bringing the average up) would significantly reduce their support levels.  
In terms of policy implications, the more progressive distribution of income might be 
desired by policy makers, but in the context of political economy, this can cause some 
opposition from farmers who would receive less benefit with such an arrangement. The 
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historic model was chosen in Scotland in the first place to avoid big changes in the 
distribution of support under the SPS. As such, the Scottish Government might be 
interested in adopting a variation of the regional model that would change the 
distribution as little as possible. Intuitively it can be expected that the more thorough the 
division into different land capability levels, the less redistribution there would be. 
Current considerations of the Scottish Government concerning the introduction of the 
area-based payments suggest it will in fact opt for 2 or 3 regions in Scotland, instead of 
a flat national rate (see section 2.2.5).  
 
The disequalizing impact of classical horizontal inequalities under the regional model 
alternatives means that in fact it increases absolute income differentials more than the 
regional model. Therefore in spite of appearing as a fairer solution form procedural 
point of view, the regional model is actually more inequitable. In particular, the 
between-type discrimination increases sharply with both version of the regional model 
(although two rates of entitlements mitigate this impact). The reason behind this is the 
fact that the previous system of support has been implicitly balanced in a way that 
ensured no commodity was more profitable at the margin than others and therefore 
prevented farmers from switching production and oversupplying this commodity at the 
cost of others. This balance has to a certain extent been maintained by the historic 
model of distribution through the link with the level of payments in the 2000-2002 
reference period. Cutting this link under the regional model caused the discrimination 
between commodities to increase sharply, which would appear to a lesser degree under 
the LFA/non-LFA model than with a single flat rate across Scotland.   
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If the policy makers are concerned that profitability of some commodities might be at 
risk under the regional model, they can consider introduction of coupled payments for 
these products. In fact, the new CAP allows for a share of the national funding to be 
directed towards coupled payments at the discretion of the national governments (see 
section 2.2.5), and the results of this analysis suggest this could be a useful option for 
Scotland. In particular, if the LFA/non-LFA model was chosen, Cattle, Mixed and 
Dairy farms on LFA land would see a sharp drop in profitability; this supports the 
existing concerns over profitability of Cattle farming under the regional model.  
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5 Income determinants model 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model which captures the determinants of 
individual agricultural income changes; the estimates from this model are then going to 
be used in the subsequent chapter for a regression-based decomposition of inequality. In 
this context, a dynamic model is specified since the results of cross-sectional regression 
will be biased if the underlying income function is dynamic rather than static. The 
coefficients from the model will serve to decompose an index of vertical mobility, and 
the long-run parameters of the model will serve to quantify and then decompose the 
equilibrium, or chronic, inequality in the agricultural incomes.  
 
If one assumes a stable dynamic income function over time, then a first-order 
autoregressive distributed lag-model can be specified, and easily converted into an Error 
Correction Model. A model like this shows that present income is determined not only 
by current levels of income determinants but all past levels as well. Analytically, such a 
model is attractive as it distinguishes between long-run equilibrium relationship and the 
short-run dynamics. 
 
Agricultural income will be modelled as a function of the economic size of farms, 
which captures their income generating capacity, with a distinction between cropping 
and livestock activity. The model will also control for idiosyncratic and time fixed 
effects. 
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The chapter starts with a theoretical description of the model in section 5.2, followed by 
a section on econometric issues and possible estimation methodologies. Section 5.4 
describes the data and variables used in the empirical model specification, as well as the 
model results, followed by estimates from different methods which serve as a 
robustness check. The chapter is closed with conclusions in section 5.5. 
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5.2 Theoretical model description 
 
The model’s aim is to capture the determinants of individual income changes. 
Assuming a stable dynamic income function over time, a first-order autoregressive 
distributed lag model (ADLM) can be specified, with lagged and contemporaneous 
responses to changes in income determinants (Davidson et al., 1987, Alogsokoufis and 
Smith, 1991):  
        (5.1) 
t=1,  … T-1 
where the composite error consists of both individual farm fixed effect and idiosyncratic 
error terms, . The model implies that present income is determined not 
only by contemporaneous levels of income determinants but all the past levels as well.  
It can alternatively be expressed as an Error Correction Model: 
       (5.2) 
where and can be interpreted as parameters of the long-run 
income relationship: 
             (5.3) 
with  corresponding to the equilibrium error in the current period and 
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model with  in all periods. This means that the estimates of the model will 
indicate whether the dynamic framework is suitable for it.  
 
Error Correction Models can be used with stationary or co-integrated non-stationary data 
where exogenous factors have different short-run and long-run effects or if there is a 
persistence of shocks (Keele and De Boef, 2004). The ECM formulation shows that the 
change in income over the following period is determined by the effects of current 
changes in income determinants, any deviation from the equilibrium income in the 
current period, and the size of the idiosyncratic income shock in the next period. This 
representation is very attractive from an analytical point of view because of the clear 
distinction between long-run equilibrium relationships and the short-run dynamics. 
Specifically, this allows to look at short-run impact of policy interventions which 
influence income determinants, as well as the persistent, or chronic income situation. 
 
The theoretical justification behind the specification of a model where current income 
levels depend on the past income levels is the assumption that farmer’s ability to grow 
is sensitive to cash flow, and therefore it will be constrained by his/her past income 
levels if the investments are made from retained earnings (Benjamin and Phimister, 
2002). This will be the case in the presence of credit constraints, which concern farmers, 
particularly with low incomes (European Parliament, 2014).   
yt = yt
* +!t
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5.3 Estimation issues 
 
A crucial issue with estimating the dynamic model of agricultural income is choosing 
the right estimation method. What follows is a description of some possible estimators 
for this kind of model, what econometric issues they address and what shortcomings 
they might have.  
 
Bond (2002) provides a good overview of some estimation methods for microeconomic 
dynamic panels, with observations on many individuals across short period of time and 
explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous. To begin with, OLS is not an 
appropriate approach, since by definition the lagged dependant variable is correlated 
with the composite error because of individual effects – a correlation that does not 
disappear as the sample gets larger.  Based on omitted variables results, this makes the 
OLS estimator biased upwards (Bond, Ibid.).  
 
The fixed effect (FE) estimator is not an optimal method either. Specifically, with the 
FE estimator, the original observations are expressed as deviations from means of the 
dependant and explanatory variables, idiosyncratic error εit and fixed effects αi. Since 
the mean of αi  is αi, individual effects are eliminated and OLS is then used to estimate 
the model. Unfortunately this creates a correlation between the transformed error term 
and transformed lagged dependant variable which is significant for panels where the 
number of time periods is not large. Since the transformed lagged dependant variable is 
given as yi,t!1 !
1
T !1(yi1 +...+ yit +...+ yi,T!1) and the transformed error terms by 
!it !
1
T !1(!i2 +...+!i,t!1 +...+!iT ) , the term  
!yit
T !1 is correlated with !it and the term  
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!!i,t!1
T !1 is correlated with yi,t-1. These are leading negative correlations, which dominate 
positive correlations between other components, therefore the correlation between the 
transformed error term and transformed lagged dependant variable is negative. Because 
these correlations do not vanish even as the number of observations increases, the FE 
estimator is inconsistent (Nickell, 1981). According to standard results on omitted 
variable bias, the FE estimator should be downward biased in large samples (Bond, 
2002). 
 
The fact that OLS and FE estimators are biased in opposite directions is in fact 
extremely useful, as they will indicate upper and lower bounds for any unbiased 
estimator.  
 
There have been Maximum Likelihood estimators developed for this sort of model, 
however dynamic models are characterized by the fact that distribution of yit for 
t=2,3,...,T depends rather significantly on our assumptions about how the initial 
conditions yi1 are distributed. There are a variety of possibilities; the process could be 
stochastic or non-stochastic, yi1 could be correlated or uncorrelated with αi, etc. 
Crucially, different assumptions about the nature of initial conditions will lead to 
different specifications of the likelihood function, which means that the Maximum 
Likelihood estimator will be inconsistent if the initial conditions process is not specified 
correctly.  
 
In this context, Instrumental Variables estimators, which require weaker assumptions 
about the initials conditions, have proved popular. Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) 
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proposed the first basic first-differenced Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator for 
an autoregressive distributed lag panel data model:  
!yi,t+1 =!!yit + "!xi,t+1 +#!xit +!$i,t+1;|! |<1;i =1,2,...N;t = 2,3,...,T       (5.4) 
 
The first-differencing serves to eliminate the individual effects αi  from the model, but 
unlike FE transformation, it does not introduce all realisation of the disturbances into 
the error term of the transformed equation. Nevertheless, the dependence of!yit  on !it  
means that the OLS estimator of η in (5.4) is inconsistent, with a downward bias that is 
usually bigger than that in FE estimation. This problem can be fixed by using 2SLS 
with instrumental variables that are correlated to !yit  and uncorrelated with !!i,t+1 .  The 
only necessary assumption about the initial conditions here is that they are uncorrelated 
with the disturbances, corr(yi1, εit)=0 for t=2,3,...,T, which means the initial conditions 
are said to be predetermined. Predetermined initial conditions, together with the 
previous assumption that the disturbances are serially uncorrelated, mean that yi,t!1   is 
uncorrelated with !!i,t+1and can therefore be a valid instrument. Such a 2SLS estimator 
is consistent in fixed T and large N panels and can identify η as long as observations for 
at least three periods are available.  
 
With more than 3 time series observations, additional instruments are available. For 
example, only yi1 can be used with t=3, but with t=4, both yi1 and yi2  are available as 
instruments, and the vector (yi1, yi2,...,yi,T-2) for period t=T. With T>3 the model is 
overidentified, which, together with the fact that the first-differenced error term !!i,t+1
has a moving average form of serial correlation (if the assumption about no serial 
correlation in εit is correct), means that 2SLS is not asymptotically efficient, even if all 
the available instruments for each equation are used and the disturbances are 
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homoskedastic (Bond, 2002). A solution to this problem is developed by Hansen (1982) 
within a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework, which serves to provide 
a consistent estimator in this situation. First-differenced GMM estimators for the type of 
model in question here were developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (AB) (1991) and they are known as difference GMM. An important 
assumption is that there is no serial correlation in the error terms.  These estimators use 
the moment conditions between the differenced error term and further lags of the 
dependent variable; E(yi,t!n,"!i,t+1) = 0 for t=T and n=3,4,....T-2. Furthermore, if 
covariates are strictly exogenous, meaning that εit cannot affect xis for any s or t, then the 
first–differences of strictly exogenous covariates are also used as instruments; 
for all s and t. Lastly, these estimators allow for predetermined regressors, 
meaning that εit may affect xis for s>t. In that case, the valid moment conditions are 
for all s ! t but  for s>t.  
 
The asymptotically efficient GMM estimator which uses this set of moment conditions 
is obtained by minimising the following criterion  
            (5.5) 
where Zi is the instrument matrix, and the matrix of weights is of the form: 
             (5.6) 
with !!
^
i representing consistent estimates of the first-differenced residuals based on a 
preliminary consistent estimator. This procedure is known as a two-step GMM. 
However, if εit  are homoskedastic, the structure of the first-differenced model means 
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that an asymptotically equivalent GMM estimator can be obtained in a one-step 
procedure, where the weight matrix is of the form:  
              (5.7) 
with H being a (T-2) square matrix with -1’s on the first off-diagonals, 2’s on the main 
diagonal and 0’s elsewhere. WN does not depend on any preliminary estimates.  
 
Most applied work using GMM estimators works with the one-step estimator as 
simulation studies have shown that the efficiency gains from two-step estimators are 
modest, and also the dependency of the two-step estimator on estimated parameters 
makes the asymptotic distributions approximations less reliable, with simulation studies 
showing that the asymptotic standard errors are often too small (Bond, 2002).  
 
With T>3, when the model is overidentified, the validity of assumptions used to get the 
moment conditions can be tested using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
(Sargan, 1958, 1988; Hansen, 1982). Under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying 
restrictions, NJN  has an asymptotic χ2 distribution. The key overidentifying assumption 
is that there is no serial correlation in εit, which can be tested using a test of no second-
order autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
  
The difference GMM estimator forms moment conditions using lagged-levels of the 
dependent variable and the predetermined or strictly exogenous variables with first-
differenced errors.  However Blundell and Bond (1998) found that if the autoregressive 
process is too persistent, then the lagged-levels make for weak instruments and, 
accordingly proposed to use additional moment conditions between the lagged 
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differences of the dependant variable and the levels of the disturbances, E(!yi,t"n,!it ) = 0
. These moment conditions are based on the assumption that the individual effect is 
uncorrelated with the first difference of the dependant variable, . Blundell 
and Bond (BB) method is called a system GMM estimator since it uses a combination 
of equations in first-differences with equations in levels to exploit the full set of 
instruments.  
 
Instead of concentrating on getting valid instruments to remove the correlation between 
the transformed lagged dependant variable and the transformed error term, Kiviet 
(1995) approaches the problem by trying to compute a specific data-dependent 
correction of the bias in the fixed effect estimator. Such a bias-corrected Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDVC) estimator eliminates the small sample bias of the FE 
estimator.  While Kiviet fixed the problem for balanced panels, Bruno (2005) developed 
a method suitable for unbalanced ones. The bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator uses a 
numerical procedure to estimate this bias and uses it to compute the bias-corrected 
coefficient estimates (Wintoki et al., 2012).  The estimator requires a consistent initial 
estimator to obtain a coefficient of starting values in order to initialize the bias 
correction (the user can specify either AB or BB as options). One potentially big 
disadvantage of this method is that it requires the regressors to be strictly exogenous 
(Flannery and Hankins, 2013). However, Flannery and Hankins (Ibid.) performed 
Monte Carlo simulations with endogenous variables for the LSDVC estimator and 
concluded from their results that the estimator produces reasonable estimates as long as 
the level of endogeneity is not too high. 
 
E(!i,!yit ) = 0
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Since OLS is not an appropriate method due to the correlation between the regressors 
and fixed effects, yet another approach to estimating the model is to explicitly model the 
fixed effects, and then proceed with OLS. Following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain 
(1980)31, one can model the dependence between xit and αi by assuming that αi is a 
function of the means of all time-varying covariates: 
              (5.8)  
where γi ~IN(0, σϒ2) and independent of xkit and εit. This formula serves to explicitly 
model the fixed effects using the data, where a0 is an intercept and  is a vector of 
sample means across time that is composed of all the time-varying covariates for 
individual i. However, if αi is correlated with yi1, one needs to control for the initial 
conditions problem. In this case, initial conditions need to be explicitly modelled rather 
than assumed to be exogenously given.   
 
Following Heckman (1981c), one can specify a reduced form equation for it,
yi1* = ! 'zi +"i with var(!i ) ="!2  and cor(! i,"i ) = #  and zi being a vector of strictly 
exogenous instruments, including variables relevant in the first period, pre-sample 
information about the dependable variable and vector of means xi . To account for the 
possibility of non-zero ρ, the following relation is specified !i ="# i = $i1 , where γi and 
εi1 are orthogonal, var(!i1) ="#2 (1! $2 )  and ! = "#$ /#% . This means that the final 
version of the model looks like: 
yit* = xit '! +"yi,t!1 + a1 ' xi +# i +$it            (5.9) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Although the methodology was originally developed over 30 years ago, it is still used to deal with fixed 
effects in models, for example by Wooldridge and Papke (2008) who used it to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity that might be correlated with explanatory variables while estimating the production risk 
impact on technology adoption, Allanson and Petrie (2013) to model dynamic health changes and 
Mavromaras et al. (2013) in an unemployment study. 
!i = a0 + a1 ' xi
k
+" i
xik
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yi1* = ! 'zi +"# i +$i1              (5.10) 
To obtain a single equation model, the approach of Wooldridge (2005) is followed. The 
author specified an alternative condition maximum likelihood estimator which employs 
the distribution conditional on the initial value and exogenous variables. That is, instead 
of specifying the distribution for , Wooldridge specifies :  
! i ="0 +"1yi1 + zi '" + ei            (5.11) 
where zi contains variables which are correlated with the unobservable γi. The intuition 
here is that the correlation between the initial value yi1 and the unobservable γi is 
controlled for explicitly, resulting in another specific individual error term ei that is not 
correlated with the initial value. Furthermore, if one specifies the means across time of 
time-varying covariates to be zi, the final model to estimate becomes:
yit* = xit '! +"yi,t!1 + a1 ' xi +# i yi1 + ei           (5.12) 
where i = 1,2,...,n and t=2,...,Ti. 
 
The final choice of the estimation method will be discussed in the following section, 
and a robustness check will compare results from the variety of estimators discussed 
here.  
 
  
P(yi1 |! i ) P(! i | yi1)
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5.4 Empirical section 
 
 
In the model, income is a function of the economic size of farms as measured by 
Standard Gross Margin (SGM). The economic size of farms is split into cropping and 
livestock SGMs. This accounts for the fact that cropping and livestock farming 
activities are of different nature; they are expected to bring different expected returns 
with different short-run and long-run dynamics, where the initial impact is likely to be 
bigger for crop as a proportion of the total long-run impact.  
 
The model is estimated using the OLS method with an addition of explicitly modelling 
the fixed effects following Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge (2005) (OLSfe from here 
on). An appealing feature of this estimator is that the explicitly modelled fixed effects 
can enter the decomposition of inequality in the next chapter, which will prove quite 
informative. The robustness of the results to the choice of estimator is investigated 
thoroughly later on, with the findings providing no evidence against the OLSfe.   
 
The section will start with a discussion of data and variables summary, followed by a 
description of model specification and model estimation and results. This is concluded 
with a robustness analysis where the model is estimated across a variety of methods in 
order to check the sensitivity of results to the assumptions used for different estimators. 
 
 
5.4.1 Data and variables summary 
 
The analysis is performed using farm-level FAS data for years 1996-2010, which 
corresponds to 1995/96-2009/10 production years.  
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Some explanation as to why this period of data differs from the earlier period studied in 
chapters 3 and 4 is needed, since the redistributive effect analysis (and by association 
the capitalisation estimation in chapter 3) looks at the support in the production years 
2005/2006 – 2009/2010, while the dynamic analysis looks at the period 1995/1996 – 
2009/2010. The reason why data from 2006 onwards is used for the first type of 
analysis is that the interest was in the post-SFP support and income distributions, seeing 
how Allanson (2008) already analysed the pre-SFP redistributive effect of support. 
However, for the dynamic analysis, in order to get meaningful estimates of the 
dynamics in the income model, longer time span is necessary (with the awareness that 
there might be issues with support regime changes over such a long period, but these are 
largely controlled by the inclusion of time fixed effects in the model). Furthermore, 
unlike with the redistributive analysis, no prior investigation of the income mobility of 
agricultural incomes in Scotland of this type exists and there was interest in using a 
longer period of data to get a more comprehensive picture. The comparison of pre- and 
post-SFP data is also achieved with the use of multiyear changes analysis. 
 
 
Table 5.1 presents the summary of variables used: initial and final incomes, SGM, and 
the cropping and livestock shares of enterprise mix. Term initial income refers to the 
income in year t, and final income is the income in t+1. The analysis is done on a 
change in income, therefore the initial and final incomes linked to a given year need to 
have the same sample size to calculate the change in income. However, the panel is not 
balanced throughout the years; thus the mean of final income in one year does not 
correspond to the mean of initial income in the following year as the samples used to 
calculate them are different.  
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Table 5.1 Data summary 
 
Variable
Number of
observation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
All Initial income 6045 37860 36606 -136936 329048
Final income 6045 37997 37419 -79721 375747
Standard Gross Margin 6045 66674 50592 1749 414763
Cropping share of enterprise mix 6045 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 6045 0.71 0.35 0 1
1996 Initial income 498 40371 36256 -23061 228581
/1997 Final income 498 44834 37212 -79721 258593
Standard Gross Margin 498 57932 42132 4727 349853
Cropping share of enterprise mix 498 0.29 0.34 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 498 0.71 0.34 0 1
1997 Initial income 507 45684 36679 -25279 234769
/1998 Final income 507 30758 27863 -30113 165227
Standard Gross Margin 507 59560 43547 5300 343838
Cropping share of enterprise mix 507 0.28 0.34 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 507 0.72 0.34 0 1
1998 Initial income 506 30147 28482 -136936 157526
/1999 Final income 506 30580 28792 -67822 189964
Standard Gross Margin 506 62131 45708 4759 371368
Cropping share of enterprise mix 506 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 506 0.71 0.35 0 1
1999 Initial income 498 31335 28966 -67822 189964
/2000 Final income 498 28063 29026 -44636 191216
Standard Gross Margin 498 62916 47276 3855 339207
Cropping share of enterprise mix 498 0.26 0.34 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 498 0.74 0.34 0 1
2000 Initial income 434 27456 28647 -44636 191216
/2001 Final income 434 29923 30114 -9835 211964
Standard Gross Margin 434 62997 45489 6623 375944
Cropping share of enterprise mix 434 0.28 0.34 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 434 0.72 0.34 0 1
2001 Initial income 364 28178 27742 -64612 182419
/2002 Final income 364 33053 33129 -40210 188855
Standard Gross Margin 364 60862 47062 6364 398376
Cropping share of enterprise mix 364 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 364 0.71 0.35 0 1
2002 Initial income 329 33109 32681 -24194 188855
/2003 Final income 329 32420 28792 -33721 174710
Standard Gross Margin 329 60966 48468 1749 376453
Cropping share of enterprise mix 329 0.28 0.34 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 329 0.72 0.34 0 1
2003 Initial income 332 34485 28504 -33721 174710
/2004 Final income 332 38806 32273 -56801 202260
Standard Gross Margin 332 65882 49131 6043 383280
Cropping share of enterprise mix 332 0.30 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 332 0.70 0.35 0 1
2004 Initial income 424 40281 33700 -56801 207943
/2005 Final income 424 40327 35467 -21985 208680
Standard Gross Margin 424 69621 52725 6007 373628
Cropping share of enterprise mix 424 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 424 0.71 0.35 0 1
2005 Initial income 437 40157 35693 -40095 208680
/2006 Final income 437 34173 32050 -48030 176977
Standard Gross Margin 437 70843 53256 5899 413278
Cropping share of enterprise mix 437 0.28 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 437 0.72 0.35 0 1
2006 Initial income 426 34115 31862 -48030 176977
/2007 Final income 426 37051 37508 -30575 293141
Standard Gross Margin 426 70792 51185 5333 305395
Cropping share of enterprise mix 426 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 426 0.71 0.35 0 1
2007 Initial income 415 37977 37910 -30575 293141
/2008 Final income 415 50367 50635 -37996 323733
Standard Gross Margin 415 73664 53444 6638 312027
Cropping share of enterprise mix 415 0.29 0.35 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 415 0.71 0.35 0 1
2008 Initial income 421 51613 51235 -46727 323733
/2009 Final income 421 49637 48037 -40250 329048
Standard Gross Margin 421 77056 59692 5378 414763
Cropping share of enterprise mix 421 0.30 0.36 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 421 0.70 0.36 0 1
2009 Initial income 454 51916 50637 -40250 329048
/2010 Final income 454 53173 49713 -41772 375747
Standard Gross Margin 454 79635 61568 5038 352254
Cropping share of enterprise mix 454 0.34 0.38 0 1
Livestock share of enterprise mix 454 0.66 0.38 0 1
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The income measure used is Cash Income, as defined in chapter 4. Like earlier for the 
purpose of the redistributive effect analysis, this measure is chosen as it seems to be the 
best representative of what is available to farmers for their spending purposes and 
therefore it corresponds closely to the income position as perceived by a farmer. Since 
the purpose of estimating the model is to complement the mobility analysis in the 
following chapter, it is important to use a consistent measure of income throughout. 
 
The variable used to measure economic size of farms is the SGM of a farm; this concept 
is measured in pounds and is closely related to the Economic Size Units (ESU) (with 1 
ESU being equal to 1200 SGM in euros). The role of the SGM in the model is to 
capture income-generating capacity of farms. The concept of SGM is used in the Farms 
Structure Survey organized by Eurostat, in the European Commission‘s Farm 
Accounting Data Network and in the Scottish Government’s Farm Accounts Survey. 
According to the European Commission’s website “the Standard Gross Margin (SGM) 
of a crop or livestock item is defined as the value of output from one hectare or from 
one animal less the cost of variable inputs required to produce that output” (European 
Commission, 2011a). The Scottish Government further states that “enterprise output is 
revenue adjusted for valuation change, plus transfers out and the value of produce used, 
less transfers in and purchases. Variable costs are those that can be readily allocated to 
an enterprise and vary in proportion to the size of the enterprise” (SGRERAD, 2011, p. 
89). 
 
All crop and livestock items have SGM figures calculated based on empirical data 
collected from the farms, averaged across 4 years. The SGM figures are updated, 
although not very frequently. Even so, the weights changed twice in the sample period, 
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in 1999 and in 2004, therefore the SGM variable used for estimation in this model was 
adjusted by recalculating the figures for the whole sample period using the latest set of 
weights for consistency. 
 
The shares of enterprise mix are calculated as a ratio of livestock and cropping SGM to 
overall SGM. As can be seen, livestock share is consistently higher than cropping. This 
implies the dominance of livestock enterprises in the Scottish agriculture. Based on 
these shares, the cropping and livestock SGM values are calculated. 
 
The model is quite simple in the fact that it does not include any additional explanatory 
variables other than the SGM. Any attempts to develop a more complex model failed to 
provide a statistically robust specification. In particular, experiments with modelling 
income as a production function, using factors of production like land, labour and 
capital, were unsatisfactory. This could be because the input measures which are 
relevant are hard to define and they might be highly correlated, causing collinearity 
among the covariates. Consequently, the SGM figure serves as a type of black box for 
the agricultural production function. 
 
One weakness of using the SGM is that the relationship of income to SGM will be 
mediated by whether the farmer provides all the land and labour, as the SGM variable 
does not take into account the ownership of factors of production. Assuming a given 
farm is roughly of fixed size over the period, then this should be to some extent 
controlled by the fixed effect. 
 
	   	  170	  
5.4.2 Empirical model specification 
 
In addition to farm fixed effects, the model further includes time fixed effects. Factors 
like market events, weather conditions or disease outbreaks impact the relationship 
between the economic size of farms and income. These factors will vary between years, 
therefore it is important to account for that impact in the model. A simple way to do this 
is to include in the model year dummies which capture shifts in average income 
between years. However, such intercept dummies would not account for the fact that the 
impact of common shocks in any given year on a farm’s income generating capacity 
will be dependent on the farm’s economic size (whether the year is good or bad, its 
impact on farms’ income will be proportional to the farms’ size). Therefore instead of 
intercept dummies, the model includes slope dummies, where year dummies are 
interacted with farms‘ SGM measure (split into livestock and cropping shares) to 
account for the differences in the impact of time fixed effects on farms of different 
sizes. The conditions in a given year are incorporated in the long-run relationship as a 
type of technological change.  
 
In the ADLM specification, the model is of the following form32: 
Incomei,t+1 = α0 + δ1(cropping SGM)i,t+1 + δ2(livestock SGM)i,t+1 +(1-λ) incomei,t 
+α1(cropping SGM)i,t + α2(livestock SGM)i,t + α3(fixed effect)i           (5.13)   
+ α4[time fixed effect*(cropping SGM)i,t] + α5[time fixed effect*(livestock SGM)i,t] 
+ εi,t+1                                             
δ‘s are the short-run impact parameters.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For simplicity, only term fixed effect enters the model specification, where in reality this consists of the 
means of livestock and cropping SGMs for farm i across time and the initial value of income yi1 (where 
contributions from the three elements are combined into a single factor in the decompositions procedures 
in chapter 6). Likewise, for simplicity the term time fixed effect is combined in the presentation of the 
model, whereas in reality in consists of 13 annual dummies. 
	   	  171	  
This can easily be converted into an ECM: 
Change in incomei,t+1 = α0 + δ1(change in cropping SGM)i,t+1 + 
 δ2(change in livestock SGM)i,t+1 + λ{β0 + β1(cropping SGM)i,t +     (5.14)  
 β 2(livestock SGM)i,t +β 3 (fixed effect)+ β 4 [time fixed effect*(cropping SGM)i,t] 
 + β 5 [time fixed effect*(livestock SGM)i,t]  -  incomei,t } + εi,t+1              
 
In the ECM version of the model, βs are the long-run equilibrium parameters and λ is 
the adjustment parameter, which shows how quickly any deviation from the equilibrium 
relationship gets adjusted the following period. !0 ="0 # , !1 = "1 +#1( ) $ , 
!2 = "2 +#2( ) $ , !3 ="3 # , !4 ="4 #  and !5 ="5 #  may be interpreted as the 
parameters of the long-run, or equilibrium, income:  
Equilibrium incomet= β0 + β1(cropping SGM)i,t + β 2(livestock SGM)i,t + 
β 3 (fixed effect)i + β 4 [time fixed effect*(cropping SGM)i,t]           (5.15) 
 + β 5 [time fixed effect*(livestock SGM)i,t]    
 
5.4.3 Model estimation results 
 
 
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results for the model, which is estimated as an ADLM 
model (the results can easily be converted into ECM following equations (5.1) and 
(5.2)), using robust standard errors which correct for presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, given tests which indicated the presence of both. Table 5.3 includes the 
converted parameters for short-run and long-run dynamics.  
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Table 5.2 Model estimation results. 
 
 
The lambda in the model is 0.493, which means that slightly under a half of the gap 
between any farm’s actual and equilibrium incomes in a given year is closed the 
following year.  
 
The short-run impact of change in the economic size of cropping enterprises is 0.123, 
implying that, on average, for every additional pound of increase in the economic size 
of cropping enterprises as measured by SGM, the instantaneous return that goes towards 
farmer’s income is 12.3 pence. For livestock enterprises, the corresponding figure is 
Dependant variable: Income
Regressors Coefficent
Robust standard 
error
t statistic P-value 95% Confidence Interval
Cropping SGM 0.1227508 0.0650281 1.89 0.059 -0.0047277 0.2502292
Livestock SGM 0.1188032 0.0676287 1.76 0.079 -0.0137733 0.2513797
Lagged income 0.5062783 0.022247 22.76 0 0.4626663 0.5498904
Lagged cropping SGM -0.0119307 0.107869 -0.11 0.912 -0.2233925 0.1995312
Lagged livestock SGM 0.1724829 0.0700516 2.46 0.014 0.0351566 0.3098091
Mean of cropping SGM -0.0070596 0.0663679 -0.11 0.915 -0.1371645 0.1230453
Mean of  livestock SGM 0.0044285 0.0543378 0.08 0.935 -0.102093 0.1109499
Initial value of income 0.1775035 0.01945 9.13 0 0.1393746 0.2156325
1997 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.2327098 0.0916536 -2.54 0.011 -0.4123837 -0.0530359
1998 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.0064753 0.0915255 0.07 0.944 -0.1729475 0.1858981
1999 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.0391003 0.0894026 0.44 0.662 -0.1361608 0.2143614
2000 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.0363582 0.0916893 -0.4 0.692 -0.2161021 0.1433856
2001 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.0891226 0.0930266 -0.96 0.338 -0.2714881 0.093243
2002 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.0285313 0.0918958 -0.31 0.756 -0.2086801 0.1516175
2003 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.0516125 0.0877245 0.59 0.556 -0.1203591 0.223584
2004 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.0867424 0.0928873 -0.93 0.35 -0.2688348 0.0953501
2005 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.0925019 0.0890868 -1.04 0.299 -0.267144 0.0821402
2006 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.1477655 0.0981819 1.51 0.132 -0.0447061 0.3402372
2007 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.3355552 0.0905688 3.7 0 0.1580078 0.5131026
2008 dummy*lagged cropping SGM -0.1419399 0.1067794 -1.33 0.184 -0.3512657 0.0673859
2009 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.0482231 0.095559 0.5 0.614 -0.1391068 0.235553
1997 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.2617652 0.0283901 -9.22 0 -0.3174199 -0.2061104
1998 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.2090543 0.0282816 -7.39 0 -0.2644964 -0.1536123
1999 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.296366 0.0260359 -11.38 0 -0.3474057 -0.2453263
2000 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.1736948 0.0354237 -4.9 0 -0.2431379 -0.1042516
2001 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.010069 0.0349788 -0.29 0.773 -0.0786401 0.0585021
2002 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.2220153 0.0348529 -6.37 0 -0.2903394 -0.1536911
2003 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.1113209 0.0331103 -3.36 0.001 -0.176229 -0.0464129
2004 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.0936619 0.0309948 -3.02 0.003 -0.1544228 -0.032901
2005 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.2174592 0.0315552 -6.89 0 -0.2793186 -0.1555997
2006 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.1688608 0.0302334 -5.59 0 -0.2281292 -0.1095924
2007 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.056255 0.0357209 -1.57 0.115 -0.1262808 0.0137709
2008 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.0422359 0.037112 -1.14 0.255 -0.1149888 0.0305169
2009 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.0871393 0.0423794 -2.06 0.04 -0.1702181 -0.0040605
Constant 2300.301 516.8706 4.45 0 1287.049 3313.553
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Observations 6045
Ho: No first-order autocorrelation Ho: Constant variance F(16, 6025) 139.68
Variables: fitted values of dependant variable Prob>F 0
F(1,647)=210.868 Chi2(1)=2708.83 R-squared 0.6451
Prob>F=0.000 Prob>chi2=0.000 Root MSE 22356
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0.119. This indicates that farms‘ short-run returns from changes in the sizes of both 
types of enterprises are very similar.   
 
Long-run returns of SGM from cropping and livestock enterprises that go towards 
farmers’ incomes will vary depending on the year, as a result of the time fixed effects. 
Wald test was performed to test the joint significance off all the slope dummies. While 
not all of them are statistically significant individually, the null hypothesis of no joint 
significance was rejected with P-value of 0.00. There are substantial differences in the 
annual returns, as shown by the wide dispersion of the long-run coefficients on the 
economic size variables, reflecting the high variability of farming prices and the impact 
of weather and disease outbreaks on production levels, and hence consequent 
unpredictability of farmers’ incomes.  
 
For cropping inputs, the average equilibrium return across all the years is 0.21 and the 
coefficient of variation, showing relative variability, is 1.3, which indicates very high-
variance distribution. Most of the years have positive coefficients, which is in line with 
economic theory – expansion of the economic size of enterprise is expected to have a 
positive impact on farmer’s equilibrium income. However, the result is highly negative 
in 199733 (-0.24) and slightly negative (-0.06) in 2008. This implies that economic 
conditions in these years made cropping unprofitable, and the larger the enterprise, the 
bigger were the losses. The Scottish Governments economic reports show that these 
results reflect negative market conditions; in 1997 world commodity prices were in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The robustness of this result was checked by estimating the model across different time horizons, for 
example, eliminating the first year of the sample and changing the base year of the model. This sensitivity 
analysis confirmed the result that the long-term return for 1997 is highly negative. The coefficient on the 
dummy for this year is also statistically significant at 5% level, unlike the 2008 which also resulted in 
negative long-run return.  
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general low and in 2008 this was caused by steep decline in returns from cereal 
(SEERAD, 2001; SGRERAD, 2009). 2007 was the best year for cropping, with long -  
 
Table 5.3 Short-run and long-run coefficients.  
 
 
run return to farmers’ income of 90 pence for every pound of economic size of cropping 
enterprises. The corresponding economic report on agriculture (SEERAD, 2008) notes 
that this year was particularly good for cereals, given a good harvest and high global 
prices.  
 
Regressors Coefficent
Lambda 0.4937217
Short run impact
Cropping SGM 0.1227508
Livestock SGM 0.1188032
Long run/equilibrium 
1996 Cropping SGM 0.22445864
1997 Cropping SGM -0.2468794
1998 Cropping SGM 0.23757392
1999 Cropping SGM 0.30365366
2000 Cropping SGM 0.15081756
2001 Cropping SGM 0.04394682
2002 Cropping SGM 0.16667041
2003 Cropping SGM 0.32899627
2004 Cropping SGM 0.04876776
2005 Cropping SGM 0.03710228
2006 Cropping SGM 0.52374769
2007 Cropping SGM 0.90410306
2008 Cropping SGM -0.0630311
2009 Cropping SGM 0.32213127
1996 Livestock SGM 0.58998035
1997 Livestock SGM 0.05979259
1998 Livestock SGM 0.16655496
1999 Livestock SGM -0.010289
2000 Livestock SGM 0.23817325
2001 Livestock SGM 0.56958627
2002 Livestock SGM 0.14030333
2003 Livestock SGM 0.36450737
2004 Livestock SGM 0.40027449
2005 Livestock SGM 0.14953141
2006 Livestock SGM 0.24796419
2007 Livestock SGM 0.47603964
2008 Livestock SGM 0.50443438
2009 Livestock SGM 0.41348557
Constant 4659.10451
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The average long-run return for livestock activity is 0.31 and the coefficient of variation 
is 0.63. Two interesting observations emerge from that finding. Firstly, the long-run 
correction relative to short-run return is bigger for livestock than for cropping, with 19 
and 9 pence average adjustment respectively. This implies that the share of the long-
term return to livestock that is realized in the short run is smaller than for cropping. This 
seems plausible from an agronomic point of view as the short-run returns to investment 
in livestock will be lower than for cropping given the nature of the livestock production 
cycle. Secondly, the higher coefficient of variation for crop returns indicates higher 
instability of markets for cropping, with less predictability of future returns for cropping 
farmers. Investigation of market conditions in that period revealed that the high 
variability is due more to price instability rather than output variation (SGRERAD, 
2008).  
 
Only 1999 shows negative return for livestock, but it is very close to zero and 
insignificant. The low return from livestock is presumably due to the Bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) disease outbreak which started in the few preceding 
years (SEERAD, 2001). Highest long-run returns were in 1996, with 59 pence per 
pound increase in the economic size of livestock activity (although the year was not 
particularly good for either type of production, there was in increase in agricultural land 
use for rough grazing and sharp increase in numbers of cattle (SEERAD, 2002)) and 57 
pence in 2001 (which reflected positive price trends and volumes for livestock sector 
recovering from Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the previous year).  
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5.4.4 Robustness check 
 
In order to test the robustness of results, the model was also estimated using the other 
possible estimators identified in section 5.3: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed 
Effects (FE), Arellano-Bond (AB), Blundell-Bond (BB), and bias-corrected Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDVC). 
 
For robustness check results are generated for all estimators based on identical sample, 
which is slightly different to the sample used for the final specification in the preceding 
section, since the GMM estimators automatically restrict the sample due to differencing 
of data  (as does LSDVC since it is based on BB estimators); thus the restricted sample 
consists of 5080 observations. For comparison, a new set of OLSfe estimates based on 
the corresponding sample is included. The results are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
Starting with the OLS estimation method, the results show a relatively large coefficient 
on lagged income, which implies a correspondingly low lambda parameter. In this case 
lambda would be (1-0.62) = 0.38, indicating that about 38% of disequilibrium from a 
previous period is fixed in the following one. Due to the correlation of the dependant 
variable and composite error term, which includes individual effects, this result is likely 
to be biased upwards. Therefore one can expect that the coefficient on lagged income 
(1- λ)  in  the  ADLM  specification  of  the  model  is  higher  than  the  true  value  of 
the parameter and that the true lambda is therefore somewhat higher, and consequently 
the rate of adjustment is faster.  
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Table 5.4 Comparison of estimation results across different estimators34.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Coefficients are in bold and standard errors are in small print under the estimates. Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted respectively as ***, **, *. 
OLS FE AB BB LSDVC OLSfe
Lagged income 0.619*** 0.0571*** -0.100* 0.0928* 0.182*** 0.520***
0.021 0.017 0.044 0.044 0.029 0.023
Cropping SGM 0.162* 0.104* 0.128 0.260*** 0.0990*** 0.121
0.069 0.043 0.079 0.064 0.006 0.072
Livestock SGM 0.177* 0.171*** 0.155* 0.305*** 0.164*** 0.171*  
0.074 0.037 0.069 0.074 0.031 0.081
Lagged cropping SGM  -0.255** -0.109* -0.062 -0.078 -0.166** -0.298***
0.084 0.051 0.091 0.091 0.058 0.088
Lagged livestock SGM -0.114 0.063 0.099 0.073 0.004 -0.118
0.077 0.042 0.113 0.078 0.033 0.073
1998 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.268*** 0.067 0.027 0.112* 0.105*** 0.243***
0.062 0.035 0.034 0.046 0.023 0.061
1999 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.304*** 0.149*** 0.115* 0.178** 0.180*** 0.296***
0.062 0.036 0.051 0.062 0.024 0.059
2000 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.217*** 0.117*** 0.090 0.136** 0.139** 0.216***
0.058 0.035 0.052 0.050 0.050 0.060
2001 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.167* 0.064 0.028 0.080 0.0895*** 0.160*  
0.066 0.037 0.057 0.068 0.022 0.063
2002 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.232*** 0.0762* 0.045 0.101 0.110*** 0.219***
0.064 0.038 0.059 0.067 0.000 0.061
2003 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.276*** 0.147*** 0.138* 0.167** 0.179*** 0.281***
0.057 0.038 0.061 0.063 0.002 0.055
2004 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.139* 0.049 0.054 0.065 0.0712*** 0.153*  
0.066 0.036 0.066 0.066 0.012 0.065
2005 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.145** 0.000 -0.002 0.032 0.035 0.156** 
0.054 0.036 0.068 0.060 0.018 0.056
2006 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.407*** 0.226*** 0.199* 0.261** 0.272*** 0.413***
0.078 0.038 0.078 0.081 0.003 0.075
2007 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.573*** 0.508*** 0.522*** 0.537*** 0.527*** 0.601***
0.062 0.037 0.079 0.069 0.015 0.059
2008 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.103 0.200*** 0.255** 0.212* 0.182*** 0.163
0.091 0.037 0.097 0.095 0.041 0.089
2009 dummy*lagged cropping SGM 0.280*** 0.194*** 0.231** 0.219** 0.217*** 0.305***
0.066 0.035 0.071 0.072 0.043 0.064
1998 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.0821** -0.027 -0.055 0.008 -0.002 0.0602*  
0.028 -0.026 -0.021 0.026 -0.003 0.027
1999 dummy*lagged livestock SGM -0.011 -0.145*** -0.176*** -0.110*** -0.114*** -0.035
-0.026 -0.025 -0.026 -0.028 -0.007 -0.025
2000 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.126*** -0.0708** -0.124*** -0.031 -0.026 0.0911** 
0.035 -0.027 -0.036 -0.039 -0.075 -0.035
2001 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.285*** 0.0924** 0.0802* 0.158*** 0.129*** 0.251***
0.036 0.029 -0.037 0.036 0.008 0.034
2002 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.047 -0.022 -0.014 0.033 -0.010 0.036
0.036 -0.029 -0.041 0.040 -0.011 0.034
2003 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.187*** 0.045 0.035 0.104** 0.0712** 0.166***
0.035 0.030 0.045 0.039 0.024 0.033
2004 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.203*** 0.104*** 0.0993* 0.142*** 0.124*** 0.191***
0.034 0.028 0.047 0.040 0.014 0.033
2005 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.049 -0.015 -0.016 0.018 0.000 0.044
0.032 -0.026 -0.048 0.038 0.011 0.031
2006 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.112*** -0.009 -0.025 0.022 0.019 0.0968** 
0.031 -0.026 -0.050 0.039 0.032 0.030
2007 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.207*** 0.0869*** 0.076 0.117** 0.115** 0.194***
0.038 0.026 0.056 0.045 0.038 0.037
2008 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.210*** 0.141*** 0.144* 0.167*** 0.160*** 0.211***
0.036 0.026 0.058 0.043 0.047 0.036
2009 dummy*lagged livestock SGM 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.149* 0.168** 0.147*** 0.171***
0.044 0.026 0.064 0.052 0.008 0.042
Mean of cropping SGM - - - - - 0.016
0.071
Mean of livestock SGM - - - - - -0.036
-0.066
Initial value of income - - - - - 0.196***
0.021
Constant 2535.2*** 20416.1*** 24406.7*** 6645.8*** - 1860.1***
578.9 1753.4 6525.2 1575.7 537.0
Sample size 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080 5080
R-squared 0.629 0.167 - - - 0.647
F 118 30 - - - 123
AIC 116311 114056 - - - 116058
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The Fixed Effects estimator, on the other hand, produces a very low coefficient on 
lagged income, implying a value of lambda equal to 0.94 - an almost full immediate 
correction of any disequilibrium from the previous period. According to theory, the 
correlation between the transformed dependant variable and the transformed error term 
in this estimation method will lead to a downward bias in the estimate of (1- λ). As 
such, the true value of λ is expected to be less than 0.94. 
 
AB estimation did not produce a suitable result, mainly because the coefficient on the 
lag of income was negative, which would translate into a lambda coefficient greater 
than 1. Furthermore, although the model passed the test for no second order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals (the null of no autocorrelation was rejected 
with P-value of 0.00), it failed the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (the null of 
overidentifying restrictions being valid was rejected with P-value of 0.00).  
 
BB estimator generated coefficients which are more in line with economic intuition; the 
coefficient on the lagged income is positive, but its value is very low and close to the 
biased FE result. Furthermore, the model still failed the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions (the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions being valid was rejected 
with P-value of 0.00). This implies that the model behind this estimator is not valid. 
 
LSDVC estimator35 produced reasonable results – the coefficient on lagged income is 
positive. The problem with this estimator is that it assumes strictly exogenous 
regressors, whereas the SGM variable has to be treated as predetermined, since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 BB was chosen as the preliminary consistent estimator in this case since it performed better than AB. 
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economic size of farms in a given year is influenced by the size in the preceding years 
and any shocks to the size are likely to play role in the future size36.  
 
The last column of the table shows the OLSfe results, with positive coefficient on 
lagged income and generally comparable values to other methods. The lagged income 
coefficient from this estimator is between the upper and lower bound of OLS and FE 
estimators accordingly37. 
 
The important thing one can see comparing the estimates from the various methods is 
that all the methods generate comparable results. There is a degree of adjustment of the 
disequilibrium from the previous period (with the exception of the odd AB result), the 
coefficients on the current levels of economic size variables are always positive and of 
comparable magnitude, and the coefficients on the lagged economic size variables 
together with the slope dummies also show robustness – most of them are positive and 
comparable, and those that are negative, remain negative across all or most of the 
estimators38.  
 
Overall, this robustness check shows the results are roughly consistent across estimators 
and hence it indicates that the estimates are relatively insensitive to the choice of 
assumptions implicit in the use of the alternative estimators. Taking into account the 
known shortcomings of OLS and FE estimators, and the negative lambda result for AB, 
the choice of the estimator boiled down to three: BB, LSDVC or OLSfe. However, BB 
failed the Sargan test of validity of the instruments, and LSDVC required strict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is confirmed by Wooldridge (2009) test of exogeneity where future values of SGM have 
predictive power and are statistically significant when added as regressors to the income model.  
37 The same was true when FE and OLS estimators were used for the full sample used in section 5.4.3. 
38 See for example the Lagged cropping SGM which represents the base year coefficient for 1997, which 
represents a particularly bad year for crop returns. 
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exogeneity of the explanatory variables, which is not the case in this model. The OLS 
method would be an acceptable estimator if it were not for the presence of individual 
effects in the error term. However, since in the case of OLSfe estimator the fixed effects 
are explicitly modelled, this removes the correlation between the lagged income and the 
error term, and should result in an unbiased estimator. The biggest disadvantage of this 
estimator is the uncertainty as to whether the fixed effects are modelled correctly or not, 
but it has been shown that the estimator is within the expected bounds as specified by 
OLS and FE estimators. Lastly, an appealing feature of the OLSfe estimator is that it 
allows using the largest sample (since no data differencing is necessary), and therefore 
there is no loss of information. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a model which captures the determinants of 
individual agricultural income changes in Scotland, using farm-level FAS data for 
production years 1995/96 to 2009/10. The income was modelled as a function of the 
economic size of farms, which was separated into cropping and livestock activities. The 
model also included time fixed effects interacted with the economic size variable in 
order to account for the fact that the impact of conditions in any given year on income 
will be dependent on the size of the farm.  
 
This type of model is not straightforward to estimate because of the inclusion of lagged 
dependant variable which is correlated with the error term. In particular, both OLS and 
FE estimators are biased in this scenario. Popular estimators for this type of models are 
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difference and system GMM, but these are not suitable if the overidentifying 
restrictions are not valid, which is the case here. Another approach is to compute the 
correction of the bias in the fixed effects estimator, however the bias-corrected Least 
Square Dummy Estimator requires the covariates to be strictly exogenous, a condition 
which is not satisfied by regressors used in this model. An alternative solution is to use 
OLS but to model the fixed effects following Mundlak’s (1978) approach. The 
weakness of this methodology is the uncertainty about whether the fixed effects are 
modelled correctly.  
 
In the light of potential shortcomings in all the available methods, the choice of the 
estimator is somewhat arbitrary. The important thing is that the results of the model are 
robust across the estimators, indicating that estimates are relatively insensitive to the 
choice of assumptions implicit in the use of the alternative estimators. Ultimately, the 
OLS estimator with modelled fixed effects was chosen since it has the appeal of 
providing explicitly estimates of fixed effects, which will prove useful in the 
decomposition of equilibrium inequality in the following chapter. Furthermore, this 
estimator allows using a larger sample than other estimators that require differencing 
and therefore it eliminates loss of information. 
 
The results indicate that almost half of the annual deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium income was corrected the following year. The short-run return from 
changes in the economic size of cropping and livestock enterprises are very similar; on 
average farmers get 12 pence return in the short run from increasing the economic size 
of both types of enterprises by one pound. Both types of activities have bigger long-run 
returns, but the adjustment for livestock is relatively larger. This is in line with the 
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expectations considering the livestock production cycle. The results also indicate larger 
variation in annual returns for cropping, which is caused by larger fluctuations in the 
price of crops.  
 
The results from this model of how economic size of cropping and livestock enterprises 
drives individual income changes will be used in the subsequent chapter to get more 
insight into the drivers of vertical mobility, as well as to model and quantify the 
contributions to long-run agricultural income inequality.   
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6 Income mobility 
6.1 Introduction 
 
When agricultural incomes are studied, the attention is most often focused on either the 
static distributional consequences of support (see section 4.2) or income instability 
(Hergrenes et al., 2001; Hill, 1999; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Cordts et al., 1984). 
Very few studies look at the dynamics of individual farm mobility, that is the movement 
of farms within the income distribution. To my knowledge, the only study of 
agricultural income dynamics in Scotland is that of Phimister et al. (2004).  
 
Looking at inequality in a dynamic context is important in order to see how inequality 
changes over time and what is driving these changes. Furthermore, studying the 
dynamics of incomes allows to determine whether inequalities are a transitory or 
chronic problem, which will influence implications for policy. While farm income 
inequality is a negative occurrence, it is less of a policy concern if income mobility 
level is high, allowing poorer farms to move up in the income distribution. High 
mobility in this context implies that poverty is a transitory phenomenon and can be seen 
as an equalizer of opportunity. High income inequality and low income mobility, on the 
other hand, pose a serious problem for policy makers, indicating that poor farms get 
stuck at the bottom and cannot move out of the poverty. 
 
Since in most countries a substantial part of farms‘ incomes comes from agricultural 
support, analysing agricultural income inequality in a dynamic context can be seen as an 
implicit evaluation of agricultural policy in terms of its impact on inequality over time. 
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As Fields (2008) points out, income mobility denotes different things to different 
researchers; consequently a broad range of mobility indices, measuring different aspects 
of mobility, have been created over time. One clear and comprehensive classification of 
different mobility indices is provided by Jantti and Jenkins (2013) who distinguish four 
mobility concepts: positional change, individual income growth, reduction of longer-
term inequality and income risk.   
 
This chapter will look at the dynamic trends in agricultural income inequality in 
Scotland in years 1995/1996 – 2009/2010, and it will tackle all four concepts of 
mobility distinguished by Jantti and Jenkins (Ibid.). Inequality trends over time will be 
characterized and the role of transitory and structural factors in these trends will be 
determined with the use of Shorrocks rigidity measure, which relates to the concept of 
mobility as the reduction of longer-term inequality. Furthermore, changes in inequality 
over time will be decomposed into components due to income growth across the income 
range, that is vertical mobility, and the reshuffling of individuals in the income 
distribution, that is reranking mobility. These two measures correspond to the mobility 
concepts of individual income growth and positional change, respectively. This part of 
the analysis will allow the investigation of whether relative income changes were 
progressive or regressive. Additionally, the dynamic model of income from chapter 5 
will be used for two purposes. Firstly, to decompose vertical mobility employing a 
regression-based decomposition procedure in order to see how inequalities in income 
determinants impact on the pattern of individual income growth. Secondly, to measure 
the degree of long-run, or structural, inequality (which is linked to the concept of 
mobility at income risk) and see how income determinants contribute to it. This analysis 
will be informative about the degree to which the economic size of farms determines 
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their financial performance and as such, to what extent it determines income inequality 
and changes in it over time. 
 
This chapter investigates a very unexplored area of agricultural income dynamics, 
particularly in Scotland. Furthermore, the methodology used to decompose the vertical 
mobility index has never been used outside the context of income-related health 
inequality (Allanson and Petrie, 2013), and this chapter adds on to the original approach 
by decomposing changes over multiyear periods.   
 
Section 6.2 provides a literature review on income mobility and Scottish income 
dynamics, followed by a methodology description in section 6.3 and empirical results in 
6.4. The chapter is closed with conclusions in section 6.5.  
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6.2 Literature review 
 
This section will briefly discuss some approaches to mobility measurement and the 
existing research on Scottish agricultural income dynamics. 
 
6.2.1 Income mobility 
 
The concept of income mobility is closely linked to the analysis of income inequality 
and it concerns changes in inequality from one period to another, or one generation to 
another. As Fields and Ok put it: 
 
“Static evaluations of income distributions can provide only an incomplete 
picture, for, in most instances, the social welfare would certainly depend on the 
dynamics of income distribution as well. This basic insight, along with the 
increased availability of longitudinal data sets, has led to a massive and rapidly 
expanding literature on the measurement of income mobility.” 
(Fields and Ok, 1999, p. 2) 
 
Specifically, inequality at a given point in time is less of a concern for policy makers if 
high income mobility exists such that those at the bottom of the income distribution 
have a high chance of climbing up over time.  
 
Fields and Ok (Ibid.) further state that in spite of a large body of literature on the 
measurement of income mobility, it fails to provide a uniform discourse of analysis. As 
Fields (2008) points out, part of it is caused by the fact that income mobility denotes 
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different things to different researchers; consequently a broad range of mobility indices, 
measuring different aspects of mobility, have been created over time.   
 
One possible classification of different dimensions of mobility is provided by Jantti and 
Jenkins (2013). Their clear and comprehensive description distinguishes four mobility 
concepts: positional change, individual income growth, reduction of longer-term 
inequality and income risk. Whether more mobility is desirable from a societal point of 
view depends on the mobility concept in question.  
 
Following Jantti and Jenkins’ (Ibid.) notations, mobility in general relates to the 
transformation linking the marginal distribution of x with marginal distribution of y, 
where x and y are incomes vectors of N individuals in first and second periods 
respectively. They have a bivariate joint density f(x, y). In general, mobility can be 
considered as the transformation which links marginal distributions of x and y; the 
different mobility concepts ‘standardise’ [sic] these marginal distributions differently in 
order to concentrate on the nature of the link between x and y. 
 
Positional change specifically concerns mobility which is separate from changes in the 
shape of marginal distributions between the periods, like an increase in income 
inequality or average income, or in more general terms, a change in the density of 
individuals in any given income range. Standardisation to measure such changes is 
usually done by summarizing each individual’s position in terms of their income rank in 
the population normalized by population size, rather than by income per se, where the 
marginal distribution of fractional ranks is a standard uniform distribution of x and y by 
definition. As such, positional change mobility concerns the pattern of exchange of 
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persons between positions (known as exchange mobility), separate from any changes in 
the density of persons at particular points in the income range (known as structural 
mobility). In other words, income changes concern positional mobility only to the extent 
that they alter each individual’s position relative to the position of others. This means 
that equiproportional income growth across individuals or equal absolute increases to 
income for each person would raise incomes but cause no mobility in the positional 
sense. This type of mobility for a specific person necessarily depends on other 
individuals’ positions. As such, if one person changes position, so must at least one 
other person, and it is impossible for everyone to be upwardly or downwardly mobile. 
This type of mobility has an upper bound but there are two ways of thinking of the 
reference points; one relates to the independence of origin and destination, and the other 
to movement. For the first one, full independence of the origin takes place when the 
chances of being in the richest tenth of population in the second period are the same for 
the individuals in the poorest tenth and richest tenth in the first period. The second way 
emphasizes the positional movement concept per se with the view that maximum 
mobility occurs when there is a full rank reversal between the periods, so that the 
poorest person in period 1 is the richest one in period 2, and the richest person in period 
1 is the poorest in period 2, etc. 
 
The individual income growth concept refers to a measure of income changes (gains or 
losses) for individuals between two points in time. This concept contrasts with the one 
of positional movement; the focus is on gross mobility with no distinction between 
structural and exchange type, and it is possible for everyone to be upwardly or 
downwardly mobile – positive income growth for all will be considered mobility even if 
relative positions do not change. In this case, mobility can be defined for each 
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individual as the distance between starting and final income. No mobility refers to the 
case when the measure of distance is zero for each individual, and the greater the 
distance for everyone, the more mobility there is, ceteris paribus. There is no natural 
maximum mobility due to no obvious upper bound. The choice of distance metric is 
crucial for this concept of mobility, with the main distinction between different 
measures concerning whether they take into account directional or non-directional 
growth. The former case treats income gains differently to income losses, whereas with 
the latter a gain and a loss of equal magnitude are given the same distance and are 
summarized as income flux (see Fields and Ok (1999) for more).  
 
The third concept of mobility defines it in the context of impact on inequality in longer-
term incomes. What Jantti and Jenkins define as the longer-term income of each person 
is the longitudinal mean of incomes in each period, so that in two periods case, the 
mean is ½(xi +yi). Income in each period is therefore made up of two components: a 
permanent one that is the longer-term average, and a transitory one which is the 
deviation from that average. The averaging across years smooths out the variability in 
incomes and, additionally, the inequality of these averaged incomes is less than the 
dispersion between individuals’ incomes in any period. Mobility is then characterized in 
terms of the degree to which the inequality is reduced as a result of longitudinal 
averaging (see Shorrocks, 1978a), and no mobility takes place if every person’s income 
in every period is equal to their long-term average. For this concept, the upper bound of 
maximum mobility can also be defined and it will correspond to the case when there is 
inequality in individual periods’ incomes but no inequality in long-term average 
incomes. Like the rank reversal aspect of positional change, this concept of mobility is 
concerned with movement, but the two concepts use different reference points to 
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evaluate it; the former assesses it using base-period positions, and the latter long-term 
average incomes.  
 
The concept of mobility as income risk is related to that of mobility as reduction of 
multiperiod inequality, but with the statistical long-term average income replaced by 
expected future income in each period based on the information in the first period. 
Given this ex ante behavioural perspective, the transitory elements constitute 
unexpected idiosyncratic income shocks. As such, the bigger is the dispersion of these 
shocks across individuals, the larger is the income risk for the population. The 
interpretation of this measure as income risk gives it a different normative 
interpretation. In this context, the movement of income over time represents its 
unpredictability. In spite of the similarities between the last two mobility concepts, the 
two differ in practice once the income generating process is no longer a sum of a fixed 
permanent component at individual level and an idiosyncratic transitory component. In 
order to describe the evolution of permanent and transitory components over time, 
econometric models are used which makes the descriptions more complicated, resulting 
in different calculations of expected incomes and deviations from it. Nevertheless, both 
concepts rely on a distinction between a predictable or steady income element and an 
unpredictable transitory deviation part.  
 
6.2.2 Scottish agricultural income dynamics 
 
 
The analysis of the dynamics of agricultural incomes in Scotland is a very unexplored 
research area. To my knowledge, the only paper looking at these issues is by Phimister 
et al. (2004). The study uses the same dataset as this thesis, Farm Accounts Survey, and 
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looks at the period between 1988/89 and 1999/2000. The authors point out that not 
much attention had been given to the dynamics of agricultural income inequality, with 
most previous analysis focusing on variability and stability of aggregate mean income 
(Hergrenes et al., 2001; Hill, 1999; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Cordts et al., 1984). 
These studies showed that aggregate income in unstable over time, but that conclusion 
is not very informative about the experience of individual farmers. Phimister et al. try to 
close that gap by answering the following questions: how mobile are individual farms 
within the income distribution? What is the proportion of farms that are stuck at the 
bottom of the distribution? Are there specific farm characteristics that affect the 
probability of a farm moving in or out of the bottom?  
 
The authors analyse trends in inequality using the Gini coefficient and coefficient of 
variation calculated for subperiods in the sample, as well as based on averages 
calculated using a rolling two-year average of individual farm incomes across the 
sample period in order to smooth out intertemporal fluctuations. Income mobility is 
measured using relative rather than absolute levels of income in order to differentiate 
between movements in income associated with the agricultural business cycles and 
movements of individual farms within the income distribution. Those farms falling in 
the lowest fifth of the income distribution are defined as low-income farms. Transition 
matrices and transition rates are used to analyse the extent of movement of farms 
between income groups from one year to another.  Low income persistence is looked at 
by counting the number of times any given farm is in the poorest income group within a 
6-year period. Furthermore, Phimister et al. model low-income exit and entry. They 
employ the proportional hazard model to see if there exists a systematic relationship 
between spells of low income and certain farm characteristics. The information included 
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in FAS allows them to investigate characteristics like farm size, farm type, tenure type, 
regional effects and farmer’s age.  
 
The conclusions of their study indicate high income variability and mobility. The exit 
rates from low income/ re-entry into low income decline as the spell in/out of low 
income persists, but they remain substantial even after a couple of years. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence of some persistence in poverty and of certain farms being stuck in a 
poverty trap (around 10% of farms will spend 4 or more years in the low income group 
in a 6-year period).  Farm characteristics that increase the probability of long low-
income spells are small size of farms (in terms of the economic size) and age of farmers 
(being over 60 years old). No significant relationships between farm type or tenure type 
and low income spells persistence were found.  
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6.3   Methodology 
 
 
 
This section presents the methodology used in this chapter. It starts with the definition 
of inequality measure used and a discussion on Gibrat’s (1931) law of proportionate 
effect, followed by a description of Shorrock’s rigidity index which addresses mobility 
as reduction of longer-term inequality; it moves on to discuss the approach to measure 
positional mobility and individual income growth, with the extension of decomposing 
the measure of individual income growth using a regression-based like procedure. The 
last subsection discusses a regression-based decomposition of the Gini coefficient of 
chronic inequality, which is linked to measurement of mobility as income risk. 
 
6.3.1 Choice of inequality measure 
 
 
 
The inequality measure used in the subsequent analysis is the Gini coefficient. If Gt is 
the Gini coefficient of incomes in period t, it can be written as: 
Gt =
2
yt
cov(yt,Rt )              (6.1) 
where yt is the income in period t, is the average income in period t; Rt ! F(yt )  
signifies the fractional income rank, determined by the cumulative distribution function 
 of income yt.   
 
While chapter 4 focused on absolute inequality implications of agricultural support’s 
redistributive effect, this chapter focuses on relative inequality39. Looking at relative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The technical difficulty of using the Gini coefficient from chapter 4 no longer applies here, since the 
earlier problem concerned the presence of negative mean incomes. However, in the case here the mean 
income by which the Gini coefficient is normalized will always be positive (in chapter 4 it was the pre-
ty
( )F ⋅
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income changes is more meaningful since the level of income changes between years 
for a given farm will be affected by that farm’s income levels; therefore the concept of 
relative income changes is a more appropriate benchmark for what is expected to be 
seen. 
 
Furthermore, the relative measure of inequality indirectly ties with Gibrat’s law of 
proportionate effect through the concept of neutral income growth process40 (in relation 
to income change decomposition following Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) discussed in 
section 6.3.3). If Gibrat’s law (1931) of proportionate effect holds, it will imply that 
(expected) income growth is distributionally neutral, providing a natural benchmark or 
null hypothesis for the evaluation of the redistributive properties of actual income 
growth processes.  
 
A number of studies have directly investigated whether Gibrat’s law holds for farms’ 
growth, with some rejecting its validity (Bakucs & Ferto, 2009; Weiss, 1998, 1999; 
Shapiro et al. 1987), and others failing to find evidence to reject it (Bremmer et al., 
2012; Upton and Haworth, 1987). Of particular relevance for the analysis in this chapter 
are the findings of Bakucs et al. (2013) who used quantile regression on panel data from 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) for France, Hungary and Slovenia, 
distinguishing between dairy and crop farms. The novelty of their research is that it 
compares the validity of Gibrat’s law for three countries which have different historical 
trajectories of agricultural sector development. In particular, Hungary and Slovenia are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
support income that had a negative mean, but the income measure used in this chapter corresponds to the 
post-support income whose average is consistently positive). 
40  In this context, farm income is treated as a size measure. As Kostov et al. (2008) point out, a wide 
range of different variables has been used as size measure in papers studying Gibrat’s law, including 
farmed acreage, livestock numbers, net worth, gross sales, total gross margins and net income (Allanson, 
1992; Clarke et al. 1992; and, Shapiro et al. 1987) 
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transition countries, whereas France is a non-transition country where market forces and 
policy support, especially from CAP, have shaped the development of the agricultural 
industry over an extended period. Their results strongly reject the validity of Gibrat’s 
law for both types of farms in Hungary; the outcome depends on the size proxy for 
Slovenia (they show divergence for land and livestock size and convergence for Annual 
Work Units41) and the results confirm the law for crop and dairy farms in France. The 
authors conclude that the differences between the countries are caused by their 
historical developments. In Hungary and Slovenia farm growth is not independent from 
farm size since “farming structures had been frozen during the communist period and 
started evolving again during the transition period” (Ibid., p. 878); this is particularly 
the case in Hungary which over the transition period developed a bi-modal structure of 
small family farms and large (mainly corporate) farms and the results indicate that the 
small farms are catching up in terms of size.  The validity of Gibrat’s law for French 
farms comes from the continuity of the market and policy environment, and therefore 
the French agriculture achieved what the authors refer to as “maturity and steadiness of 
farm size-farm growth equilibrium” (Ibid., p. 880). In Scotland the farm structure has 
been shaped similarly to France, therefore the validity of Gibrat’s law in Scotland 
would be consistent with the findings of Bakucs et al., implying an equilibrium 
relationship between farms size and income growth in Scottish agriculture with growth 
rates uniform across all farm sizes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  One unit corresponds to the work performed by one person engaged in a full-time occupation on 
agricultural holding (European Commission, 2012). 
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6.3.2 Shorrocks rigidity measure 
 
 
 
The degree of inequality in each year will be affected not only by the underlying long-
run factors but also by random shocks to individual farms’ incomes in a given year. The 
Shorrocks rigidity index helps to identify the impact of transitory shocks on income 
inequality and hence the extent of inequality in the longer-term incomes. This measure 
corresponds to the concept of mobility as reduction of longer-term inequality, as 
distinguished by Jantti and Jenkins (2013). 
 
Shorrocks (1978a) developed the concept of mobility as the degree to which 
equalization occurs when the study period is lengthened. He saw mobility as the 
opposite of rigidity, which he defined as 
RT =
GT
wtGt
t
!
                        (6.2)  
where t=1,…,T, GT is the Gini coefficient calculated using the average annual income of 
each individual over all T periods (i.e. longer-term average income), Gt is the Gini 
coefficient for incomes in year t, and wt = µt /µT , where µt is average income in year t 
(averaged across all individuals) and µT  is the corresponding average for the T periods. 
 
The index is equal zero if incomes are exactly equalised by the extension of the 
measurement period, in which case GT is equal zero; that is if the longer-term averages 
are equal for everyone in the population, there will be no inequality and the 
corresponding Gini coefficient will be zero. The index will be equal 1 if relative 
incomes remain constant over time (the T-period Gini and all the annual Gini 
coefficients are equal). Therefore, an index value close to zero implies inequality is 
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largely driven by transitory shocks and is more of a short-term phenomenon; values 
closer to 1 imply more rigidity in the sense that inequality is largely due to long-term 
differences between farms. The index also has a simple interpretation as the proportion 
of cross-sectional inequality which persists as the measurement period is extended 
(Rohde et al., 2010). 
 
6.3.3 Decomposition of inequality change 
 
 
This part of methodology is based on the measurement of inequality change developed 
by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006).  
 
When we look at a change in income inequality between two points in time, two 
elements can be extracted; reshuffling of individuals within the income pecking order, 
and growth or contraction of the income (Fields and Ok, 1996). In particular, Jenkins 
and van Kerm (2006) show that when inequality is measured using one of the broad 
class of S-Gini indices (Yitzhaki, 1983), the change in inequality between two periods 
can be decomposed into two factors; one that captures the reranking mobility, and one 
that quantifies vertical mobility – that is whether it favoured the rich or the poor. These 
two measures correspond respectively to concepts of mobility as positional change and 
individual income growth.  
 
This type of inequality change decomposition is similar to approaches used for poverty 
trends decompositions in development economics (Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani 
(1993, 2000), Tsui (1996), or more recently Ravallion and Chen (2003)). However, 
these older approaches track the fortunes of incomes groups rather than individuals, 
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taking no account of changes in the composition of the poor group over time. The 
approach of Jenkin and van Kerm follows the income paths of individuals instead of 
income groups, which requires knowledge of the initial and final distributions of 
income, as well as of the transition process linking observations on these two 
distributions.  
 
The decomposition can be performed on any of the class of Gini indices where different 
weighting can be given to inequality at different points of the income distribution 
(Yitzhaki, 1983). The analysis here follows the most common approach of using the 
standard Gini coefficient.  
 
The change in inequality between two periods, measured using the Gini coefficients of 
initial and final periods can be decomposed as follows: 
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Gf and Gs are the Gini coefficients of final and initial incomes respectively, CIfs  is the 
concentration index from incomes in the final period f ranked by period s incomes, MH 
is the vertical mobility index and MR is the horizontal mobility index.  
 
The vertical mobility index MH captures the effects of changes in incomes on relative 
inequality. It is determined by the scale of income changes q and their progressivity P.  
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CI!y,s is the concentration coefficient of income changes ranked by income in the initial 
period s; is the average income change between s and f. MH is positive if 
income changes are equalising, meaning they reduce inequality ceteris paribus. 
Accordingly, it will be negative if income changes are disequalizing, resulting in an 
increase in inequality. It will be zero if relative income changes are independent of 
income. 
 
Progressivity is captured by the Kakwani-type (1977) index P = (Gs !CI"y,s ) . P is 
positive if income changes are more concentrated among the poorer individuals, 
meaning these individuals either obtain a bigger share of total net income gains, or 
alternatively suffer a bigger share of total net income losses compared to their initial 
share of income attainment. P is negative if the richer individuals obtain a bigger share 
of income gains or suffer a bigger share of income losses. In this manner, positive 
values of P mean equalizing effect for net income improvements and disequalizing 
effect for net income losses. Given any P, the overall impact of vertical mobility on 
inequality will be proportional to the scale of income changes . 
 
MR captures the effect of the reshuffling of individuals within the income distribution. It 
must be zero or positive, exacerbating inequality, since those who go up the income 
ladder must be better off in the final period than those who move down. 
 
f sfy y yΔ = −
f fq y y= Δ
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Smaller inequality in final incomes happens only if income growth is progressive and it 
does not result in a reranking of individuals large enough to more than offset the 
equalizing impact of progressivity. 
 
Since !G =MR "MH is an accounting identity, the three elements cannot have distinct 
and independent welfare implications. For a given level of progressivity in income 
changes, MH, a higher reranking mobility MR will lead to a lower level of reduction in 
inequality. For a given change in inequality, a higher reranking will be associated with a 
higher degree of vertical mobility. If reranking is held fixed, more pro-poor growth will 
mean larger reduction in inequality.  
 
When inequality change is measured using a relative inequality measure like the Gini 
coefficient, the result of vertical mobility will be informative about the validity of 
Gibrat’s law (1931) of proportionate effect, which states that the rate of growth of an 
enterprise is unrelated to its size and therefore determined by random facts. The 
violation of this empirical law would mean that smaller farms grow at a faster rate than 
larger ones (which would be shown by progressivity of income growth), or vice versa 
(shown by regressivity of income growth). Neutral income growth (neither progressive 
nor regressive) would validate Gibrat’s Law.  
 
6.3.4 Decomposition of vertical mobility 
 
 
This is an extension to the inequality change decomposition in the manner of Allanson 
and Petrie (Allanson and Petrie, 2013) who use the regression-based decomposition to 
analyse the determinants of vertical mobility. Allanson and Petrie have used this 
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methodology to analyse income-related health inequality, and this is the first time it is 
used outside of this context.  
 
The use of regression-based decomposition approach allows the vertical mobility index 
to be decomposed into its determinants. The question that the vertical mobility index 
addresses is whether relative income changes favour those who are initially poor or 
those who are initially rich. Nevertheless, this index provides a misleading measure of 
how much relative income changes are linked to initial income, since initial income is 
not the only thing that affects these changes. Factors that impact income growth and are 
correlated with initial income also play a part; these factors will be the determinants of 
income changes from the ECM model, for example the changes in the economic size of 
farms. This implies there is a need for a procedure that can determine the contributions 
of inequalities in all the determinants of income changes to the overall vertical mobility.  
 
Borrowing from the approach of Allanson and Petrie (2013), this can be achieved with 
the use of a model capturing the determinants of individual income changes (see chapter 
5, the technical presentation of the model is repeated here to describe the decomposition 
approach). If we assume that a stable dynamic income function exists over time, we can 
specify a first-order ADLM, with lagged and contemporaneous responses to changes in 
income determinants:  
 ; t=1,  … T-1       (6.5) 
where the composite error consists of fixed effects and idiosyncratic error terms, 
. 
This can easily be expressed as an Error Correction Model: 
yt+1 =!0 + !k xk ,t+1
k=1
K
! + !k xkt
k=1
K
! + (1"!)yt +!t+1
!i,t+1 ="i +#i,t+1
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        (6.6) 
 and  can be interpreted as parameters of the long-run 
income relationship 
              (6.7) 
where  corresponds to the ‘equilibrium error’ in the current period and 
 is the rate of adjustment towards equilibrium.  If , and  ’s 
(k=1,…K) are zeros, there is full adjustment and the equation collapses to a static model 
with  in all periods. 
 
With  and  f=s+1, vertical mobility index MH can be decomposed in the 
following way:42 
M H = Pq = Gs !CIss
"xk( ) !ˆk"xkf
"y f
+ Gs !CIss
!ˆ0( ) !ˆ0
"y fk=1
K
#
$
%
&
'&
+
Gs !CIss
xk( ) !ˆ!ˆk xks
"y f
! Gs !Gs( ) !ˆk ys
"y fk=1
K
# + (Gs !CIss!ˆ )
!ˆ
"y f
(
)
&
*&
"y f
y f
+
,
-
-
.
/
0
0
      (6.8) 
with , ’s, ,  's and being the estimates of the parameters from the 
dynamic income model. CIss
!xk is a concentration index of changes in income 
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δ α λβ λ
= =
Δ
+ + − =
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∑ ∑ by definition, because the mean of the regression 
residuals  ˆ fε will equal zero by construction. 
 
!yt+1 = yt+1 ! yt( ) = !k xk ,t+1 ! xkt( )
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determinant k  ranked by period s income, CIss
xk is the concentration index of income 
determinant k  ranked by period s income, etc. The equation can be rewritten as: 
M H = Gs !CIss
"xk( ) !ˆk"xkfy f
+ Gs !Css
!ˆ0( ) !ˆ0y fk=1
K
#
$
%
&
'&
+ Gs !CIss
xk( ) !ˆ!ˆk xksy f
+ (Gs !CIss
!ˆ ) !ˆ
y fk=1
K
#
(
)
&
*&
= P
"xk
q
"xk
+
k=1
K
# P!ˆ0q!ˆ0 + Pxkqxk
k=1
K
# + (Gs !CIss!ˆ )
!ˆ
y f
         (6.9) 
 
Which, by combining the contribution from the constant and the long-run equilibrium 
parameters, can be also rewritten as: 
M H = Gs !CIss
"xk( ) !ˆk"xkfy f
+ Gs !CIss
( yˆs
*!ys )( ) !ˆ( yˆs
* ! ys )
y fk=1
K
#
$
%
&
'&
+ (Gs !CIss
!ˆ ) !ˆ
y f
(
)
&
*&
= P
"xk
q
"xk
+
k=1
K
# P( yˆs*!ys )q( ys*!ys ) + (Gs !CIss
!ˆ ) !ˆ
y f
   (6.10)
 
where MH consists of the contributions from the changes in individual income change 
determinants within the dynamic income model, the contribution of the disequilibrium 
error and a final term due to the regression residual, reflecting the unpredictability of 
future income outcomes43.  The impact of each determinant can be expressed as a 
product of the progressivity and scale of income changes due to that determinant.  If an 
income determinant has a positive scale factor, meaning that its contribution to the 
overall income change is positive, it will also have a positive impact on if it is 
distributed less unequally than starting income, when it is ordered by starting income. 
Accordingly, an income determinant with a negative scale factor will have a negative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 There is no separate term in initial income ys since ( ) 0y ss ssP G G= − =  by definition.  Thus the sum of 
the scale factors,  
0ˆ1 1k k
K K
x x yk k
q q q q qαΔ= =+ + = −∑ ∑  not q, where ˆy s fq y yλ= − . 
HM
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impact on if it is distributed less unequally than starting income when ordered by 
starting income, and will have a positive impact on otherwise.   
 
The sign of the contribution of adjustment towards the equilibrium level of income as 
implied by P
( yˆs
*!ys )
and q
( yˆs
*!ys )
will be determined by the relationship between the 
actual and equilibrium income inequalities. The equation below helps to understand this 
point: 
 
P
( yˆs
*!ys )
q
( yˆs
*!ys )
= Gs !CIss
( yˆs
*!ys )"
#
$
%
&
'
!ˆ( yˆs
* ! ys )
y f
= Gs !Gyˆs*( )
!ˆ yˆs
*
y f
      (6.11) 
where 
!ˆ yˆs
*
y f
 will always be positive, therefore the overall contribution of P
( yˆs
*!ys )
q
( yˆs
*!ys )
 
to MH will be determined by the sign of Gs !G yˆs*( ) . If actual inequality is bigger than the 
inequality of equilibrium incomes, the contribution from equilibrium adjustment will be 
equalizing; conversely, if the actual inequality is smaller, this adjustment will act in a 
disequalizing manner. 
 
6.3.5 Multiyear decomposition extension 
 
 
One might want to decompose the change in inequality over a longer time horizon than 
two consecutive years. This extension is a new addition to the methodology of Allanson 
and Petrie (2013). While the overall change in inequality for a multiyear period will be 
equal to the sum of changes between the consecutive years in this period, such 
HM
HM
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additivity does not apply to vertical mobility and reranking indices. That is the sum of 
either vertical or reranking mobility for individual year changes will not be equal to the 
corresponding mobility measures over the multiyear change. Taking an example of two 
years period:  
!Gt ,t+2 =Gt+2 "Gt = !Gt ,t+1 +!Gt+1,t+2 =
(Mt ,t+1
R "Mt ,t+1
H )+ (Mt ,t+2
R "Mt ,t+2
H ) =Mt ,t+2
R "Mt ,t+2
H
       (6.12) 
 
where ΔGt,t+2 is the change in Gini coefficients between periods t+2 and t, Gt+2 is the 
Gini coefficient in period t+2, Mt,t+1R is the vertical mobility between periods t and t+1, 
and Mt,t+1H is the reranking mobility between periods t and t+1, etc. 
 
However, Mt ,t+1
R +Mt+1,t+2
R !Mt ,t+2
R and Mt,t+1H +Mt+1,t+2H !Mt,t+2H  which is caused by the 
changes in ranking that occur in between44. This means that measuring vertical mobility 
over a multiyear period cannot be achieved by simply adding the indices of individual 
changes in between, and consequently, a modified approach to decomposition is 
required.  
 
In general, the multiyear income change from period t to t+m (m>1) can be written from 
(6.6) as: 
yt+m ! yt = (
k=1
K
" (1!!)m! j"k#xk,t+ j )+ (
k=1
K
" (1!!)i!#k#xk,t+ j
i=0
m! j
"
j=1
m!1
"
j=1
m
" )
+( (1!!)m! j )!(yt* ! yt )+ (1!!)m! j$t+ j
j=1
m
"
j=1
m
"
       (6.13) 
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 As Ruiz-Castillo (2004) points out for the case of two periods, the rank reversal in first and second 
period is separate to rank reversal in first period and aggregate income over both periods. 
	   	  206	  
Taking the parameters from this multiyear change obtained using the model estimates, 
vertical mobility for a multiyear period will decompose in the following way: 
 
M H = Gs !CIss
!( ) !y fk=1
K
! + (Gs !CIssyˆs
*!ys )
( (1!!)m! j!( yˆs
* ! ys )
j=1
m
!
y f
+
(Gs !CIss
(1!! )m! j "ˆt+ j )
(1!!)m! j "ˆt+ j
j=l
m
!
y f
= Pcombined!xqcombined!x +
k=1
K
! P yˆs*!ys( )q yˆs*!ys( ) + Pcombined"ˆqcombined"ˆ
       (6.14)
 
 
where ! = (
j=1
m
" 1# !ˆ)m# j !ˆk$xt+ j ,kf + ( (
i=0
m# j
"
j=1
m#1
" 1# !ˆ)i )!ˆ!ˆk$xt+ j ,kf . Therefore the vertical 
mobility in a multiyear period will consist of the term which captures the combined 
effect of changes in income determinants, the combined disequilibrium error in the 
period, and the combined share of mobility due to regression residual which reflects the 
unpredictability of income. When m=1, this equation simplifies to (6.10). 
 
6.3.6 Analysis of structural income inequality 
 
 
The coefficients from the long-run income relationships in the income model (chapter 5) 
can be used to obtain the equilibrium income levels. The Gini coefficient of that income, 
Gyˆt*
, will provide a measure of the long-run, or chronic, inequality. The difference 
between the actual income inequality and structural income inequality in a given year 
provides a proxy for income risk, which corresponds to the mobility concept of income 
risk identified by Jantti and Jenkins (2013). 
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Further, using a regression-based decomposition of the Gini coefficient (Shorrocks, 
1983; Morduch and Sicular, 2002), the equilibrium Gini coefficient is decomposed with 
the use of long-term coefficients from the income model in order to provide information 
on the determinants of structural inequality: 
Gyˆt* = !ˆk
2
yˆt
*Cov(xkt ,Ryˆ*t ) =
!ˆk xkt
yˆ*tk=1
K
!
k=1
K
! CI yˆt*
xk
         (6.15) 
where !ˆk  is the estimate of the long-run coefficient for income determinant k, yˆ *t is the 
mean value of equilibrium income in period t, xkt is the mean value of income 
determinant k in period t, and CI yˆt*
xk  is the concentration index of determinant k ranked 
by equilibrium income in period t.  
 
Hence the Gini coefficient can be represented as a weighted sum of the concentration 
indices of income determinants, where the weights correspond to the shares of income 
attributable to each determinant. 
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6.4 Empirical section 
 
 
This chapter uses weighted farm-level FAS data for the years 1996-2010, which 
corresponds to 1995/96-2009/10 production years. The description of the variables and 
their summary statistics correspond to those reported in section 5.4.1, as both chapters 
work with the same dataset. However, the calculation of indices here will limit the 
sample to balanced panels for the period under consideration, that is either annual 
changes or multiyear changes. 
 
The empirical results start with a descriptive summary on income and Gini coefficients 
trends and a discussion of Shorrocks rigidity index results. This is followed by the 
results from annual and multiyear decompositions of inequality changes following the 
Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) approach; a robustness check of these results is also 
provided. Moving on, the vertical mobility of annual changes is decomposed using 
Allanson and Petrie’s (2013) method, followed by the decomposition of vertical 
mobility for multiyear periods. Lastly, the equilibrium inequality and its determinants 
are discussed. 
 
6.4.1 Descriptive summary 
 
Table 6.1 provides information on mean level of income and the Gini coefficient in each 
year. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 graphically show the trends in average income over the studied 
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period 1996-2010; Figure 6.1 plots the mean income for every year, and Figure 6.2 
shows the average income change45.  
 
Table 6.1 Average income and Gini coefficient values, 1996-2010. 
 
 
The trends of initial decline and then slow recovery over years in average farm income 
can be better understood with some knowledge about contemporaneous events in the 
agricultural sector included in the Scottish Government’s annual economic reports on 
agriculture (SEERAD, 2001-2007; SGRERAD, 2008-2012). And so, the decrease in 
incomes between 1996/97 to 1998/1999 was mainly driven by a strong pound, weak 
world commodity prices and the ongoing impact of Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE, commonly known as mad cow disease). In 2000/2001 a decline in output and 
income values continued due to several factors, most notably the weak Euro, FMD 
outbreak and autumn floods.  
 
Following this, the average income increased in 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 as 
agricultural prices improved, particularly the ones for all types of potatoes and milk, and 
output value for livestock recovered following the FMD disease outbreak. This 
continued in 2003/2004 when the cereal sector benefited from a good summer and 
experienced improved yields. 
 
In 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 net incomes were lower again across most sectors due to a 
combination of higher input costs and lower output prices. Bad weather conditions did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Where the change in income is calculated for balanced set of farms present in two consecutive years 
and corresponds to values in Table 6.3 later on. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average income 39096 44144 27955 29965 26842 27719 31131 32660 37498 35877 32302 37130 52203 48785 49544
Gini coefficient 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52
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not affect yield as much, but the quality, and consequently the crop prices suffered.  
      
Figure 6.1 Mean income (£) trends 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Average change in income (£) trends 
 
 
The following increase in average income was caused by an increase in incomes for 
General Cropping, Cereal and Dairy farms, reflecting the increase in prices for milk and 
crops, driven by the global demand for cereals outstripping the global supply. The 
recession in 2008/2009 caused the prices to fall, and the two largest harvests in a row 
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meant that stocks recovered, which has been accompanied by key inputs being at 
historically high prices, and is reflected in slight drop in average income in 2009. In 
2010 income levels increase again reflecting increasing prices for most commodities. 
 
The above description illustrates how various events in the agricultural markets affect 
the income levels from farming. Both the magnitude and the direction of average 
income changes are very variable, going from -15858 in 1997 to 14005 in 2007. The 
standard deviation for average income across the years was 8367; this means relatively 
high variability between years, indicating high instability of agricultural incomes. As 
the OECD points out: 
 
“Agricultural activity is subject to different risks, some natural or biological in 
origin, others economic. These risks affect production volumes and prices and 
are thought to result in receipts and incomes that are more variable than in many 
other sectors. […] At the individual level, excessive farm income variability can 
be a problem, in particular for farms that have not been able to adopt basic 
income risk strategies and, as a result, are too dependent on one source of 
income or do not have sufficient savings or capital raising capacity”.  
 
(OECD, 2003, p. 20) 
 
A wide range of studies looks at the issues of income variability (Hegrenes et al., 2001; 
Hill, 1999; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Cordts et al., 1984). Vrolijk et al. (2009) 
provide an extensive study of farm income volatility in the EU using FADN data for 
years 1990-2003. The study finds substantial volatility in farm incomes caused mainly 
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by factors like instability of agricultural markets, animal diseases and weather 
conditions. The authors further conclude that volatility in some sectors is larger than in 
others; one reason behind this is differences in CAP measures for different 
commodities, for example dairy farmers had more stable incomes than pig farmers since 
CAP stabilizes milk and dairy prices while pig prices are not managed to avoid 
fluctuations. Another reason is dependency on specific inputs, like energy in 
horticulture greenhouses or compound feeds for speciality pigs and poultry farms; price 
fluctuations in these inputs will impact the income volatility for the specific farm types. 
Lastly, differences in margin of income46 also count. The more specialised larger farms 
that hire more labour have smaller profit margins and larger volatility; such large farms 
are more characteristic of certain commodity types, like horticulture or pigs and poultry 
farms. 
 
The Gini coefficient fluctuates over the years, staying in the range of 0.45 - 0.57. This 
indicates that the level of relative inequality in Scottish agricultural incomes is higher 
than overall income inequality in Scotland, for which the value of the Gini coefficients 
in the corresponding period fluctuated between 0.30 – 0.35 (Scottish Government, 
2013a)47.   
 
What is often ignored in analysis of ordinary Gini indices in a dynamic setting is the 
link between the value of the Gini coefficient and the average income in a given year, 
since Gini coefficient is normalized by mean income. This means that a change in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 What the authors define as “the returns of products less the costs paid (and including depreciation) as a 
percentage of the returns” (Vrolijk et al., 2009, p. 10).  
47 However, it needs to be noted that these figures are not directly comparable, since the measure of 
income used in this study represents profitability from farming rather than overall income available to 
farmers (which might also include income from non-agricultural sources). It is the overall income 
available to farmers that is used as a representative figure in generating the Gini coefficient for all 
incomes in Scotland. 
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relative inequality can occur either due to a change in the absolute dispersion of 
incomes or due to a change in average income.  
 
Figure 6.3 Trends in average income and inequality. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the values of the Gini coefficients, the average incomes and the 
average absolute dispersion of incomes48. As can be seen, the dispersion of incomes and 
mean value of income generally move in the same directions across the years, which 
means that common shocks are broadly proportional in nature49; this supports the use of 
slope dummies in the income model in chapter 5, since they control for proportional 
impact of time fixed effects.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Where the average absolute difference is calculated as Gini coefficient times twice the average income 
(Charles-Coll, J. A., 2011). 
49 If shocks were not proportional in nature, then an increase in mean income would not be reflected in an 
increase in income dispersion; this would be the case if for example a good year implied that everyone’s 
income goes up by 1000 pounds – mean income would increase but the dispersion would not change. 
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6.4.2 Shorrocks rigidity measure 
 
 
Shorrocks’ rigidity index was calculated using incomes in the years 1996-2010, which 
gives a maximum T of fifteen years50. Numerical results are presented in Table 6.2, 
while Figure 6.3 plots the evolution of the index as the measurement period is extended.  
 
Table 6.2 Shorrocks rigidity index, T=1,...,15. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Shorrocks rigidity index, T=1,...15. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This is performed on a balanced panel of 151 farms. 
Measurement 
period
T
Weighted average of 
annual Gini 
coefficients
Gini coefficient for 
T-period averaged 
income
Shorrock's 
R index
1996 1 0,46 0,46 1,000
1996-1997 2 0,42 0,41 0,973
1996-1998 3 0,43 0,40 0,947
1996-1999 4 0,43 0,40 0,931
1996-2000 5 0,43 0,40 0,921
1996-2001 6 0,44 0,39 0,905
1996-2002 7 0,44 0,39 0,897
1996-2003 8 0,43 0,39 0,887
1996-2004 9 0,43 0,38 0,878
1996-2005 10 0,43 0,37 0,872
1996-2006 11 0,43 0,37 0,864
1996-2007 12 0,44 0,37 0,861
1996-2008 13 0,44 0,38 0,859
1996-2009 14 0,45 0,38 0,857
1996-2010 15 0,45 0,38 0,856
0.8 
0.82 
0.84 
0.86 
0.88 
0.9 
0.92 
0.94 
0.96 
0.98 
1 
0 5 10 15 
Shorrocks 
index 
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As Table 6.2 shows, Shorrocks rigidity index is equal to 1 when T=1, which is true by 
definition. With T>1, Gy  is consistently smaller than the weighted average of Gini 
coefficients for the measurement period, and this discrepancy increases as the 
measurement period is extended.  Over one year change in incomes (T=2), Shorrocks 
index is equal 0.97; this decreases to 0.90 with T=6, but then the decrease slows down. 
With T=11, the value of the index goes down to approximately 0.86 and it does not 
change as the measurement period is extended further all the way to T=15.  
 
This result implies that 86% of cross-sectional inequality is persistent, and the 
remainder is due to transitory shocks. In other words, there is some degree of transitory 
inequality, such that annual Gini coefficients tend to overstate the extent of inequality in 
longer-term average incomes, but the overwhelming bulk of cross-sectional inequality is 
structural in nature. This is in line with findings of Phimister et al. (2004) who found 
that averaging incomes over two years induced a 10% drop in the inequality levels in 
Scottish agricultural incomes measured by the Gini coefficient.  
 
 
6.4.3 Inequality change decomposition 
 
 
In this subsection the inequality change is decomposed into vertical and reranking 
mobility. The measures of vertical and reranking mobility presented here correspond to 
two of the mobility concepts distinguished by Jantti and Jenkins (2013), that is mobility 
as individual income growth and mobility as positional change, respectively. In this 
context mobility as income growth is desirable when growth is progressive as it reduces 
inequality, whereas positional movement is always disequalizing. 
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If the dynamic income process obeys Gibrat’s Law, then the expected income growth 
should be distributionally neutral in relative terms, meaning it is neither progressive 
(which would favour poorer farms), nor regressive (which would favour richer farms). 
 
This section will start with the results of annual inequality changes decomposition, 
followed by multiyear changes decompositions and finished with a robustness check of 
the results concerning the nature of the individual income growth. 
 
6.4.3.1 Annual changes 
 
 
Table 6.3 provides statistical summary of the initial and final incomes for each year, 
including (ordinary) Gini coefficients; it also presents the results of the change 
inequality decomposition into vertical and horizontal components from equation (6.3) 
and (6.4) in the methodology section. In all tables, the figures in bold are the results and 
the small print figures are bootstrap errors based on 1000 repetitions51.  
 
The summary indices are presented for income changes between two consecutive years, 
thus like in chapter 5, term initial income refers to the income in year t, and final income 
is the income in t+1. The analysis is done on pairs of adjacent years using observations 
on farms that are present in dataset for both years, while the panel is not balanced 
throughout the year. As a result the mean of final income in one year does not 
correspond to the mean of initial income in the following year, since the sample sizes 
used in both cases are different52.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted respectively as ***, **, *. 
52 The sample size for each pair of years corresponds to that given in Table 5.1. 
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Table 6.3 Summary indices, annual change decompositions. 
 
 
In order to facilitate the understanding of how the elements of the inequality change 
decomposition come about, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 provide graphical representations of the 
measurement of inequality and corresponding decomposition for years when inequality 
is falling and rising respectively. Figure 6.6 shows the situation in 1996, where the 
inward shift for the 1997 income Lorenz curve represents a decrease in inequality 
(although the two curves overlap for the first fifth of the income ranks). The difference 
in the Gini coefficients that measures this change in inequality is given by twice the area 
between the 1996 and 1997 income Lorenz curves. This change can be broken down 
into two parts. One part is due to the difference between the 1996 income Lorenz curve 
and the concentration curve of 1997 incomes ranked by 1996 incomes, where the 
vertical redistributive effect of the income growth is given as twice the area between the  
1996 39096 *** 0,48 *** 42392 *** 0,45 *** 0,36 *** -0,03 ** 0,12 *** 1,58 0,08 * 0,09 *** 3296 !!
/1997 1505 0,02 1474 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 9,67 0,03 0,02 1334
1997 44144 *** 0,44 *** 28286 *** 0,50 *** 0,41 *** 0,06 *** 0,03 * -0,05 * -0,56 *** 0,09 *** -15858 ***
/1998 1338 0,01 988 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,01 1024
1998 27955 *** 0,52 *** 29343 *** 0,52 *** 0,41 *** 0,01 0,10 *** 2,15 0,05 0,11 *** 1388
/1999 1041 0,02 1447 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,03 55,21 0,04 0,02 1156
1999 29965 *** 0,52 *** 27387 *** 0,56 *** 0,46 *** 0,05 ** 0,06 *** -0,59 -0,09 ** 0,10 *** -2577 ***
/2000 1484 0,03 1465 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 1,06 0,04 0,01 965
2000 26842 *** 0,57 *** 28978 *** 0,52 *** 0,40 *** -0,05 * 0,17 *** 2,35 0,07 * 0,13 *** 2136 !
/2001 1551 0,03 1654 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 23,28 0,04 0,02 1207
2001 27719 *** 0,54 *** 31467 *** 0,52 *** 0,37 *** -0,02 0,18 *** 1,47 0,12 ** 0,15 *** 3748 !!
/2002 1821 0,02 1298 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 6,49 0,05 0,02 1543
2002 31131 *** 0,52 *** 30999 *** 0,49 *** 0,33 *** -0,03 0,19 *** -44,79 0,00 0,16 *** -133
/2003 1374 0,02 1731 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,04 85,27 0,05 0,03 1587
2003 32660 *** 0,47 *** 36775 *** 0,47 *** 0,38 *** 0,00 0,09 *** 0,81 0,11 *** 0,09 *** 4115 ***
/2004 1822 0,02 1670 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,68 0,03 0,01 1266
2004 37498 *** 0,46 *** 36167 *** 0,49 *** 0,38 *** 0,03 0,09 *** -2,36 -0,04 0,12 *** -1332
/2005 1631 0,02 1809 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 1151,67 0,04 0,02 1280
2005 35877 *** 0,49 *** 31209 *** 0,51 *** 0,37 *** 0,02 0,12 *** -0,77 * -0,15 ** 0,13 *** -4668 ***
/2006 1715 0,02 1614 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,40 0,04 0,02 1165
2006 32302 *** 0,49 *** 36283 *** 0,53 *** 0,38 *** 0,04 0,12 *** 1,08 0,11 *** 0,15 *** 3980 ***
/2007 1538 0,02 1705 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03 2,00 0,04 0,02 1518
2007 37130 *** 0,53 *** 51134 *** 0,52 *** 0,39 *** 0,00 0,13 *** 0,49 *** 0,27 *** 0,13 *** 14005 !!!
/2008 1870 0,02 2413 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,02 1683
2008 52203 *** 0,52 *** 46957 *** 0,51 *** 0,34 *** -0,01 0,18 *** -1,61 -0,11 ** 0,17 *** -5246 !!
/2009 2407 0,02 2266 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03 10,49 0,05 0,02 2419
2009 48785 *** 0,52 *** 49544 *** 0,52 *** 0,36 *** 0,00 0,16 *** 10,66 0,02 0,16 *** 759
/2010 2320 0,02 2439 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03 89,74 0,04 0,02 2013
Redis-
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index
Mean 
initial 
income
Gini 
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of initial
income
Mean final
income
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income
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income 
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initial 
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income 
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change in
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Figure 6.5 Decomposition curves, 1996. 
 
 
two curves. In this case the concentration curve is unambiguously above the 1996 
income Lorenz curve, so the growth is clearly pro-poor. If it was entirely below, it 
would be regressive. If the two curves crossed, it would not be clear from the graph 
whether the income growth is progressive or regressive (in such a case, the numerical 
result for this depends on which inequality measure from the class of the generalized 
Gini class of indices is used). The second part is due to the difference between the 
Lorenz curve for 1997 income and the concentration curve, which captures the extent of 
reranking (note that by construction the concentration curve will lie nowhere below the 
final income Lorenz curve so this is unambiguously disequalizing). 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the curves for 1999 and represents a different relevant empirical case, 
opposite to that in 1996, that is when inequality increases; this is reflected in an outward 
shift of the Lorenz curve for 2000 income. The concentration curve still lies above the 
0
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1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1996 income 1997 income
1997 income by 1996 income ranks Line of perfect equality
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1999 income Lorenz curve, which means that income changes were progressive, but 
they were more than offset by the impact of reranking - therefore the overall result was 
an increase in inequality. 
 
Figure 6.6 Decomposition curves, 1999. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 graphically present the results of decomposition from Table 6.3; it shows the 
Gini coefficients, the redistributive index of income changes (measured as the 
difference between Gini coefficients for initial and final incomes) and the vertical 
mobility and reranking indices over time. 
 
Whether the change in inequality between two years was negative or positive, income 
growth was always equalizing as indicated by the positive vertical mobility index in 
every year, a result that is consistently statistically significant. This means that expected 
income growth was higher in relative terms for farms with lower initial incomes. As 
0
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such, the increase in inequality in some of the years resulted from reranking mobility 
which would more than offset the progressive income growth. The reranking mobility is 
always zero or positive, serving to increase inequality, since those who move up the 
income ladder must be better off in the final period than those who move down.  
 
Figure 6.7 Gini coefficient and decomposition indices, annual decompositions 1996-2009. 
 
 
The statistically significant result of progressivity in expected income growth might 
suggest that poorer farms grow faster. Such result would contradict Gibrat’s empirical 
law of proportional effect. The following section subjects this result to scrutiny by 
verifying if the expected income growth is still progressive over multiyear period 
changes. 
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6.4.3.2 Multiyear change decomposition 
 
 
The decomposition of multiyear changes in inequality is useful for two reasons. Firstly, 
it will serve to inspect if expected income growth remains progressive over few years 
changes. The results from the annual changes decompositions showed a lot of 
variability which implies noise in the data; this was reemphasized by the results of the 
Shorrocks rigidity measure which highlighted the role of transitory shocks in observed 
inequality. Looking at multiyear changes should increase the degree of systematic 
structural change relative to noise, which will make it easier to capture the real 
redistributive nature of income changes and scrutinize the result of progressive income 
growth in annual changes. Secondly, splitting the multiyear changes around the 
introduction of the SFP allows seeing if the introduction of decoupled direct payments 
impacted on the inequality change trends in agricultural incomes.  
 
Table 6.5 presents the results of multiyear analysis which was performed for four 
subperiods: 1996-2010 to assess the change in inequality for the entire sample period, 
for subperiods 1996-2005 and 2006-2010 in order to compare the periods before and 
after the SFP was introduced. This is complemented with an annual change 2005-2006, 
which looks directly at the change in the year when SFP was introduced. This multiyear 
analysis uses only the farms present in the dataset over the whole period 1996-2010, 
which gives a sample of 151 farms; the analysis uses consistent weights for all 
periods53.  Table 6.4 presents the breakdown of farms by farm type in this balanced 
sample, to give a feel of how representative they are. While the restriction to the 
balanced panel might introduce some bias in the sample, the sample is weighted with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The results from 2005-2006 change decomposition are already included in the annual results, but the 
decomposition here is recalculated using the same sample and weights as the multiyear changes in the 
section. 
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weights adjusted in a way that it still should to be representative of the overall 
populations. 
 
Table 6.4  Breakdown of balanced panel by farm type. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Multiyear decomposition summary indices 
 
 
The results imply an increase of 10% in relative inequality over the whole sample 
period; this was largely driven by the increase in inequality of 4% in the year the SFP 
was introduced, and of 13% in the period after its introduction. Between 1996 and the 
introduction of the SFP in 2005 the inequality decreased by 6%. However, while the 
values of Gini coefficients are statistically significant, the redistributive effect itself is 
consistently insignificant. 
 
Number of farms in the sample:
Year All Cereal
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist 
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle
Cattle &
Beef
Cattle &
Beef 
Lowland Mixed
1996 151 1 14 29 18 33 34 2 20
1997 151 3 15 29 17 34 34 2 17
1998 151 6 13 30 18 34 33 1 16
1999 151 5 14 28 21 35 28 2 18
2000 151 2 16 28 21 33 30 2 19
2001 151 3 15 26 21 35 31 2 18
2002 151 4 14 26 21 38 30 2 16
2003 151 3 16 26 21 37 30 1 17
2004 151 7 13 25 16 43 25 1 21
2005 162 8 13 25 15 46 23 21 11
2006 151 11 11 25 16 43 23 1 21
2007 151 11 11 25 16 44 22 1 21
2008 151 11 10 24 17 42 24 2 21
2009 151 8 14 21 16 40 28 2 22
2010 151 9 13 21 16 45 24 1 22
1996 39747 *** 0,46 *** 44480 *** 0,51 *** 0,34 *** 0,05 0,11 ** 1,07 0,11 0,16 *** 4733
-2010 4311 0,04 5300 0,04 0,06 0,04 0,05 9,12 0,08 0,04 3680
1996 39747 *** 0,46 *** 35221 *** 0,43 *** 0,28 *** -0,03 0,18 *** -1,38 -0,13 0,15 *** -4526
-2005 4311 0,04 2866 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,05 15,30 0,12 0,03 3967
2005 35221 *** 0,43 *** 28907 *** 0,45 *** 0,33 *** 0,01 0,10 ** -0,48 -0,22 0,12 *** -6314
-2006 2866 0,03 2532 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,04 2,59 0,10 0,03 2426
2006 28907 *** 0,45 *** 44480 *** 0,51 *** 0,38 *** 0,06 0,07 0,20 0,35 *** 0,13 *** 15573 ***
-2010 2532 0,04 5300 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,17 0,07 0,03 4511
Mean 
initial 
income
Average 
change in
income
CI of final
income 
ranked by
initial 
income
Gini 
coefficient 
of final
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Gini 
coefficien
t of initial
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Redis-
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index
Vertical 
mobility 
index
Prog- 
ressivity 
index
Scale of
income 
change
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mobility 
index
	   	  223	  
Like with the annual changes, the analysis reveals that vertical mobility has been 
positive for all these periods, suggesting that expected income growth was higher in 
relative terms for farms with lower initial incomes. In 1996-2010 and 2006-2010 
periods the progressivity was caused by positive income changes being concentrated 
proportionally more among farms with lower initial income, whereas in 1996-2005 and 
2005-2006 the initially richer farms suffered relatively more of negative income 
changes. The increase in inequality over the whole sample means that the extent of 
reranking mobility was big enough to offset the equalizing impact of income growth. 
These results are statistically significant with the exception of vertical mobility index in 
period 2006-2010. 
 
More generally, the positive vertical mobility is a result of a double negative or double 
positive relationship between the progressivity of income changes and their scale, which 
means that if income changes were on average negative in any given year, they were 
concentrated among richer farmers. On the other hand, if the average income changes 
were positive, it was the poorer farmers that benefited from them more. More insight 
into the nature of this result is gained by looking at Figure 6.8, where income changes 
over the entire period 1996-2010 are plotted against initial income rank. The figure 
shows that higher income ranks are in general associated with larger negative changes 
to income, whereas the lower income ranks experience positive income changes at least 
as large as farms higher up the income ladder; this implies a degree of regression to the 
mean. In relative terms, there is a disproportionate concentration of positive income 
changes among poorer farms. 
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Figure 6.8 Income change (£) plotted against initial income rank, all years. 
 
 
Overall, the main continuity between the annual and multiyear results is that vertical 
mobility index was positive for all the analysed inequality changes, which indicates that 
relative income changes consistently favoured poorer farmers. The consistency of 
progressive income growth even for multiyear period gives further support to invalidity 
of Gibrat’s law in Scottish agriculture. However, the fact that positive income changes 
were concentrated among poorer farms and negative income changes among richer ones 
could indicate the result of progressivity is driven by transitory shocks which result in 
regression to the mean, particularly given the earlier demonstration that some 
proportion of inequality is due to transitory shocks. This possibility is further analysed 
in the following section. 
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6.4.3.3 Robustness check of the progressivity 
 
 
 
In order to investigate if the result of progressivity in income growth is driven by 
regression to the mean from transitory shocks, or even measurement error, the approach 
of Jenkins and van Kerm (2011) is employed. These authors also obtained progressivity 
of income growth in their analysis and in order to investigate if the result was spurious 
and driven by a regression to the mean they recalculated the decompositions on data 
which has been manipulated in two ways: 
- by calculating a rolling three-year average for the income measure which 
smooths out transitory variability, 
- by using a so-called IV method where the income measure stays unchanged but 
the ranking is recalculated based on an alternative income measure, which is an 
average of the one year lag and lead of income, that is yˆt = (yt!1 + yt+1) / 2 ; this 
breaks the link between impact of shocks on the initial income and on income 
growth.  
 
Such transformations allow for better monitoring of substantive variations, thus 
repeating the analysis on data transformed in these ways provides a robustness check to 
see if the progressivity is a result of actual structural change in the industry, instead of 
being driven by noise from transitory, idiosyncratic shocks 54  to incomes or 
measurement error.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The definition of income used means that any expenditure on investment in a given year will affect the 
income position of a given farm; if this expenditure is substantial, the impact will be large. For example, 
if a tractor on a given farm breaks and it chooses to buy a new one and pay for all or most of the amount 
in the specific year, the individual income shock for that farm will be substantial, which will strongly 
affect its income change in that year, but also is likely to overstate the extend of reranking. What is more, 
an investment in a given year, which will constitute a negative income shock, is likely to bring an 
improvement to the income in the following year/years (assuming the returns are not instant), which will 
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The necessity of lags and leads limits the period of analysis to 1997-2009. No annual 
changes are looked at to avoid overlap between years used for calculating the averages; 
instead the minimum change is 3 years. The multiyear change periods, which are 
analysed using a balanced panel of farms present across years 1997-2009, are also 
different than in section 6.4.3.2 to avoid the overlapping, but they are chosen to 
correspond to the earlier multiyear periods as close as possible; 1997-2009 for the 
whole sample change, 1997-2005 to show pre-SFP change and 2006-2009 to show post-
SFP change55. In order to allow for better comparison, the results from raw (not 
manipulated) data were recalculated using corresponding periods.  
 
Table 6.6 presents the corresponding results from raw data, which show that the result 
of progressivity in income growth is sensitive to the choice of measurement periods; 
while earlier vertical mobility was consistently positive for all annual changes and the 
specified multiyear periods, it becomes zero when change over 1997-2009 period is 
measured and it becomes marginally negative for the change between 2000-2003 
(although both of these results are not statistically significant, while the positive vertical 
mobility for other period changes is statistically significant). This sensitivity of results 
to the measurement period alone indicates the importance of transitory shocks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
drive the regression to the mean mechanism. In this context, the data smoothing techniques will serve as a 
useful check of results robustness. 
55 The multiyear decompositions also included 2005-2006 but it is skipped here since minimum of 3 years 
change is required to avoid overlapping. 
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Table 6.6 Raw data comparison results. 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 Three-year rolling average robustness check results. 
 
 
Comparing these values to results from three-year rolling averages of income in Table 
6.7 further confirms the impact of transitory shocks; while the averaging does not lead 
to reduction of progressivity for every period, overall for most of the periods it is 
smaller (and it is statistically insignificant for the 4 periods when it is small). This set of 
results shows that using moving averages reduces the size of the progressivity effect but 
it does not eliminate it entirely. 
1997 44052 *** 0,43 *** 26230 *** 0,55 *** 0,45 *** 0,12 *** -0,02 0,03 -0,68 0,09 *** -17822
-2000 1591 0,01 1694 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,01 1068
2000 26793 *** 0,59 *** 29845 *** 0,54 *** 0,43 *** -0,05 0,16 *** 1,59 0,10 ** 0,11 *** 3052 **
-2003 2433 0,03 2026 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 37,84 0,05 0,02 1441
2003 28558 *** 0,45 *** 28150 *** 0,50 *** 0,36 *** 0,05 0,09 *** -6,26 -0,01 0,14 *** -408
-2006 1616 0,03 1969 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 625,01 0,06 0,02 1532
2006 30399 *** 0,49 *** 43181 *** 0,51 *** 0,37 *** 0,02 0,12 *** 0,41 *** 0,30 *** 0,14 *** 12782 ***
-2009 1499 0,03 2497 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,10 0,03 0,02 1697
1997 43542 *** 0,39 *** 39505 *** 0,51 *** 0,40 *** 0,12 ** 0,00 0,04 -0,10 0,11 *** -4037
-2009 3868 0,03 4780 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,04 6,28 0,10 0,04 3681
1997 43542 *** 0,39 *** 34298 *** 0,43 *** 0,31 *** 0,04 0,08 * -0,31 -0,27 0,12 *** -9244
-2005 4008 0,03 3586 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,49 0,13 0,03 3896
2006 27457 *** 0,51 *** 39505 *** 0,51 *** 0,41 *** 0,00 0,10 ** 0,33 * 0,30 *** 0,10 *** 12048 !!!
-2009 3270 0,05 4728 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,20 0,06 0,03 3256
Average 
change in
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mobility 
index
1997 36691 *** 0,45 *** 26492 *** 0,49 *** 0,44 *** 0,04 ** 0,01 -0,02 -0,38 0,05 *** -10199
-2000 1725 0,02 1679 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,01 1119
2000 26966 *** 0,53 *** 31050 *** 0,47 *** 0,40 *** -0,06 0,13 ** 0,95 0,13 *** 0,07 *** 4084 ***
-2003 2350 0,04 2065 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 92,49 0,05 0,01 1583
2003 32383 *** 0,41 *** 31949 *** 0,45 *** 0,39 *** 0,04 0,01 -0,95 -0,01 0,06 *** -434
-2006 1527 0,02 1790 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 205,26 0,04 0,02 1328
2006 34203 *** 0,45 *** 44482 *** 0,46 *** 0,39 *** 0,01 0,05 ** 0,22 ** 0,23 *** 0,06 *** 10279 ***
-2009 1606 0,02 2492 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,10 0,03 0,01 1588
1997 35612 *** 0,44 *** 40908 *** 0,47 *** 0,38 *** 0,03 0,05 0,42 0,13 * 0,09 *** 5296 !
-2009 3892 0,04 5024 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,04 21,19 0,08 0,03 3196
1997 35612 *** 0,44 *** 31409 *** 0,40 *** 0,31 *** -0,04 0,12 *** -0,93 -0,13 0,09 *** -4203
-2005 3915 0,04 2984 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,05 3,84 0,11 0,02 3300
2006 29911 *** 0,44 *** 40908 *** 0,47 *** 0,42 *** 0,03 0,02 0,08 0,27 *** 0,05 ** 10997 !!!
-2009 3172 0,04 4946 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,16 0,06 0,02 3215
Redis-
tributive 
index
Mean 
initial 
income
Gini 
coefficien
t of initial
income
Mean final
income
Gini 
coefficient 
of final
income
CI of final
income 
ranked by
initial 
income
Vertical 
mobility 
index
Prog- 
ressivity 
index
Scale of
income 
change
Reranking 
mobility 
index
Average 
change in
income
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Table 6.8 IV method robustness check results. 
 
 
Table 6.8 provides the summary indices from the decomposition using the IV method, 
which removes the link between current income and current rank. This way of 
manipulating the data means that a current shock to the income will not drastically 
affect the rank in this year. The statistical significance of these results is very low, with 
vertical mobility index statistically significant at 5% only for 1997-2000 change. As can 
be seen, the delinking significantly impacts the values of vertical mobility. Specifically, 
the vertical mobility index is largely reduced; for some periods it is positive, for others 
negative, but generally it oscillates in the proximity of zero. The delinking, which 
purges incomes shocks from the ranks, almost entirely eliminates the progressivity 
result which suggests that the progressivity of income growth from the raw data 
analysis is not driven by a structural change in the industry which favours the poorer 
farms; it is instead a result of transitory shocks to income which cause regression to the 
mean.  
 
Overall, the robustness results show some mixed results. Extending the measurement 
period with the use of multiyear changes supports the finding of progressive expected 
1997 43763 *** 0,37 *** 26180 *** 0,45 *** 0,42 *** 0,09 *** -0,06 ** 0,08 ** -0,67 *** 0,03 * -17583 !!!
-2000 1880 0,02 1873 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,08 0,02 1160
2000 28571 *** 0,45 *** 32077 *** 0,36 *** 0,40 *** -0,08 0,05 0,46 0,11 ** -0,03 3506 *
-2003 2887 0,04 2868 0,06 0,05 0,07 0,04 39,46 0,06 0,05 1817
2003 29596 *** 0,33 *** 28761 *** 0,40 *** 0,34 *** 0,06 * -0,01 0,32 -0,03 0,05 * -835
-2006 1590 0,03 1957 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 8,35 0,06 0,03 1659
2006 30555 *** 0,40 *** 42643 *** 0,39 *** 0,39 *** -0,01 0,01 0,03 0,28 *** 0,00 12088 ***
-2009 1668 0,03 2630 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,02 1757
1997 43542 *** 0,33 *** 39505 *** 0,42 *** 0,35 *** 0,09 * -0,02 0,19 -0,10 0,07 * -4037
-2009 4039 0,04 4851 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 10,26 0,10 0,04 3684
1997 43542 *** 0,33 *** 34298 *** 0,34 *** 0,28 *** 0,01 0,05 -0,19 -0,27 0,06 -9244
-2005 3830 0,04 3502 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,84 0,12 0,05 3797
2006 27457 *** 0,43 *** 39505 *** 0,42 *** 0,41 *** -0,01 0,01 0,04 0,30 *** 0,01 12048 !!!
-2009 3358 0,05 4761 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,18 0,06 0,03 3237
Redis-
tributive 
index
Mean 
initial 
income
Gini 
coefficien
t of initial
income
Mean final
income
Gini 
coefficient 
of final
income
CI of final
income 
ranked by
initial 
income
Vertical 
mobility 
index
Prog- 
ressivity 
index
Scale of
income 
change
Reranking 
mobility 
index
Average 
change in
income
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income growth. When the analysis is done on three-year rolling averages of data, the 
progressivity is reduced but not eliminated entirely. Given these results, it could be 
concluded that not all progressivity is simply regression to the mean from transitory 
shocks. However, the IV approach showed that breaking the link between the ranking of 
income and income change eliminates the progressivity, which suggests that neither 
richer nor poorer farms are favoured by structural developments in the industry. Based 
on these mixed results, it can be concluded that expected income growth is progressive, 
but only minor part of this is due to systematic structural change and majority is due to 
transitory shocks that cause regression to the mean, since farms that suffered a bad 
shock in one year are likely to recover the following season, and vice versa – farms 
which experienced a positive transitory shock are likely to have a worse next season. 
 
6.4.4 Vertical mobility decomposition 
 
 
This section provides a further subdecomposition of one of the components of the 
Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) decomposition of change in inequality by exploring the 
systematic forces driving vertical mobility, based on the approach of Allanson and 
Petrie (2013). The big question addressed by the vertical mobility index is whether 
relative income changes favour those who are initially poor or those who are initially 
rich. However, the vertical mobility index alone will provide a misleading picture of 
how much relative income changes are linked to initial income, since initial income is 
not the only factor affecting these changes. Other factors which impact on income 
growth and are correlated with initial income may also play role. The decomposition 
presented in this section allows to determine the contributions of inequalities in all the 
determinants of income growth to vertical mobility.  
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The decomposition analysis builds upon the Error Correction Model of agricultural 
income from chapter 5. First the results from the decomposition of vertical mobility in 
annual changes will be presented, followed by the decomposition of vertical mobility in 
multiyear changes. 
 
 
6.4.4.1 Annual changes 
 
 
Table 6.9 presents the decomposition of the vertical mobility index using equation 
(6.10) from the methodology section. The decomposition identifies the contributions to 
vertical mobility of: 
- the change terms in the income function which represent the short term impact 
of changes in the economic size of cropping and livestock enterprises,  
- the disequilibrium error which shows the adjustment towards the equilibrium 
income, 
- the residual which represents idiosyncratic income shocks.  
 
 
The absolute contributions of each component to vertical mobility are plotted in Figure 
6.9, with Figure 6.10 showing the relative contributions to total vertical mobility.  
 
The contributions of changes in the economic size of both livestock and cropping 
enterprises are very minor and statistically insignificant in all years. This negligible 
impact can be seen well in both figures, where in absolute and relative terms the 
contributions are miniscule in comparison with those from the residual and the 
disequilibrium error.  
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Table 6.9 Vertical mobility decomposition, annual changes 1996-2009. 
 
% share of overall 
vertical mobility
1996 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** 0,005 * 0,094 0,0005 0,4%
0,061 0,003 0,157 0,0009
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,000 -2,064 0,0004 0,3%
0,069 0,001 49,722 0,0008
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,034 2,300 0,0778 *** 63,3%
0,021 0,038 45,524 0,0087
Residual - 0,039 1,139 0,0442 *** 36,0%
- 0,020 290,049 0,0153
Overall vertical mobility - 0,078 1,580 0,1229 100,0%
1997 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** 0,007 * 0,003 0,0000 0,1%
0,064 0,004 0,234 0,0018
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,001 0,594 0,0007 2,3%
0,065 0,002 14,113 0,0010
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,507 *** -0,086 *** 0,0438 *** 144,8%
0,022 0,044 0,019 0,0089
Residual - -0,061 *** 0,233 -0,0143 -47,2%
- 0,019 0,452 0,0173
Overall vertical mobility - -0,561 -0,054 0,0302 100,0%
1998 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** -0,004 0,191 -0,0008 -0,8%
0,065 0,003 1,223 0,0010
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,001 -0,229 -0,0002 -0,2%
0,068 0,001 12,332 0,0006
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,049 2,274 0,1123 *** 110,6%
0,021 0,035 20,035 0,0210
Residual - 0,001 -11,134 -0,0097 -9,6%
- 0,020 171,946 0,0279
Overall vertical mobility - 0,047 2,148 0,1016 100,0%
1999 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** 0,011 * 0,189 0,0021 3,7%
0,063 0,007 0,181 0,0026
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,000 2,990 -0,0008 -1,4%
0,070 0,001 8,804 0,0008
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,058 -1,705 0,0990 *** 178,4%
0,022 0,038 28,262 0,0240
Residual - -0,047 *** 0,961 -0,0448 * -80,8%
- 0,017 0,797 0,0266
Overall vertical mobility - -0,094 -0,590 0,0555 100,0%
2000 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * 0,000 0,701 0,0001 0,0%
0,064 0,002 21,120 0,0010
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * -0,002 0,541 -0,0011 -0,6%
0,066 0,001 1,092 0,0008
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,075 * 2,113 0,1575 *** 90,8%
0,020 0,044 233,228 0,0244
Residual - 0,001 17,017 0,0170 9,8%
- 0,022 79,020 0,0221
Overall vertical mobility - 0,074 2,355 0,1735 100,0%
2001 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * -0,003 0,903 -0,0030 -1,7%
0,065 0,003 248,748 0,0027
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * -0,001 1,890 -0,0014 -0,8%
0,065 0,001 891,397 0,0010
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,160 *** 1,104 0,1771 *** 100,9%
0,021 0,050 5,831 0,0167
Residual - -0,037 -0,074 0,0028 1,6%
- 0,023 31,012 0,0244
Overall vertical mobility - 0,119 1,473 0,1755 100,0%
2002 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** 0,001 -0,724 -0,0010 -0,5%
0,063 0,002 41,105 0,0014
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * -0,001 0,196 -0,0002 -0,1%
0,066 0,002 1,105 0,0014
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,057 -2,009 0,1136 *** 59,3%
0,022 0,045 20,603 0,0211
Residual - 0,052 ** 1,525 0,0793 *** 41,4%
- 0,022 4,787 0,0257
Overall vertical mobility - -0,004 -44,785 0,1916 100,0%
Vertical mobility
due to componentECM parameter q P
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% share of overall 
vertical mobility
2003 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * 0,002 0,343 0,0008 0,9%
0,065 0,004 545,419 0,0023
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,001 -0,048 0,0000 0,0%
0,067 0,001 4,105 0,0005
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,119 *** 0,948 0,1131 *** 124,8%
0,022 0,033 0,650 0,0153
Residual - -0,011 2,159 -0,0232 -25,6%
- 0,017 145,990 0,0172
Overall vertical mobility - 0,112 0,810 0,0907 100,0%
2004 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * 0,006 0,290 0,0016 1,9%
0,064 0,004 0,224 0,0016
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,000 -0,804 -0,0001 -0,1%
0,066 0,001 5,047 0,0009
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,039 -2,373 0,0924 *** 106,4%
0,021 0,042 35,463 0,0114
Residual - -0,004 1,967 -0,0071 -8,1%
- 0,022 13,221 0,0214
Overall vertical mobility - 0,037 -2,359 0,0869 100,0%
2005 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * -0,003 0,530 -0,0017 -1,5%
0,064 0,004 295,963 0,0031
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,000 -5,472 0,0007 0,6%
0,066 0,001 50,342 0,0011
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,161 *** -0,545 * 0,0877 *** 76,1%
0,021 0,042 0,286 0,0139
Residual - 0,015 1,950 0,0286 24,8%
- 0,022 12,932 0,0235
Overall vertical mobility - -0,150 -0,771 0,1153 100,0%
2006 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * -0,001 0,430 -0,0004 -0,3%
0,065 0,002 22,526 0,0013
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,000 -0,085 0,0000 0,0%
0,068 0,001 11,427 0,0012
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,187 *** 0,931 *** 0,1741 *** 146,5%
0,022 0,045 0,300 0,0226
Residual - -0,076 *** 0,721 -0,0549 ** -46,2%
- 0,022 0,332 0,0230
Overall vertical mobility - 0,110 1,083 0,1188 100,0%
2007 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 ** 0,001 -0,581 -0,0004 -0,3%
0,060 0,001 846,767 0,0006
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * 0,001 0,412 0,0006 0,5%
0,070 0,001 8,768 0,0009
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,311 *** 0,539 *** 0,1677 *** 124,8%
0,021 0,027 0,059 0,0201
Residual - -0,039 ** 0,851 -0,0335 -24,9%
- 0,017 15,583 0,0204
Overall vertical mobility - 0,274 0,491 0,1344 100,0%
2008 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * 0,007 * 0,006 0,0000 0,0%
0,066 0,004 0,092 0,0006
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * -0,004 0,321 -0,0013 -0,7%
0,065 0,003 0,174 0,0011
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,148 ** -0,909 0,1342 *** 74,5%
0,022 0,058 6,648 0,0149
Residual - 0,034 1,411 0,0473 ** 26,2%
- 0,028 31,766 0,0229
Overall vertical mobility - -0,112 -1,613 0,1802 100,0%
2009 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 * -0,001 2,275 -0,0017 -1,0%
0,063 0,002 41,105 0,0014
! Livestock SGM 0,119 * -0,002 0,568 -0,0012 -0,7%
0,066 0,002 1,105 0,0014
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,016 9,275 0,1475 *** 90,3%
0,021 0,044 1185,881 0,0221
Residual - 0,002 8,417 0,0187 11,4%
- 0,025 21,037 0,0257
Overall vertical mobility - 0,015 10,662 0,1634 100,0%
ECM parameter q P
Vertical mobility
due to component
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Figure 6.9 Absolute contributions to vertical mobility, annual changes 1996-2009. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Percentage contributions to vertical mobility, annual changes 1996-2009. 
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From these results we can conclude that changes in enterprise size structures did not 
play a major role in accounting for annual changes in inequality due to income growth 
over the period of 1996-2010. Whether structural change is also of minor importance 
over longer time horizons is investigated later on with the use of multiyear change 
decompositions.  
 
The disequilibrium error term represents the lagged adjustment of the deviation from 
equilibrium in a previous year. Generally, one can see that the contribution of the 
disequilibrium error to vertical mobility is positive in every year, meaning that the 
adjustment towards equilibrium is always equalizing. As shown in equation (6.11), the 
sign of the contribution from the disequilibrium error will be determined by the 
relationship between the actual inequality and the inequality of equilibrium incomes. 
The equalizing impact of the disequilibrium error implies therefore that the equilibrium 
inequality is smaller than the actual inequality. This is in line with expectations given 
the intuition behind Shorrocks rigidity index (and the results of the index in section 
6.4.2). The long-run inequality is smaller than the actual inequality because transitory 
shocks to income are noise around the equilibrium relationship and they constitute an 
additional source of inequality. The equilibrium relationship (as specified by income 
model from chapter 5) shifts in response to common income shocks in a given year, 
therefore the additional inequality in actual incomes is caused by idiosyncratic income 
shocks. 
 
The contribution of the disequilibrium error is consistently statistically significant at 1% 
level, being the only statistically significant factor in the decomposition. The average 
contribution of the disequilibrium error is 107%, thus it is the main equalizing force 
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behind the progressivity of the individual income growth, in some years being offset 
and it others reinforced by contribution of the residual. 
 
The residual component captures the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks to farms’ 
incomes on vertical mobility. After controlling for time fixed effects and farms fixed 
effects, there should be on average no association between incomes and residuals, and 
therefore residuals capture true random shocks which are on average zero at any given 
level of initial income. This leads to an a priori expectation that the share of the residual 
in vertical mobility should oscillate around zero; this is supported by the fact that the 
contribution was positive in 7 years and negative in 7 years, and that the effect is mostly 
statistically insignificant at 10% level, which implies that idiosyncratic income shocks 
have no systematic impact on expected income growth.  
 
Overall, the results indicate that the majority of vertical mobility is driven by the 
disequilibrium adjustment while the short-run effects of changes in the economic size 
are negligible, indicating the minor role of structural change in annual inequality 
changes. In this context, it is particularly useful to look at a multiyear perspective in 
order to get more insight into the possible role played by structural changes in the 
longer term.  
 
Furthermore, the results of the decomposition of annual vertical mobility reveal no clear 
differences between those for the subperiods 1996-2005 and 2006-2010, implying that 
the introduction of the SPS did not appear have an impact on the contributions of 
income determinants to vertical mobility, or at least not one that could be detected by 
this methodology. The multiyear approach will allow investigating this further. 
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6.4.4.2 Multiyear changes 
 
 
 
The multiyear decomposition is performed using the same subperiods and indices as in 
section 6.4.3.2, that is 1996-2010 to assess the change in inequality for the entire sample 
period, subperiods 1996-2005 and 2006-2010 in order to compare the periods before 
and after the SFP was introduced, and the annual change 2005-2006 which looks 
directly at the year of the SFP introduction. As before, these results are based on 
balanced panel of 151 farms present in the dataset throughout 1996 to 2010, with the 
use of consistent weights for all periods.  
 
Table 6.10 presents the decomposition of vertical income mobility from multiyear 
changes using equation (6.14). from methodology section. The decomposition identifies 
the contributions to vertical mobility of: 
- the combined effect of changes in the economic size of cropping and livestock 
enterprises in the multiyear period,  
- the combined disequilibrium error impact, 
- the combined residual impact.  
 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 plot the results to facilitate interpretation; Figure 6.11 in terms of 
absolute contributions to the vertical mobility index and Figure 6.12 in percentage terms 
as a share of vertical mobility.  
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Table 6.10 Vertical mobility decomposition, multiyear changes. 
 
 
Over the entire sample period 1996-2010, changes in both cropping and livestock shares 
of the economic size served to reduce the inequality. The average growth of SGM for 
cropping enterprises in the entire period was negative; this means that cropping 
enterprises on average got smaller (and hence the share of income from them also 
decreased) and these losses were concentrated among farms with larger initial income. 
For livestock, on the other hand, the positive scale of income changes reflects the fact 
that livestock enterprises grew on average over the entire sample period and 
% share of overall 
vertical mobility
1996 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 -0,009 -0,759 0,0067 5,8%
- 0,075 0,024 6,008 0,0097
2010 ! Livestock SGM 0,119 0,018 0,413 0,0075 6,5%
0,078 0,031 78,715 0,0218
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,001 129,352 0,1269 *** 111,3%
0,032 0,060 146,400 0,0281
Residual - 0,096 -0,281 -0,0270 -23,7%
- 0,071 14,307 0,0435
Overall vertical mobility - 0,106 1,071 0,1140 100,0%
1996 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 -0,002 -3,382 0,0077 4,3%
- 0,075 0,018 9,795 0,0096
2005 ! Livestock SGM 0,119 0,006 -0,926 -0,0054 -3,0%
0,078 0,024 49,510 0,0151
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,156 * -0,927 0,1450 *** 81,5%
0,032 0,086 23,530 0,0330
Residual - 0,024 1,262 0,0307 17,3%
- 0,073 25,636 0,0389
Overall vertical mobility - -0,129 -1,385 0,1780 100,0%
2005 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 -0,009 0,319 -0,0028 -2,7%
- 0,075 0,009 13,469 0,0068
2006 ! Livestock SGM 0,119 -0,001 -1,840 0,0016 1,5%
0,078 0,003 7,972 0,0021
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** -0,176 *** -0,440 0,0775 *** 74,1%
0,032 0,052 0,448 0,0212
Residual - -0,032 -0,874 0,0283 27,1%
- 0,080 6,433 0,0407
Overall vertical mobility - -0,218 -0,479 0,1046 100,0%
2006 ! Cropping SGM 0,123 0,001 0,806 0,0010 2,1%
- 0,075 0,011 25,001 0,0057
2010 ! Livestock SGM 0,119 0,019 0,222 0,0042 8,8%
0,078 0,018 84,795 0,0132
Disequilibrium error 0,494 *** 0,233 *** 0,803 ** 0,1873 *** 397,2%
0,032 0,064 0,323 0,0520
Residual - 0,097 -1,261 -0,1222 *** -259,0%
- 0,070 22,674 0,0420
Overall vertical mobility - 0,069 0,168 0,0472 100,0%
ECM parameter q P
Vertical mobility
due to component
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consequently income growth from these changes was positive; farms with lower income 
in 1996 experienced higher relative growth rates. Changes in both cropping and 
livestock SGM contributed around 6% each to the vertical mobility over this period. 
Although this cumulative result is somewhat higher than for the individual annual 
changes in section 6.4.3, the role of structural change in inequality is still relatively 
minor – jointly growth of both types of enterprises accounted for little over 12% of 
vertical mobility (which is largely due to the relative small contribution of enterprise 
size changes to the overall growth in average income) and the result is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Figure 6.11 Absolute contributions to vertical mobility, multiyear changes. 
 
 
Similarly to the annual change results, the disequilibrium adjustment acted in an 
equalizing manner - specifically through positive income changes that were pro-poor in 
nature, and it is the only factor that is statistically significant. Accordingly, it was the 
main equalizing force behind the progressivity of expected income growth, accounting 
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for more than 100% of overall vertical mobility. The idiosyncratic income shocks had a 
disequalizing impact since they reduced vertical mobility by around 24%, but their 
contribution is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
For the subperiods, the impact of economic size changes is always small and 
statistically insignificant. The disequilibrium error adjustment remains the main 
equalizing force and is consistently statistically significant. The impact of idiosyncratic 
shocks on vertical mobility was statistically insignificant with the exception of 2006 -
2010 period. 
 
Figure 6.12 Percentage contributions to vertical mobility, multiyear changes. 
 
 
The key finding from this analysis is the unimportance of structural change even over 
the full sample period – while its magnitude increases slightly, it is still very small 
compared to the disequilibrium adjustment, and remains statistically insignificant. This 
highlights the dominant impact of transitory shocks over structural change on inequality 
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changes over the studied period. Furthermore, the structural change did not play 
significant role in vertical mobility both before and after the introduction of the SFP.  
 
6.4.5 Equilibrium inequality  
 
 
Modelling the long-run equilibrium income relationship allows us to quantify the extent 
of structural, or chronic, inequality in agricultural incomes. This section starts with a 
discussion of how the equilibrium inequality links with the concept of mobility as 
income risk, followed by an analysis of the determinants of equilibrium inequality. 
 
6.4.5.1 Mobility as income risk 
 
 
Table 6.11 presents the information on mean actual56 and equilibrium incomes in each 
year, as well as the corresponding Gini coefficients. Figure 6.13 provides a graphic 
representation of the two Gini coefficients over time.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.13, the Gini coefficient of the equilibrium incomes is 
lower than that of actual observed incomes in each year of the analysis, with the 
exception of 1997. Like the equalizing impact of disequilibrium error on vertical 
mobility, this indicates that the equilibrium, or chronic, inequality in the industry is less 
than the observed levels of inequality in any given year. The difference between the 
Gini of actual and equilibrium incomes captures the idea of mobility as income risk, 
illustrating the last concept of mobility distinguished by Jantti and Jenkins (2013). This 
concept of mobility closely links with the idea of equalization of longer-term incomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This corresponds to the initial income values earlier on. 
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as shown by Shorrocks rigidity index. In Shorrocks’ case, individual’s income in any 
period is a sum of a permanent and a transitory components, as measured by the longer-
term average and the deviation from it. However, in the case here, the permanent part of 
the income is modelled and is given a behavioural interpretation in the sense that it 
represents expected future income. In this context, the deviation from that expectation, 
the transitory component, represents an unexpected income shock, and the larger the 
dispersion of these shocks across individuals, the larger is income risk for the 
population. In the income model the common shocks to all incomes caused by given 
year’s conditions shift the equilibrium relationship, while the idiosyncratic income 
shocks cause a deviation from this equilibrium (and increase the level of inequality). 
 
Table 6.11 Equilibrium inequality summary indices, 1996-2009. 
 
1996 39096 *** 0,48 *** 42001 *** 0,37 *** 2905 -0,12 !!!
1480 0,02 3032 0,01 3153 0,02
1997 44144 *** 0,44 *** 15069 *** 0,45 *** -29076 *** 0,02
1356 0,01 2183 0,11 2538 0,11
1998 27955 *** 0,52 *** 30891 *** 0,38 *** 2936 -0,13 !!!
1074 0,02 2100 0,02 2189 0,03
1999 29965 *** 0,52 *** 26744 *** 0,44 *** -3221 -0,08 !
1403 0,03 1967 0,03 1971 0,04
2000 26842 *** 0,57 *** 31218 *** 0,36 *** 4375 * -0,21 !!!
1624 0,03 2478 0,02 2620 0,03
2001 27719 *** 0,54 *** 37945 *** 0,37 *** 10225 *** -0,17 ***
1729 0,02 2399 0,02 3129 0,02
2002 31131 *** 0,52 *** 27582 *** 0,40 *** -3550 -0,13 ***
1403 0,02 2606 0,03 2766 0,03
2003 32660 *** 0,47 *** 41547 *** 0,37 *** 8887 *** -0,10 ***
1747 0,02 2528 0,02 2533 0,02
2004 37498 *** 0,46 *** 34646 *** 0,37 *** -2853 -0,09 ***
1613 0,02 2946 0,03 2990 0,03
2005 35877 *** 0,49 *** 25709 *** 0,37 *** -10168 *** -0,12 ***
1735 0,02 2364 0,02 2484 0,03
2006 32302 *** 0,49 *** 46048 *** 0,39 *** 13746 *** -0,11 ***
1539 0,02 3730 0,02 3815 0,03
2007 37130 *** 0,53 *** 69346 *** 0,40 *** 32217 *** -0,13 ***
1742 0,02 4048 0,01 3760 0,02
2008 52203 *** 0,52 *** 38158 *** 0,42 *** -14046 *** -0,11
2315 0,02 4794 0,08 5300 0,09
2009 48785 *** 0,52 *** 50381 *** 0,36 *** 1596 -0,16 ***
2183 0,02 4120 0,02 4415 0,02
Difference between actual 
and equilibrium income 
Gini coefficients (income 
risk proxy)
Mean 
(initial) 
income
Gini 
coefficient of 
the initial 
income 
Mean 
equilibrium 
income
Gini 
coefficient of 
the 
equilibrium 
income 
Average 
difference 
between 
equilibrium and 
actual incomes
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Figure 6.13 Gini coefficients of start and equilibrium incomes, 1996-2009. 
 
 
The crucial difference between the earlier concept of income mobility as a reduction of 
longer-term inequality and that of income risk is its normative interpretation. The 
concept of mobility as reduction of longer-term inequality focuses on the reduction of 
inequality once the transitory shocks are smoothed out. The larger is the difference 
between the inequality of actual incomes and the inequality of long-term average 
incomes, the more exchange mobility there is, and such mobility is generally seen as a 
desirable thing. But there is a flipside to this situation, which has already been pointed 
out by Shorrocks: 
“Changes in relative incomes still tend over time to equalise the distribution of 
total income receipts, and to this extent welfare is improved. But greater 
variability of incomes about the same average level is disliked by individuals 
who prefer a stable flow. So to the extent that mobility leads to more 
pronounced fluctuations and more uncertainty, it is not regarded as socially 
desirable.” 
(Shorrocks, 1978a, p. 392-393) 
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Therefore in the case when individuals are not indifferent between two income streams 
offering the same real present value, which will be the case for risk-averse individuals 
when capital markets are imperfect and consumption cannot be easily smoothed out, the 
uncertainty associated with a fluctuating income stream is undesirable. As such, in spite 
of the long-run inequality-reducing impact of income mobility, mobility might no 
longer be socially desirable if it entails transitory income shocks, since it will also be 
associated with unpredictability and insecurity (Jantti and Jenkins, 2013). In this 
context, an individual might prefer being relatively poorer if his/her income flow is 
more stable overtime, rather than having a higher overall income but with larger 
intertemporal fluctuations. This stems from risk-aversion and preference for income 
stability, which facilitates better planning for the future. 
 
The results show that in most years the share of inequality due to transitory shocks to 
equilibrium income is at least 20%, and it was as high as 37% in 2000. This indicates a 
substantial degree of income risk, and confirms the already mentioned instability of 
agricultural incomes. These figures are slightly higher than the results of Shorrocks 
measure, which indicated that over a longer-period 14% of cross-sectional inequality is 
due to transitory shocks. However, both measures show that transitory shocks do matter 
but overwhelming majority of inequality is structural in nature. 
 
6.4.5.2 Equilibrium inequality decomposition 
 
 
The Gini coefficient of the equilibrium inequality is decomposed in order to gain some 
insight into the determinants of equilibrium inequality. The decomposition is done using 
the coefficients from the equilibrium relationship implied by the income model from 
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chapter 5, following equation (6.15). Table 6.12 reports the contribution of each 
determinant to equilibrium inequality. Figures 6.14 and 6.15 plot these contributions 
and the resultant shares of total equilibrium inequality. 
 
With respect to the economic size variables, the reported results consist of both the 
impact of the base long-run parameter and the slope dummy for a given year of the 
decomposition. These two elements are combined to give the long-run parameter for a 
specific year and represent the share of equilibrium inequality due to the economic size 
of both types of enterprises in a given year.  
 
The decomposition results show that the economic size variables for both cropping and 
livestock enterprises contribute significantly to structural inequality in virtually every 
year. This result is expected – since income is generally a positive function of SGM, 
inequality in the economic size translates into income inequality. For most years, as 
established by the income model, the share of income attributed to these two variables is 
positive, which means that higher values of SGM are associated with higher equilibrium 
income. 
 
Moreover, the concentration indices of the economic size ranked by initial income are 
also positive in most cases, showing that farms of bigger economic size as measured by 
SGM generally have higher equilibrium income levels. This is in line with the results of 
Phimister et al. (2004), who concluded that small economic size of farms was a 
characteristic which increases the probability of long low-income spells.  There are few 
exceptions to this pattern. In both 1997 and 2008 the  share of  income due to  cropping  
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Table 6.12 Equilibrium inequality decomposition, 1996-2009. 
 
% share of
eqilibrium 
inequality
1 Cropping SGM 0,22 * 0,12 0,36 *** 0,04 12,1
9 0,21 0,11 0,12 0,04
9 Livestock SGM 0,59 0,43 0,41 *** 0,18 48,5
6 0,11 0,09 0,04 0,05
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,33 *** 0,43 ** 0,14 *** 39,5
0,17 0,11 0,21 0,04
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,11 *** - - 0,0
987,12 0,03 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,37 100,0
1 Cropping SGM -0,25 -0,40 -0,19 0,08 16,7
9 0,14 0,27 0,16 0,11
9 Livestock SGM 0,06 0,13 * 0,38 *** 0,05 * 10,7
7 0,11 0,25 0,03 0,09
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,97 *** 0,34 * 0,33 *** 72,6
0,17 0,33 0,20 0,12
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,31 *** - - 0,0
957,85 0,09 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,45 100,0
1 Cropping SGM 0,24 0,21 * 0,56 *** 0,12 * 30,7
9 0,14 0,12 0,04 0,07
9 Livestock SGM 0,17 0,17 0,26 *** 0,05 12,0
8 0,11 0,12 0,03 0,03
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,46 *** 0,47 0,22 *** 57,4
0,17 0,17 0,76 0,07
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,15 *** - - 0,0
958,66 0,03 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,38 100,0
1 Cropping SGM 0,30 ** 0,30 ** 0,66 *** 0,20 ** 45,7
9 0,15 0,14 0,03 0,10
9 Livestock SGM -0,01 -0,01 0,14 *** 0,00 -0,4
9 0,11 0,14 0,04 0,02
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,54 *** 0,44 0,24 *** 54,7
0,17 0,20 0,37 0,09
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,17 *** - - 0,0
1005,64 0,04 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,44 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,15 0,13 0,47 *** 0,06 17,4
0 0,15 0,13 0,11 0,06
0 Livestock SGM 0,24 ** 0,26 ** 0,32 *** 0,08 * 23,0
0 0,12 0,13 0,04 0,05
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,46 *** 0,47 0,22 *** 59,6
0,18 0,18 1,10 0,07
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,15 *** - - 0,0
1010,32 0,04 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,36 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,04 0,03 0,24 ** 0,01 2,2
0 0,14 0,11 0,12 0,03
0 Livestock SGM 0,57 *** 0,47 *** 0,43 *** 0,20 *** 54,0
1 0,12 0,10 0,03 0,05
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,37 *** 0,44 0,16 *** 43,8
0,17 0,14 0,55 0,05
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,12 *** - - 0,0
1004,85 0,03 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,37 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,17 0,17 0,56 *** 0,10 24,0
0 0,15 0,15 0,07 0,08
0 Livestock SGM 0,14 0,17 0,27 *** 0,05 11,5
2 0,11 0,13 0,04 0,04
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,49 ** 0,52 0,26 *** 64,4
0,18 0,20 2,74 0,09
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,17 *** - - 0,0
981,75 0,04 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,40 100,0
Equilibrium 
parameter Share of income
Concentration 
index Contribution
	   	  246	  
 
 
Equilibrium 
parameter
Share of
income
Concentration 
index Contribution
% share of
eqilibrium 
inequality
2 Cropping SGM 0,33 ** 0,26 ** 0,49 *** 0,13 ** 35,0
0 0,14 0,11 0,05 0,06
0 Livestock SGM 0,36 *** 0,28 *** 0,28 *** 0,08 *** 21,6
3 0,11 0,09 0,03 0,03
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,34 ** 0,48 0,16 *** 43,4
0,17 0,14 3,08 0,06
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,11 *** - - 0,0
1006,39 0,02 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,37 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,05 0,05 0,18 0,01 2,2
0 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,03
0 Livestock SGM 0,40 *** 0,40 *** 0,42 *** 0,17 *** 45,9
4 0,12 0,12 0,04 0,06
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,42 ** 0,46 0,19 *** 51,9
0,17 0,18 0,44 0,06
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,13 *** - - 0,0
995,76 0,03 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,37 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,04 0,05 0,28 ** 0,01 3,8
0 0,14 0,19 0,12 0,06
0 Livestock SGM 0,15 0,21 0,34 *** 0,07 19,3
5 0,11 0,15 0,05 0,05
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,56 ** 0,50 0,28 *** 77,0
0,17 0,23 0,53 0,08
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,18 *** - - 0,0
1032,44 0,04 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,37 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,52 *** 0,37 *** 0,58 *** 0,22 *** 55,9
0 0,16 0,10 0,04 0,07
0 Livestock SGM 0,25 ** 0,20 ** 0,20 *** 0,04 * 10,5
6 0,11 0,09 0,04 0,02
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,33 ** 0,40 0,13 ** 33,7
0,17 0,13 1,13 0,06
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,10 *** - - 0,0
1021,74 0,02 - -
2 Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,39 100,0
0 Cropping SGM 0,90 *** 0,44 *** 0,59 *** 0,26 *** 65,0
0 0,16 0,07 0,02 0,04
7 Livestock SGM 0,48 *** 0,27 *** 0,21 *** 0,06 *** 14,1
0,12 0,07 0,03 0,02
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,22 ** 0,37 0,08 ** 20,9
0,17 0,09 0,93 0,04
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,07 *** - - 0,0
992,69 0,01 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,40 100,0
2 Cropping SGM -0,06 -0,06 -0,11 0,01 1,7
0 0,20 0,21 0,24 0,07
0 Livestock SGM 0,50 *** 0,53 *** 0,49 *** 0,26 *** 62,1
8 0,12 0,13 0,03 0,08
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,41 ** 0,37 0,15 ** 36,3
0,17 0,19 0,74 0,06
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,12 *** - - 0,0
1000,62 0,03 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,42 100,0
2 Cropping SGM 0,32 ** 0,27 ** 0,48 *** 0,13 ** 35,6
0 0,15 0,12 0,08 0,07
0 Livestock SGM 0,41 ** 0,31 *** 0,30 *** 0,09 *** 25,6
9 0,13 0,10 0,05 0,04
Fixed effect 0,35 ** 0,33 ** 0,43 0,14 *** 38,8
0,17 0,14 0,36 0,05
Constant 4659,10 *** 0,09 *** - - 0,0
1012,97 0,02 - -
Equilibrium inequality - - - 0,36 100,0
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Figure 6.14 Absolute contributions to equilibrium inequality. 
 
 
Figure 6.15 Percentage contributions to equilibrium inequality. 
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SGM is negative57. However, cropping SGM still contributed to inequality in these 
years since the negative share of income was associated with a negative concentration 
index between cropping SGM and income58. Overall, therefore, the unequal distribution 
of enterprise size served to increase the long-term inequality of farming incomes in all 
years except 1999, when the contribution of livestock economic size to inequality was 
slightly below zero. This has been the result of a slightly negative income share (close 
to zero) combined with a positive concentration index59. The role of the economic size 
of cropping and livestock enterprises in equilibrium inequality is not always statistically 
significant, with the contributions to Gini coefficient being statistically different from 
zero roughly half of the times.  
 
Figures 6.14 and 6.15 show there is some variability in the size of the economic size 
contributions, however, overall, averaged across all the years, both cropping and 
livestock shares of the economic size account for around 25% of equilibrium inequality 
each. Therefore on average the economic size of farms is responsible for roughly half of 
the chronic inequality in the studied period. In other words, across the studied years, 
half of the equilibrium inequality within Scottish agricultural incomes was due to 
observable differences in the size of farm businesses, as measured by economic size 
units. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The Scottish Governments economic reports show that these results reflect negative market conditions; 
in 1997 world commodity prices were in general low and in 2008 this was caused by steep decline in 
returns from cereal. 
58 Normally income is a positive function of cropping SGM, but it becomes a negative function of 
cropping SGM these years when it is not profitable. Because this effect was quite strong, it led to an 
overall negative correlation between the level of equilibrium income and the cropping SGM, so the 
concentration index for the two became negative in the two years. 
59 Unlike with the cropping result, the negative share of income from livestock SGM is negligible 
therefore it does not impact on the correlation index which remains positive.  
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This leaves the remaining half of structural inequality to be driven by farm-level fixed 
effects – a proportion that at first might seem surprisingly high. The contribution of the 
fixed effects term is consistently significant at 5% for all the years. In the income model 
used, the fixed effects term will represent two things. Firstly, it captures various factors 
that can affect farms‘ income generating performance but are hard to measure, and 
therefore are not controlled for in the model. The Scottish Government’s Scottish Farm 
Enterprise Performance Analysis (RESAS, 2012) report facilitates the understanding of 
what exactly is included in these unobservable differences. As the report points out, 
there is a multitude of factors which affect farm’s financial performance, including: 
- natural constraints, like quality of land or weather, 
- reasons for farming, for example financial or personal satisfaction, 
- attitudes towards animal welfare and use of chemicals, 
- farms fixed costs, 
- interaction with other enterprises within the farm business, 
- nature of contracts the farm has with food retailers or suppliers. 
 
Secondly, fixed effects also capture differences in workforce composition and land 
ownership structure between farms, which are not taken into account in the calculation 
of SGM but will affect farms’ incomes.  
 
This result indicates that a big driver of chronic inequality in agricultural farming 
income in Scotland is differences in income generating performance of farms that are 
not linked to their economic size.  This important role of fixed effects is consistent with 
the findings presented in the Scottish Farm Enterprise Performance Analysis (RESAS, 
Ibid.), which uses FAS 2010-2011 data. Scottish Government undertook the analysis of 
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enterprise output and associated costs of crops and livestock in order to assess the 
financial performance of the main types of farm enterprises in Scotland.  
 
The report‘s main finding is that there is substantial heterogeneity in farms‘ financial 
performance60, irrespective of size, with high performers achieving better management 
of variable costs, higher sales per tonne of crops or head of animal, reflecting better 
quality, as well as higher yields linked to greater volume of output per hectare for 
cropping enterprises and a greater increase in value due to improved technical 
performance for livestock enterprises.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
 
In studies on agricultural incomes distribution, the focus is usually on static analysis, 
with very few studies looking at the dynamics of inequality over time. Analysing 
inequality in a dynamic context is important in order to characterize the changes in 
inequality over time and what is driving these changes. What is more, studying the 
dynamics of incomes allows to determine whether inequalities are a transitory or 
chronic problem, which will influence implications for policy.  
 
This chapter looked at the evolution of agricultural income distribution through the 
analysis of various aspects of mobility using data for the period of 1995/1996 – 
2009/2010. The results showed high instability of agricultural incomes which was 
reflected in variability of income levels across the years. The relative inequality in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Which is measured using three proxies: enterprise gross margin per head/hectare, the enterprise’s 
income, and output: input ratio which shows how much gross return there is per pound spent per single 
unit of output (head/hectare). 
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agricultural incomes is higher than for representative incomes in the Scottish 
population. The level of inequality has increased by 10% for balanced panel between 
1996 and 2010, but this reflects the choice of particular years rather than systematic 
trend given the fluctuations in inequality levels over the years. 
 
In order to better understand how the transitory shocks impact the inequality picture in 
Scottish agricultural incomes, the Shorrocks rigidity measure was calculated. This index 
corresponds to the concept of mobility as equalizer of longer-term incomes, and uses 
the comparison between inequality of longer-term average of incomes, and actual 
observed incomes which will include the fluctuations caused by transitory income 
shocks. As the measurement period is extended, the proportion of inequality determined 
by the long-term structure of the industry settles at 86%. This means that transitory 
shocks play some role in the inequality levels observed in any given year, but the 
structural inequality in the industry is substantial. 
 
The concepts of mobility as positional movement and individual income growth were 
analysed by decomposing change in inequality between two points in time following 
Jenkins and van Kerm’s (2006) approach. The expected income growth was 
consistently progressive for both annual and multiyear changes, implying that poorer 
farms benefited relatively more from positive income changes, or suffered less from 
negative ones. Robustness checks based on averaging the data showed some mixed 
results, but there was evidence that transitory shocks drive the progressivity result. As 
such, it can be concluded that while expected income growth was progressive, the 
structural change played minor role in this progressivity; larger role was played by 
transitory shocks that caused regression to the mean. This implies there is no systematic 
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size bias in farms’ growth, which indirectly supports Gibrat’s law of proportionate 
effect suggesting that the rate of growth of an enterprise is unrelated to its size and 
therefore determined by random facts. 
 
The decomposition of vertical mobility using the parameters of the ECM estimated in 
Chapter 5 provided additional insights into the drivers of individual income changes 
underlying the evolution of the agricultural income distribution. The contribution of 
growth in the economic size of farms to the vertical mobility was negligible reflecting 
the dominance of transitory shocks as a source of income changes. Measured over the 
multiyear change between 1996 and 2010, the impact of the economic size growth was 
mildly equalizing but still accounted for no more than 12% of total vertical mobility and 
was not statistically significant. This implies that the redistributive effects of structural 
change have been relatively minor even over a long time horizon, which is largely due 
to the relative small contribution of enterprise size changes to the overall growth in 
average income. This minor role of structural changes was consistent for pre and post-
SFP multiyear changes in inequality.  
 
The results further showed that the contribution from the disequilibrium adjustment was 
always equalizing, both for annual and multiyear analysis, implying that the long-run, 
or equilibrium, inequality of the industry is smaller than actual observed inequality. 
This was confirmed by the fact that the Gini coefficient of equilibrium incomes was 
consistently smaller than that of actual incomes. The deviations from equilibrium levels 
of income caused by idiosyncratic income shocks may be interpreted as measures of 
income risk, indicating the unpredictability of incomes and economic insecurity. The 
adjustment towards the equilibrium was the main force behind the equalizing impact of 
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individual income growth, which was then enhanced or impaired by individual income 
shocks (which had a random and statistically insignificant effect), and to a much smaller 
extent, structural change.  
 
Overall, the result of progressivity of income growth in agricultural incomes is not 
driven by the structural change in the industry; it is instead a result of transitory income 
shocks which cause a regression to the mean that appears to favour poorer farmers, 
because farms that face an adverse income shock in one year (and thus have 
unexpectedly low incomes) will have better growth prospects in the following year as a 
result.  Therefore inequality changes in Scottish agricultural incomes are largely driven 
by the adjustment towards the underlying equilibrium relationship which incorporates 
income shocks common to all farmers in a given year, as well as the idiosyncratic 
income shocks experienced by individual farmers. Changes in the economic size of 
farms over time play a relatively minor role. 
 
The decomposition of equilibrium inequality revealed the extent to which it is driven by 
the economic size of farms. While the contribution of the economic size to the 
equilibrium inequality varied between the years, on average over longer period it caused 
around half of the structural inequality. The positive impact of farms’ economic size on 
inequality was expected given that income is a positive function of SGM, however the 
result indicates that only some of the differences between farmers’ incomes come from 
differences in productive capacity. The remaining half of the inequality is due to non-
observable farm or farmer characteristics affecting income generating performance 
unrelated to their economic size, and captured by fixed effects; examples include 
managerial ability and the quality of natural resources on farm. The contribution of 
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fixed effects will also partially reflect the observable workforce composition and land 
ownership structure which are not taken into account in the SGM measure. This has 
policy implications for any solutions to structural inequality in the industry, since 
addressing farms’ economic size differences will not eliminate the inequality entirely.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
One of the founding goals of the CAP was “to ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture” (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The CAP was formed as a continuation 
of national policies and initially consisted only of support in the form of market price 
measures, which determined its path of development for decades to come. Market price 
measures were initially successful at increasing production, which was welcomed after 
the World War II food shortages. However, soon enough the shortcomings of such a 
policy became apparent and European agriculture was beset with surpluses, which 
together with rising budgetary pressure served to increase criticism of the policy and 
pressure for reforms. The agricultural lobby existed prior to the CAP and became 
supranational with its creation; its actions meant that any reforms to the policy had high 
political costs, and this caused divergence between what the academic sector 
recommended and what policy makers actually did. Specifically, the idea of direct 
decoupled payments had already emerged in the academic sector in the 1960s, being 
perceived as an optimal form of subsidy that did not have the shortcomings of market 
price measures, and offered greater transparency and targeting potential. However, the 
process of reforming the policy was long and gradual. The market support measures 
were largely reduced and replaced with payments coupled to hectares planted and heads 
of livestock. Eventually, the decoupled direct payments were introduced in 2005 in the 
form of the SFP, which is independent from production and paid out on a per hectare 
basis.  
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Scotland opted for the historic model of the SFP, where the entitlement values received 
by farmers are determined by their individual historic levels of coupled support, and 
allow them to enjoy support levels comparable to those in the past. The government’s 
choice of this solution was politically motivated by the intention to minimize changes in 
the distribution of support and, specifically, to avoid creating losers from the reform. 
However, the historic model of the SFP implementation has been widely criticized as 
unfair and increasingly hard to justify, and the post-2014 CAP reform obliges countries 
which opted for the historic model to switch to regional flat rate payments. 
 
The introduction of decoupled direct payments made the distribution of support more 
transparent and open to manipulation, giving the policy potential to be targeted in order 
to meet different policy objectives. The policy’s objectives evolved and multiplied over 
time, which together with different national views on what farmers should be rewarded 
for make the assessment of agricultural support in the EU difficult. Nevertheless, the 
improvement of the income position of the agricultural community was one of the 
founding objectives of the policy. Furthermore, equity and targeting were identified by 
the OECD (1998) as general operational criteria for agricultural policy evaluation and 
the European Commission has repeatedly expressed concerns over the inequitable 
distribution of farm income support. The common wisdom on the redistributive impact 
of the CAP is summarised by the OECD (2003), which argues that support does not 
alter the income distribution in significant way since the transfers are mainly based on 
production levels or production factors. In this context, the focus of this thesis was on 
the distribution of agricultural incomes and support in Scotland.  
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The empirical part of the thesis started by estimating the rate of capitalisation of the 
SFP into agricultural rent values in Scotland. The motivation behind this part of the 
study was the improvement of assumptions used in calculating net transfer values while 
measuring the redistributive effect of support later in the thesis. The use of the 
empirically obtained passthrough rate constituted an improvement over the approach 
used by Allanson (2008, Allanson and Rocchi (2008)) who, following the OECD 
(2003), assumed that a return from a unit increase in direct payments to individual 
inputs is equal to the farm-owned share of those inputs; in the case of the SFP for 
tenanted farmers this would imply zero passthrough. Relatively little empirical research 
on the capitalisation rate of the SFP exists, with no estimates for Scotland. As such, the 
empirical rate of capitalisation is of interest in its own right and it adds to the existing 
literature, providing an illustration of the SFP transfer efficiency in Scotland. By 
estimating a rent equation, it was established that the average rate of capitalisation is in 
the proximity of 15 pence per pound of the payment. This means that out of every 
pound received through the SFP, on average a tenant farmer keeps 85 pence and the 
landowner captures 15 pence. This figure is plausible since it lies between the 35% 
capitalisation rate for historic model as suggested by Kilian et al. (2008) and the 6% 
rate as reported by Ciaian et al. (2011); it is also very close to the results of Ciaian and 
Kancs (2012) and Van Herck and Vranken (2011) who analysed the capitalisation rate 
of the SAPS and obtained estimates of 20% and between 10% and 15% respectively. 
 
The thesis moved on to analyse the impact of agricultural policy on income inequality 
by measuring and decomposing its redistributive effect. The majority of research done 
on the redistributive performance of agricultural transfers has largely focused on its 
vertical aspect. The methodology used in this thesis, based on Allanson (2008), not only 
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measures if support is progressive, but also addresses the issue of horizontal inequalities 
in support provision, which is largely neglected by the pre-existing literature. Allanson 
analysed the redistributive effect of support in Scotland prior to 2005, and this thesis 
investigated how the redistributive performance of the policy was affected by the 
introduction of the SFP (with the use of improved procedures to calculate pre-support 
incomes). In addition to the analysis of actual support regime under the historic model 
of the SFP, the thesis analysed two counter-factual distributions of support; a flat rate of 
entitlements for the whole Scotland, or two rates of entitlements, with different values 
for LFA and non-LFA farms. The analysis of regional model redistribution is 
particularly useful in the context of the upcoming CAP reform, since Scotland will have 
to introduce a flat rate payment system of the SFP, and is most likely to opt for a 
solution along the lines of the LFA/non-LFA split of rates. 
 
This analysis exposed the chronic dependence of Scottish agriculture on support, with 
more than half of farms making losses in the absence of support. The results further 
showed that the provision of support in Scottish agriculture increases absolute 
inequality. However, in spite of the historic link to support levels and hence volume of 
production, and the common belief that agricultural support rewards the most 
productive large farms, the support in Scotland under the historic model is actually 
progressive in absolute terms. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that 
agriculture in Scotland would be to a large extent a loss-making activity in the absence 
of support (particularly for some farm types), such that many farms would go out of 
business. The support was in fact regressive for the range of farms that would break 
even without it, but a large number of farms have negative pre-support incomes and the 
policy transfers keep them in business – the high progressivity of support for this range 
	   	  259	  
drives the overall result. In spite of this progressivity, the distribution of support 
increased absolute income differentials because of the presence of large classical 
horizontal inequalities. Specifically, the main source of these inequalities was the 
weakness of the relationship between pre-support incomes and transfer levels within 
each farm type, rather than systematic discrimination between farm types due to 
different commodity regimes. The policy implication of the large within-type horizontal 
inequalities is that policies designed to focus support on farms with low income by 
limiting the size of payments received by large farms under current arrangement, like 
for example modulation, would be largely ineffective (Allanson, 2008).  
 
Overall, the redistributive performance of agricultural support did not change with the 
introduction of the SFP, since the results from the historic model analysis are 
comparable to those reported by Allanson (2008) for years 2001 – 2005. As such, the 
historic model met its initial objective not to drastically change the distribution of 
support in Scotland. 
 
The analysis of the alternative scenarios of the SFP distribution showed that despite 
seeming fairer from a procedural point of view, the regional model would have 
increased inequality more than was the case with the historic model. Of the two 
scenarios considered in the study, the flat rate model was more unequal; the LFA/non-
LFA split of rates scenario mitigated the disequalizing impact reflecting the 
intermediate nature of such a model. 
 
The flat rate scenario resulted in increased progressivity of support, but it increased the 
inequality more than the historic model due to a sharp increase in between-type classical 
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horizontal inequality. This was driven by a large redistribution of support towards 
Sheep and Sheep and Cattle farms, which on average are holdings of large land area 
(and hence with many entitlements) with low entitlement values under the historic 
model. All other farm types lose out from the flat rate, and this causes an increase in the 
number of farms with post-support losses. Thus the flat rate does not manage to make 
farms break even as well as the historic model and may therefore threaten the survival 
of some farms.  
 
The analysis of the LFA/non-LFA version of the regional model suggests that using two 
rates rather than one could mitigate some of the problems of the flat rate scenario. The 
LFA/non-LFA model constitutes an intermediate solution which would have limited the 
extent of support redistribution relative to the historic model, as reflected in the smaller 
increase in the progressivity of support and lower between-type discrimination. This 
model of distribution also generated less post-support loss making farms in most years 
compared to the flat rate. However, while non-LFA holdings would benefit from 
differential rates, LFA farms other than Specialist Sheep and Sheep and Cattle farms 
would be highly disadvantaged, since averaging their entitlement values with low 
entitlement values of Specialist Sheep and Sheep and Cattle farms (without non-LFA 
farms bringing the average up) would significantly reduce their transfer levels.  
 
The crucial policy conclusion from this set of results is that the sharp increase in 
discrimination between different farm types implies that the continued production of 
some commodities might be at risk under the regional model distribution. Policy makers 
and farms organisations have expressed concerns about the profitability of certain 
enterprises, most notably cattle production, under the regional model. These results give 
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support to these concerns and suggest that policy makers in Scotland should consider 
using the coupled support options available under new post-2014 CAP regime. In 
particular, the concerns over profitability of cattle farming under the regional model are 
supported, since both flat rate and LFA/non-LFA versions make Specialist Cattle farms 
worse off, and the impact is worse under the latter scenario. 
 
More generally, the choice of variable to indicate unobservable income-generating 
capacity is a crucial aspect of successful support targeting. Particularly, if the goal of 
agricultural policy is to ensure a minimum standard of living for farmers by supporting 
those with the lowest incomes, an indicator capable of identifying these farmers is 
necessary. The results of this analysis indicate that land is a poor choice, particularly in 
the light of heterogeneity of farms with regards to the relationship between land and 
productivity, and hence the income they are capable of generating. Therefore any 
solution looking to target the support in an efficient and effective manner would be 
dependent on finding an indicator for payment entitlements which is more strongly 
correlated to income generating capacity (Allanson, 2008). As such, splitting land into 
different quality types provides a marginal improvement over treating all land the same, 
but it does not solve the problems of flat rate, and creates even worse problems for some 
farms and the viability of cattle production. In this context, the historic model of the 
SFP seems to be performing better at targeting support to the most needing farms, since 
it results in the lowest percentage of post-support loss making holdings. Overall, further 
work is required to identify clear criteria and gain better information concerning the 
incidence and causes of financial problems among farms in order for the decoupled 
payments to become the most efficient solution, as suggested by the OECD (2003). 
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The static analysis described the income distribution at given points in time, revealing 
the disequalizing impact of agricultural support. However, a more comprehensive 
characterization of agricultural income situation can be obtained when static analysis is 
complemented by the study of the evolution of income distribution over time.  
 
Agricultural income dynamics, particularly in Scotland, are a largely unexplored 
research topic. Indeed, the only study of Scottish agricultural income dynamics is 
performed by Phimister et al. (2004) for the period from 1998/1989 to 1999/2000. This 
thesis used data for years 1995/1996 to 2009/2010 to explore all four concepts of 
mobility (as distinguished by Jantti and Jenkins), providing a comprehensive analysis of 
the issue. 
 
To set the ground for the analysis, an ECM of farm income was estimated in chapter 5; 
results from the model were subsequently used for regression-based decompositions of 
vertical mobility and equilibrium income inequality indices. The specification of the 
dynamic income function focused on the role played by the economic size of farms, 
which later on allowed analysing the role of structural change in inequality changes.  
 
Over the sample period 1995/1996 – 2009/2010 average income level showed a 
considerable amount of variation, confirming the instability of agricultural incomes. 
The relative inequality in agricultural incomes is higher than for representative incomes 
in the Scottish population. The level of inequality has increased by 10% for balanced 
panel between 1996 and 2010, but this reflects the choice of particular years rather than 
systematic trend given the fluctuations in inequality level over the years. In general, the 
extent of inequality and redistribution observed in any particular year is influenced both 
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by underlying structural factors and by temporary stochastic shocks to incomes. 
Discriminating between these two factors is crucial for policy design since the first 
requires action to deal with the chronic, structural problems that capture some farms in 
the low or negative incomes range, while the second might call for short-term assistance 
to tackle transitory problems of low or negative incomes on individual farms. The 
results indicated that transitory shocks affected the observed level of inequality to a 
moderate extent, with long-term structural inequality in the sector settling at 86% of 
cross-sectional inequality, as indicated by Shorrocks rigidity measure. The role of 
transitory shocks in observed levels of inequality was confirmed by the fact that the 
inequality of equilibrium incomes based on the empirical results from the ECM was 
consistently smaller than that of actual incomes. This finding points out the issue of 
income risk linked to the unpredictability of incomes and economic insecurity. In the 
presence of imperfect capital markets, which do not allow to smooth out intertemporal 
consumption, and risk-aversion of individuals, a more stable income flow with lower 
overall value will be preferred to a higher expected value with more fluctuations and 
uncertainty. What this result implies is that insurance mechanisms to smooth incomes 
would also serve to reduce inequality in annual farm incomes.  
 
The results from the inequality change decomposition imply that expected individual 
income growth was consistently pro-poor; as such, the relative inequality increased 
when the disequalizing impact of the resulting reranking of individuals more than offset 
the equalizing impact of income growth. However, the sensitivity analysis suggested 
that the majority of the apparent progressivity in expected income growth was due to 
transitory shocks to incomes causing regression to the mean rather than due to structural 
change in the industry. The regression-based decomposition of vertical mobility index 
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further confirmed that the progressivity of income growth in agricultural incomes is not 
driven by changes in the economic size of enterprises. Instead, the progressivity is 
largely a result of the adjustment towards the underlying, more equal, equilibrium 
relationship (which varies depending on shocks common to all farmers in a given year) 
and transitory income shocks experienced by individual farmers. Overall, these results 
do not provide evidence against Gibrat’s law of no systematic size bias in terms of 
expected income growth rates. 
 
The analysis of the determinants of equilibrium income inequality revealed that only 
half of it is due to differences in the economic size of farms, with the other half of it 
driven by farms’ fixed effects that include factors such as managerial ability, farms’ 
natural resources and structure of ownership of the production factors. Thus the fixed 
effects allow for differences between farms in converting the economic size of farms 
into income, and the results indicate these differences are substantial. This implies that 
the economic size of farms is not a sufficient indicator of farms’ financial situation. 
Therefore while measures based on the economic size of enterprises could to some 
extent be used to target support to smaller and poorer farmers, the large role played by 
fixed effects suggests that such policies would not eliminate inequality entirely.  
 
This result links with the large role played by within-type horizontal inequalities in the 
disequalizing redistributive effect of agricultural support in Scotland. Given the historic 
link between the levels of support received and the economic size of enterprises 
(through area and headage payments which served as a basis for the SFP entitlements), 
the large within-type inequality implies the differences between farms in productivity 
which disturb the one-to-one relationship between pre-support incomes and transfer 
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levels. Thus these two results are a manifestation of the same phenomenon which 
indicates the difficulty for both eliminating structural inequality and targeting support 
with the use of policies that employ economic size variables as indicators.  
 
In terms of final summary, the idea of support in the form of direct decoupled payments 
emerged in the academic sector already in the 1960s and it has been perceived as an 
optimal form of subsidies that do not have the shortcomings of market price measures. 
With some implementation difficulties, the idea was slowly put in practice in the EU. 
The current shape of the policy makes it both more open to manipulation for targeting 
purposes and to scrutiny in order to assess its performance. How it performs on other 
grounds is beyond the scope of this paper, but the inequality analysis shows that support 
increases absolute income differentials in the historic form of implementation. 
Switching to a flat rate of payments, which might seem more fair from procedural point 
of view, would results in even more inequalities. This shows that decoupled support 
performs poorly on equity grounds when past support levels determine its value, 
however, using land only as an indicator makes it even more disequalizing. The 
dynamic analysis further shows that introducing the decoupled payment did not 
significantly impact the mobility aspects of agricultural income. The instability of 
agricultural incomes has been an issue over the years, and the incidence of income 
shocks has dominant impact on inequality levels, with structural change playing a minor 
role both before and after introduction of the SFP. This suggests that in order to 
improve its equalizing performance, support should include explicit security 
mechanisms to protect farmers from transitory shocks.  
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The thesis also pointed out the difficulty of using the economic size of farms, which 
captures their productive capacity, to target support and design policy measures meant 
to eliminate the inequality in income distribution. What needs mentioning in the context 
of this discussion is the inherent trade-off between productivity and equity. While 
linking support to the economic size of farms might not solve the equity issues of 
agricultural income distribution, it will be consistent with the idea of awarding the most 
productive farmers for their provision of public goods and to compensate their higher 
costs linked to operating in highly regulated market, which some stakeholders of the 
agricultural policy stage are advocating (Pack, 2010b).  
 
In terms of critical discussion of the thesis, the nature of the data used needs to be 
addressed. In spite of using weighted samples, there is always risk of biased sample 
which might produce unrepresentative results, particularly in the part of the analysis 
which uses limited samples. The fact that only full time farms are included in the FAS 
dataset means that the picture of broader agricultural community might be 
misrepresented, and the pluriactivity of farmers is played down. Furthermore, the 
inequality analysis will apply more to the profitability of farming rather than actual 
financial situation of farmers, seeing as many farms have additional sources of income 
but they are not included in the dataset. Furthermore, the analysis uses current 
agricultural incomes and the inequality of wealth is not taken into account, which might 
result in a misrepresentation of farmers’ welfare. What is more, different measures of 
income will lead to different set of results; choice of cash income focuses on the income 
position as perceived by the farmers, but it does not control for the fact that farms which 
do not need to rent land and hire labour will be better off in the analysis which uses this 
measure. In terms of structural change analysis, the panel is rather narrow and stable in 
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the sense that farms which undergo drastic size change are removed from the dataset or 
given another number, which makes them lose their earlier identity. This means that the 
results are likely to play down the real size of structural change happening in the sector. 
 
The results of inequality analysis are always very sensitive to the choice of inequality 
measure. Accordingly, if measures with other degree of inequality aversions were used, 
the results would be different. Specifically, the shortcomings of the Gini coefficients are 
that it is most sensitive to inequalities in the middle of the income distribution and it is 
unable to differentiate different kinds of inequalities (Lorenz curves might intersect, 
which would reflect different patterns of income distribution, but they might still result 
in very similar values of the Gini coefficient) (De Maio, 2007). Furthermore, the 
analysis in chapter 4 focused on absolute inequality and in chapter 6 on relative 
inequality, while perhaps both types of inequality analysis for both chapters could 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the income distribution issues. 
 
The weakness of the redistributive effect analysis in the thesis is that it does not 
endogenise the production choices to changes in policy when alternative support and 
pre-support distributions are analysed. Thus the work here could be taken forward by 
endogenising these impacts, along the lines of work by Deppermann et al. (2013). 
 
In terms of the dynamic analysis, one might wish to study in more depth the nature of 
fixed effects to get a more detailed understanding of what is driving structural inequality 
so as to better inform the design of policy solutions to tackle farm income inequality. 
Furthermore, the decomposition of vertical mobility and equilibrium inequality could be 
done on an alternative dynamic model of income, where change in income is a function 
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of different sources of income, including various types of agricultural support. Such an 
analysis would provide a more explicit assessment of agricultural policy’s role in 
agricultural income inequality changes. 
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AB                     Arellano-Bond 
ADLM                         Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model  
BB                     Blundell-Bond 
BSE     Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (aka mad cow disease) 
CAP          Common Agricultural Policy 
COGECA              General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives 
COPA           Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations 
ECC              European Economic Community 
ECM                  Error Correction Model 
FADN           Farm Accountancy Data Network 
FAS                   Farm Accounts Survey 
FMD                Foot-and-Mouth Disease  
FE             Fixed Effects 
GATT           General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
HI           Horizontal Inequality 
LCA                Land Capability for Agriculture 
LFA           Less-Favoured Areas 
LSDVC             Bias-corrected Least Square Dummy Variable 
NC                  National Ceiling 
OECD           Organisation for Cooperation and Development 
OLS                  Ordinary Least Squares 
OLSfe               Ordinary Least Squares with fixed effects modelled 
RESAS        Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services 
SAC         Scottish Agricultural College 
SAPS            Simplified Area Payment Scheme 
SEERAD        Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department 
SFP             Single Farm Payment 
SGM                  Standard Gross Margin 
SGRERAD         Scottish Government Rural and Environment Research            
and Analysis Directorate 
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